Chapter Thirty-Five: The Reign of Bahram V (420–438 AD): Political Dynamics, Religious Tensions, and Military Strategy in the Late Sasanian Empire

The Reign of Mohammad Shah Qajar (1834–1848) and the Early Germination of Constitutional Thought

One year after the death of Abbas Mirza, his father, Fath-Ali Shah Qajar, died on Thursday, October 23, 1834, at the age of sixty-three, after a reign of thirty-seven years. In the wake of his death, the throne passed to his grandson, Mohammad Shah Qajar, the son of Abbas Mirza, who ascended with the decisive support of the Farahani statesman Haji Mirza Aqasi.

The succession did not unfold in a purely domestic context. Both the Russian and British governments had previously recognized Abbas Mirza as the legitimate heir to the Persian throne in their diplomatic arrangements with Iran. Consequently, their representatives—John Campbell and Ivan Simonich—extended political and, where necessary, military support to ensure a smooth transfer of power to Mohammad Shah. Their intervention was guided less by dynastic loyalty than by strategic calculation: any contest among rival princes risked destabilizing Iran, potentially undermining existing treaties and disrupting the commercial and geopolitical interests of both empires. More broadly, unrest in Iran threatened to reverberate across the fragile balance of power in Europe.

This alignment of Anglo-Russian interests is clearly reflected in contemporary diplomatic correspondence. On January 28, 1834, Sir John Duncan Bligh wrote to Lord Palmerston, reporting that the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Karl Nesselrode, was deeply concerned about the succession crisis in Iran. Both governments, Bligh noted, shared an interest in preventing disorder and therefore sought a coordinated policy.

Palmerston, in turn, articulated a clear framework for Anglo-Russian cooperation. The death of Abbas Mirza before formally securing the succession had reopened the question of legitimacy, inviting competing claims from various princes and factions. Given the high stakes, Palmerston argued that neither Britain nor Russia could afford to remain passive. Each power would inevitably be drawn into supporting rival claimants unless a prior understanding was reached. It was therefore, in his view, essential that both governments reconcile their interests and jointly endorse a single კანდიდატი.

Reports from Tehran suggested that the Russian envoy favored Mohammad Mirza, the son of Abbas Mirza. Palmerston indicated that the British government was prepared to support the same кандидат, seeing him as the most capable and politically viable . He further instructed that this convergence be communicated to the Russian court, emphasizing Britain’s satisfaction with the emerging unity of policy. In August 1834, Nesselrode confirmed this alignment in a letter to Palmerston, expressing approval of Britain’s موقف and instructing the Russian envoy in Iran to cooperate closely with his British counterpart.

Meanwhile, developments on the ground reflected these broader diplomatic maneuvers. According to reports by British officials, a small contingent of British officers —originally dispatched to support Abbas Mirza—arrived in Bushehr in January 1834. Following Abbas Mirza’s death, Fath-Ali Shah Qajar ordered them to proceed to join Mohammad Mirza, the designated heir, who had already departed for Tabriz shortly after his formal recognition as successor. Among these officers were Justin Sheil and Franz Farrant, both of whom would later play notable roles in British-Iranian relations.

Despite this external enmity, serious internal challenges remained. Campbell himself expressed doubts regarding Mohammad Shah’s ability to consolidate power. In his reports, he observed that the royal treasury was depleted, soldiers had gone unpaid for extended periods, and the Persian army had been severely weakened by prolonged campaigns in Khorasan.

In response, Palmerston sought to strengthen the new ruler’s position by dispatching John Lindsay Bethune, a capable and experienced Scottish officer, to reorganize and rebuild the Persian military. Bethune had previously served in Iran and had been awarded the Order of the Lion and the Sun by Fath-Ali Shah. Now reappointed to assist the new regime, he initiated orders for substantial quantities of military equipment, including rifles, artillery, and munitions. Although the British government ultimately reduced the حجم of these provisions, the effort reflected a broader commitment to stabilizing Mohammad Shah’s rule.

At the same time, Britain pursued diplomatic and commercial objectives. James Baillie Fraser was sent to Iran to negotiate a strategic and commercial treaty. However, Campbell, then serving as British minister in Tehran, expressed reservations about initiating such negotiations amid the uncertainty following Abbas Mirza’s death. His hesitation drew criticism from Henry Ellis and Palmerston, both of whom increasingly viewed him as ineffective in advancing British interests and coordinating policy with Russia.

Fraser, in his correspondence with Charles Grant, further criticized Campbell’s conduct, noting that his diplomatic approach had alienated the Qajar court and failed to secure influence with the heir apparent in Tabriz—an area where Russian representatives had been more successful. These accumulating concerns ultimately led Palmerston to replace Campbell. In 1835, Henry Ellis was appointed as the new British envoy to Iran, marking a shift toward a more assertive and coordinated Anglo-Russian engagement in Qajar affairs.

Viscount John Palmerston, British Foreign Secretary in 1839

Consolidation of Power in Tabriz and the March to Tehran

In Tabriz, the arrival of John Lindsay Bethune in April 1834 (1214 AH) to assume command under the authority of the heir apparent, Mohammad Shah Qajar, was accompanied not by order but by discord within the British military mission. Tensions quickly emerged between Bethune and Major Passmore, who had erroneously assumed that Bethune would fall under his command. This misunderstanding soon escalated into open conflict.

Reports indicate that Passmore actively obstructed Bethune’s efforts, even preventing the disbursement of Persian financial support intended for the reorganization of the army. In a letter dated August 18, 1834, addressed to British authorities in India, Passmore complained that Bethune had failed to properly report his arrival through subordinate channels—a criticism  that appears to have masked deeper issues of authority and resentment.

John Campbell, the British envoy, viewed Passmore’s conduct as insubordinate and detrimental to British objectives. In correspondence and conversations—such as his exchange with Henry Rawlinson—Campbell expressed astonishment that Passmore could have misunderstood the chain of command. He emphasized that he had personally introduced Bethune as the officer responsible for conveying the orders of Mohammad Mirza to the British contingent. Ultimately, Passmore’s continous defiance led to his dismissal, and he was compelled to accept Bethune’s superior authority.

Meanwhile, momentous developments were unfolding. News of the death of Fath-Ali Shah Qajar reached Tabriz in October 1834. Shortly thereafter, both Campbell and the Russian envoy, Ivan Simonich, formally congratulated Mohammad Mirza on his accession. With foreign backing secured, preparations were rapidly made for his advance toward Tehran to consolidate power.

Bethune was placed in a key military position, overseeing artillery and playing a central role in organizing a force reportedly numbering around 24,000 men. Yet the weakness of the royal treasury posed a serious obstacle. To facilitate the swift انتقال of power, Campbell himself provided a substantial sum—reportedly 30,000 liras—to finance the march.

The succession, however, was contested. According to contemporary accounts, including that of the British merchant Edward Burgess, Ali Mirza Qajar, an uncle of Mohammad Shah, seized the late monarch’s treasury in Tehran, proclaimed himself “Adel Shah,” and dispatched a force of approximately 5,000 men to block the advance from Tabriz. This challenge proved short-lived: upon encountering Mohammad Shah’s army, many of these troops defected. Zill al-Sultan was forced to submit, and other princes—including Bahman Mirza Qajar, the شاه’s brother—rallied to the new ruler.

The British historian Percy Sykes provides a vivid account of this critical moment. He observes that the death of Fath-Ali Shah unleashed a wave of rival claims, notably from princes such as Farmanfarma and Zill al-Sultan. Yet, in Sykes’s interpretation, the decisive factor in Mohammad Shah’s success was the coordinated support of the British and Russian envoys. Backed financially and militarily, and guided by Bethune’s command, the new Shah was able to advance steadily toward Tehran.

The visible alignment of British and Russian representatives with Mohammad Shah had a powerful psychological effect. Supporters of rival claimants rapidly deserted them, and Zill al-Sultan submitted without prolonged resistance. Farmanfarma proved a more persistent opponent, mobilizing tribal forces in central and western Iran. However, these irregular troops were no match for the reorganized royal forces equipped with modern muskets and artillery. Defeated in the field, Farmanfarma attempted to flee but was eventually captured; he died en route to imprisonment in Ardabil.

The Arrival of Dr. John McNeill and the Expansion of British Influence

Following Mohammad Shah’s accession, changes within the British diplomatic establishment signaled a more assertive phase of engagement. Henry Ellis was appointed to replace Campbell and traveled to Iran to formally congratulate the Shah.

At the same time, the British government turned its attention to a figure who would soon play a significant—and controversial—role in Iranian affairs: John McNeill. Formerly a physician attached to British forces in Persia, McNeill was encouraged to enter diplomatic service. On February 10, 1835, Arthur Wellesley, then serving in Robert Peel’s government, advised McNeill to proceed to Persia while maintaining his ties to the East India Company as a precaution.

The advice reflected both opportunity and uncertainty. Wellington reportedly suggested that McNeill’s advancement would depend not only on his performance in Persia but also on the outcome of British domestic politics. Indeed, the انتقال of power later in 1835, which brought William Lamb to the premiership and restored Lord Palmerston to the Foreign Office, reshaped the trajectory of British policy in Iran.

Under Palmerston’s direction, McNeill was appointed not merely as a subordinate official but as a future envoy with significant authority. He resigned from the East India Company and departed for Iran on June 5, 1836, arriving in Tehran later that year. His arrival coincided with a new phase in Mohammad Shah’s reign: the campaign against Herat, a अभियान that would draw Iran into a broader geopolitical contest with Britain.

McNeill, however, initially faced diplomatic obstacles. The Shah, encamped with his army, restricted access to foreign envoys, preventing McNeill from formally presenting his credentials in person. Despite this early limitation, his presence in Tehran marked the beginning of a more intrusive and strategically driven British role in Qajar Iran—one that would soon become deeply entangled in the crisis of Herat and the wider dynamics of Anglo-Russian rivalry.

Dr. John McNeill

Dr. John McNeill: Character, Perceptions, and Strategic Mandate

Beneath a cultivated façade of professional civility, John McNeill emerges in the historical record as a complex and controversial figure—shrewd, calculating, and deeply embedded in the political designs of British imperial policy. Trained as a physician, McNeill’s role in Iran extended far beyond medical service. He was actively engaged in political intelligence, diplomatic maneuvering, and the shaping of British strategy in the region.

Even prior to his formal diplomatic appointment, McNeill had participated in efforts to influence Iranian policy. British sources suggest that he sought to dissuade Abbas Mirza from pursuing military ambitions toward Herat—an issue of acute strategic importance to Britain, given its implications for the security of India. Some contemporaries and later commentators have gone further, alleging that McNeill played a role in the provokation of anti-Russian sentiment surrounding the killing of Alexander Griboyedov in Tehran in 1829, although such claims remain debated and should be treated with caution in the absence of definitive documentary evidence.

What is less ambiguous, however, is the tone of McNeill’s private correspondence. In a letter dated April 17, 1821, to Andrew Robinson, he expressed a deeply critical—indeed dismissive—view of Iranian society. He described Iranians as possessing an inflated sense of civilizational superiority, coupled, in his view, with a readiness to employ deception in pursuit of even minor advantages. Such remarks, while reflective of prevailing orientalist attitudes within segments of the British establishment, also illuminate the subjective framework through which McNeill interpreted Iranian political behavior.

Upon his appointment, McNeill was entrusted by the British Foreign Office with a broad and strategically significant mandate. His instructions included:

• Coordinating with British representatives at the Ottoman Empire to manage potential disputes between Iran and neighboring powers.

• Initiating negotiations with the Iranian government regarding commercial agreements and the revision of existing political treaties.

• Discouraging Iranian expansionist ambitions—particularly toward Afghanistan—and redirecting the Shah’s attention toward internal administrative and economic reform.

• Pressing for the settlement of Iran’s financial obligations to Russia, a matter with implications for regional stability.

• Offering British mediation in disputes between Iran and Afghanistan.

• Monitoring and, where appropriate, supporting Polish émigrés who might seek refuge in Iran following uprisings in Europe.

• Maintaining communication with British diplomatic missions in Saint Petersburg and Constantinople, as well as with the Governor-General of India and the directors of the East India Company.

These directives reveal the extent to which Iran had become embedded within a wider geopolitical framework. British policy was not merely reactive but sought actively to shape Iran’s strategic orientation—limiting its external ambitions while encouraging forms of  interna; consolidation that aligned with British interests.

Early Currents of Modernization under Mohammad Shah

At the same time, Iran during the reign of Mohammad Shah Qajar was tentatively entering the early phases of structural transformation. Although constrained by fiscal weakness and political fragmentation, the period witnessed initial efforts toward technological and economic modernization.

Among these developments were the early extraction and processing of mineral resources—particularly iron—using more systematic methods than in previous periods. Efforts were made to establish iron-smelting facilities capable of producing military materiel such as cannonballs and ammunition, reflecting the government ongoing concern with military reform. industries associated with textiles, including silk production, also received attention.

In the realm of education, the gradual introduction of European pedagogical models began to take shape, with the establishment of institutions influenced by French and, to a lesser extent, American practices. Although still limited in scope, these schools represented an important transition toward new forms of knowledge transmission.

Agricultural expansion and reform likewise formed part of the broader attempt to stabilize the economy and enhance state capacity. While these initiatives remained embryonic and often uneven in their implementation, they nonetheless signaled the emergence of a reformist impulse—one that would, in later decades, contribute to the intellectual and institutional foundations of constitutional thought in Iran.

Mohammad Shah and the Persian Court at the Beginning of His Reign

At the outset of his reign, Mohammad Shah Qajar faced the delicate task of consolidating authority within a court marked by factional rivalries and lingering resentments. Central to these tensions was his relationship with the powerful statesman Mirza Abolqasem Qaem-Maqam Farahani. Although Qaem-Maqam had played a decisive role in securing the prince’s accession, their relationship deteriorated rapidly after Mohammad Shah’s enthronement.

The شاه harbored deep grievances against Qaem-Maqam, rooted in earlier perceived slights during his tenure in Azerbaijan, where the minister had, in the prince’s view, failed to show appropriate deference. Once crowned, Mohammad Shah grew increasingly distrustful of his formidable وزیر, whose political independence and administrative authority appeared to overshadow the monarch himself. Court intrigues and personal animosities compounded this mistrust, gradually isolating Qaem-Maqam from the شاه’s inner circle.

This tension culminated in a dramatic and decisive act. In Safar 1251 AH (June 1835), Qaem-Maqam was summoned to the Negarestan Palace in Tehran. Upon his arrival, he was arrested and imprisoned. Within days—on the night of Saturday of that same month—he was executed by strangulation. His death marked the elimination of one of the most capable and reform-minded administrators of the early Qajar period. He was subsequently buried near the shrine of Abd al-Azim al-Hasani in Rey.

Following Qaem-Maqam’s execution, the office of grand vizier passed to Haji Mirza Aqasi, a figure whose rise reflected a markedly different model of political authority. Unlike his predecessor, Aqasi was less a bureaucratic statesman than a mystically inclined advisor whose influence over the Shah derived from personal devotion and spiritual authority.

Born in 1784 (1198 AH) in Iravan, Aqasi was the son of a cleric and received his early education within religious circles. He later became a disciple of Mulla Abd al-Samad Hamedani, under whom he developed a reputation for asceticism and mystical learning. After his teacher’s death, Aqasi continued his studies and embarked on extended travels, reportedly adopting the attire and practices of a dervish. He visited the holy cities of Mecca and Medina before returning to Azerbaijan, where he gradually established connections among local elites.

It was in this context that Aqasi entered the orbit of the crown prince Mohammad Mirza. The prince developed a strong personal attachment to him, not only as a teacher in matters of religious and ethical conduct but also as a spiritual guide. According to contemporary accounts, Aqasi is even said to have foretold Mohammad Mirza’s eventual accession—a claim that further deepened the Shah’s trust in him.

Once enthroned, Mohammad Shah elevated Aqasi to the highest office of the state and granted him extraordinary influence. Unlike Qaem-Maqam, whose authority rested on administrative competence and political experience, Aqasi’s power derived from the شاه’s personal devotion. The monarch treated him with exceptional reverence and refrained from imposing the conventional responsibilities expected of a grand vizier. Aqasi’s counsel often superseded that of all other officials, and his pronouncements carried decisive weight in court affairs.

The transition from Qaem-Maqam to Aqasi thus represents more than a смена of personnel; it reflects a fundamental shift in the nature of governance at the Qajar court—from bureaucratic рациональность toward a more personalistic and spiritually inflected mode of rule.

Before turning to the broader consequences of Qaem-Maqam’s execution and examining Aqasi’s tenure in greater detail, it is also necessary to consider the role of external actors—most notably Ivan Simonich, whose influence would prove significant in shaping the political trajectory of Iran during these formative years of Mohammad Shah’s reign.

Count Ivan Simonich and Russian Strategy in Qajar Iran

Ivan Simonich (Ivan Osipovich Simonich), who arrived in Iran in 1832 in the aftermath of the قتل of Alexander Griboyedov, was a figure whose background and temperament set him apart from conventional diplomats. Born in Dalmatia (in present-day Croatia), Simonich had, in his youth, served in the армии of Napoleon Bonaparte before being captured by Russian forces during the Napoleonic Wars. Subsequently integrated into the Russian military—particularly in artillery—he developed a career shaped more by martial experience than by diplomatic training. He was reportedly wounded in earlier campaigns in the Caucasus, including engagements involving Persian forces, which left him physically impaired and reinforced his demanding and militarized outlook.

Simonich’s tenure in Iran reflected this background. Unlike traditional envoys concerned primarily with protocol and negotiation, he approached his mission through a strategic and quasi-military lens. His primary concern was not merely the development of Russo-Persian trade but the consolidation of Russian influence within Iran as part of a broader imperial design. In this respect, he resembled earlier Russian commanders such as Aleksey Yermolov, who emphasized coercive power and strategic positioning over diplomatic subtlety.

This orientation did not go unnoticed. His successor, Alexander Duhamel, later criticized Simonich in stark terms, suggesting that few less suitable figures could have been chosen to represent Russian interests in so sensitive a geopolitical environment. Such criticism centered on Simonich’s limited appreciation for diplomatic nuance and his tendency to conflate political representation with military command.

Indeed, Simonich’s role extended beyond that of a conventional envoy. Evidence suggests that he operated in close coordination not only with the Russian Foreign Ministry but also with multiple military authorities, including regional commands connected to Orenburg and the Caucasus. These linkages tied his mission to broader Russian strategic thinking in Asia, particularly the ambitions associated with figures such as Ivan Paskevich, whose campaigns in the late 1820s helped define Russia’s expanding frontier.

Within this framework, Iran occupied a pivotal position. Russian strategic planners increasingly viewed access to the منابع and routes of India—and ultimately to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean—as essential to enhancing their position vis-à-vis European rivals. Simonich appears to have internalized this vision. Drawing upon historical precedent, he reportedly invoked the example of Nader Shah’s campaign into India as evidence that, under favorable conditions, a renewed eastward thrust might again be conceivable. In this context, Afghanistan—particularly regions such as Herat—assumed critical importance as a geopolitical gateway.

British observers were quick to register the implications of Simonich’s activism. John McNeill, upon his return to Iran, remarked on the marked expansion of Russian influence at the Qajar court, noting that it was accompanied by a corresponding decline in British standing. Although McNeill disagreed with Russian ambitions, he nonetheless acknowledged the strategic significance of Afghanistan and repeatedly warned Lord Palmerston of the need to establish a defensive buffer to protect British India. From this perspective, the separation of Herat and Kandahar from Iranian control became a central objective of British policy.

Simonich’s conduct further reflected his adversarial stance toward Britain. He pursued Russian objectives with persistence and, at times, overt rigidity. While his personal views of Iranian society appear to have been shaped by the prejudices common among European officials of the period, he nevertheless cultivated close working relationships with key figures at the Qajar court. His methods, however, occasionally departed from established diplomatic conventions. Contemporary reports indicate that his behavior—such as adopting unfamiliar modes of courtly interaction—could unsettle both European colleagues and Iranian officials alike. These irregularities prompted concern from British representatives, including Henry Ellis, who raised the issue directly with him.

Despite Simonich’s own silence regarding his political interventions, historical evidence suggests that he exercised considerable influence over the court of Mohammad Shah Qajar, particularly through his relationship with the grand vizier Haji Mirza Aqasi. Some accounts portray Aqasi as highly susceptible to Russian influence, implying that Simonich was able to shape Iranian policy through him. Yet such interpretations may oversimplify the dynamic. It is equally plausible that Aqasi, far from being a passive instrument, skillfully leveraged Russian support to counterbalance British pressure.

In particular, Russian backing for Iranian claims over Afghanistan—especially the ambition to reassert control over Herat—provided Aqasi with a strategic counterweight. By appearing receptive to Russian counsel, he may have strengthened his bargaining position vis-à-vis British envoys such as Ellis and McNeill, whose demands often pressed for the limitation of Iranian sovereignty in the region. In this sense, the relationship between Simonich and Aqasi was likely not one of simple domination, but rather a more پیچیده interplay of influence, opportunism, and mutual utility.

Herat at the Crossroads of Empire: Anglo-Russian Rivalry and Strategic Convergence

By the late 1830s, the ancient city of Herat had emerged as one of the most strategically contested points in Asia. Between roughly 1838 and the early 1840s, it became a focal point of Anglo-Russian rivalry, contributing directly to two major conflicts whose financial burden on Britain alone exceeded twenty million pounds drawn from Indian revenues. Yet conflict was hardly new to Herat. Situated in the fertile valley of the Hari Rud, the city had, over centuries, been repeatedly invaded, destroyed, and rebuilt—arguably more frequently than any comparable urban center in the region.

Herat’s importance derived from a convergence of geographical, economic, and strategic factors. From the west, it formed the most accessible corridor from Khorasan—particularly from Mashhad—into the regions historically known as Aria and Arachosia (later Afghanistan). It also stood at the intersection of major transregional routes: northward toward Merv and Turkmen lands; northeastward toward Samarkand and Bukhara via Mazar-i Sharif; eastward toward Kabul; and southward toward Kandahar and, ultimately, India. This network rendered Herat a critical commercial hub linking Central Asia, Iran, and the Indian subcontinent.

Equally important was its agricultural capacity. The fertile plains surrounding the Hari Rud endowed Herat with the ability to sustain large armies over extended periods—a decisive advantage in pre-modern and early modern warfare. For this reason, successive powers—Turkic, Uzbek, and Pashtun—contested control over the city. At the same time, Herat was a major center of Persianate culture, producing figures such as Kamal ud-Din Behzad, Khwaja Abdullah Ansari, Abdur Rahman Jami, and Hafiz-i Abru.

Strategic Anxiety and the “Road to India”

British concern over Herat’s fate intensified in the aftermath of the Treaty of Turkmenchay, which consolidated Russian dominance in the Caucasus and effectively transformed the Caspian into a Russian-controlled sphere. Observing these developments, Sir John Macdonald warned as early as March 1830 that Russia might eventually project power through Persian territory toward India.

In response, he commissioned Arthur Conolly to survey potential invasion routes linking Mashhad to Herat, and onward to Kandahar and Kabul. Conolly’s findings were striking. He described Herat as “the key to Afghanistan,” emphasizing both the strength of its fortifications and the extraordinary fertility of its surrounding valley. In his assessment, the city could sustain a large army for prolonged campaigns, with local resources sufficient to meet logistical needs.

More significantly, Conolly warned that Iran was increasingly falling under Russian influence. If this trend continued, he argued, a joint Russo-Persian advance could culminate in the capture of Herat. Internal divisions among Afghan ruling groups—particularly between the Saduzai rulers of Herat and the Barakzai powers in Kandahar and Kabul—would, in his view, facilitate such an outcome. From there, the route toward India would become strategically conceivable.

Haji Mirza Aqasi

The Fall of Qaem-Maqam and the Rise of Haji Mirza Aqasi Revisited

The geopolitical contest over Herat cannot be understood in isolation from internal developments at the Qajar court. The removal of Mirza Abolqasem Qaem-Maqam Farahani—already discussed—was interpreted by contemporaries, including Ivan Simonich, as a decisive turning point.

According to accounts attributed to Simonich, Mohammad Shah Qajar, frustrated by the dominating influence of his powerful minister, sought ways to free himself from Qaem-Maqam’s authority. The vizier, who viewed himself as the architect of the Shah’s accession, exercised control with a degree of assertiveness that bred resentment. His insistence on centralizing administrative power and his practice of rewarding merit—while admirable in principle—alienated many court factions.

Simonich portrays the court as an arena of intrigue in which disaffected elites gathered—even at the Russian legation—to voice grievances against the vizier. Whether exaggerated or not, such accounts underscore the extent of factional opposition. Influenced by these currents, and increasingly impatient with his minister’s reproaches, the Shah ultimately resolved to remove him.

Interestingly, Simonich himself appears to have advised caution. In response to inquiries from the Shah, he reportedly suggested that Qaem-Maqam be retained in office but politically weakened by appointing rivals to key positions—thus reducing his influence without provoking instability. This counsel, however, was not followed.

British accounts provide a harsher assessment. In a report to Robert Taylor, John Campbell described the Persian court as deeply disordered and attributed much of the dysfunction to the vizier’s weakness, indecision, and suspicion of others. He suggested that Qaem-Maqam’s downfall was the inevitable consequence of these failings, noting that he and his supporters had been arrested and that his fate was effectively sealed.

Later Iranian historiography offers a more balanced perspective. Mohammad Hassan Khan Etemad al-Saltaneh, in his Sadr al-Tawarikh, acknowledged the vizier’s firmness—even boldness—in advising the Shah, while emphasizing his loyalty to the state and his role in stabilizing the succession. Similarly, Percy Sykes, though critical, recognized that Qaem-Maqam had exercised extraordinary control over the machinery of government—perhaps to the point of paralysis.

His execution and replacement by Haji Mirza Aqasi thus marked not merely a change of personnel but a profound transformation in governance. Under Aqasi, the state shifted away from centralized bureaucratic management toward a more personalized and less structured system—one that would shape Iran’s response to the crisis of Herat and the intensifying pressures of Anglo-Russian rivalry.

Hidden Hands: The Political Context Behind the Assassination of Qaem-Maqam Farahani

Mirza Abolqasem Qaem-Maqam Farahani, born in Hazaveh in the Farahan region, emerged as one of the most capable and intellectually sophisticated statesmen of early Qajar Iran. Educated in the classical traditions of Persian administration, literature, and political thought, he inherited both position and responsibility from his father, Mirza Isa Farahani. He first served as a secretary under Hajji Ebrahim Khan Kalantar, and later rose within the administrative hierarchy. Following the death of his brother Mirza Hasan Farahani, he entered the service of Abbas Mirza in Tabriz, eventually becoming his most trusted advisor.

The causes behind Qaem-Maqam’s execution cannot be understood solely through court intrigue; they must be situated within the broader geopolitical upheavals of the early nineteenth century. The post-Napoleonic order reshaped global power dynamics, and Iran—positioned between expanding Russian influence and British imperial interests—became an میدان of strategic competition.

Following the Treaty of Gulistan, negotiated in part by Sir Gore Ouseley, a tense and fragile peace prevailed along the Russo-Persian frontier. This equilibrium, however, masked deeper structural vulnerabilities. European diplomacy—shaped by figures such as Klemens von Metternich and Robert Stewart—sought to stabilize the continent after the Napoleonic Wars, often at the expense of peripheral regions such as the Caucasus and Iran.

Within this context, Qaem-Maqam played a central role in efforts to rebuild Iran’s military and administrative capacity. Under Abbas Mirza, reforms were introduced to modernize the army, leading to notable successes, including the conclusion of the Treaty of Erzurum with the Ottoman Empire. Yet these reforms unfolded under severe financial and diplomatic constraints.

One of the most consequential constraints was the ambiguous nature of Anglo-Persian agreements, particularly the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1814. While Britain had pledged financial support to Iran in the event of foreign aggression, the شروط of this commitment were sufficiently elastic to allow British officials to withhold subsidies by arguing that Iran had initiated hostilities. This ambiguity provided Britain with strategic flexibility while leaving Iran exposed.

Indeed, when Mirza Abolhassan Khan Shirazi sought British support against Russia, Castlereagh refused, warning of Russian strength and discouraging further conflict. His successor, George Canning, was even more explicit in his skepticism toward the treaty, privately describing it as imprudent given the احتمال of costly obligations should Russia advance further into Iranian territory.

The renewed Russo-Persian War (1826–1828) further exposed Iran’s ضعف. Following the accession of Nicholas I of Russia, Russian forces under Ivan Paskevich decisively defeated Iranian armies. The subsequent Treaty of Turkmenchay imposed severe territorial and economic concessions on Iran.

Qaem-Maqam, acutely aware of Russia’s overwhelming superiority, had reportedly cautioned against renewed confrontation, emphasizing the disparity in fiscal and military capacity between the two states. His strategic preference, by many accounts, leaned toward consolidating Iranian control in the east—particularly over Herat—where British power projection was more limited than Russian land-based القوة.

At the same time, the diplomatic environment surrounding the Turkmenchay negotiations illustrates the پیچیده interplay of foreign influence. Alexander Griboyedov played a central role in drafting the treaty, while British representatives, including Sir John Macdonald, sought involvement to safeguard their own interests. Although Abbas Mirza initially hoped that British mediation might reduce Russian demands, British priorities increasingly focused on commercial access rather than territorial تحفظ.

Provisions such as the establishment of Russian consulates and commercial privileges in Iran created precedents that Britain would later seek to replicate. These arrangements effectively opened Iranian markets to foreign penetration under conditions that limited the state’s regulatory authority. Qaem-Maqam appears to have been one of the few senior officials who clearly recognized the long-term implications of such economic concessions, particularly the threat they posed to domestic production and sovereignty.

British reports from the early 1830s suggest growing frustration with his resistance. John Campbell noted that considerable effort had been expended to persuade the Shah and his minister to accept British commercial proposals, yet the vizier remained reluctant. Campbell’s own observations indicate a divergence between the شاه’s inclinations and those of Qaem-Maqam, implying that the latter served as a restraining force against external economic pressure.

At the same time, British strategic thinking increasingly centered on the succession question. Officials feared that reliance on Russian support would draw Abbas Mirza—and by extension Iran—into Moscow’s sphere of influence. Figures such as Henry Ellis argued that Britain should counterbalance this trend by strengthening Abbas Mirza militarily and politically, thereby reducing his dependence on Russia.

This dual dynamic—external pressure from competing empires and internal tension between monarch and minister—formed the backdrop to Qaem-Maqam’s سقوط. To foreign observers, he was at once indispensable and obstructive: a capable administrator who resisted excessive concessions, yet whose independence limited the leverage of both British and Russian actors.

His eventual execution, therefore, cannot be reduced to personal rivalry alone. It reflected the convergence of court factionalism, monarchical insecurity, and the broader geopolitical struggle in which Iran found itself entangled. In removing Qaem-Maqam, the Qajar state lost one of its most competent defenders of administrative autonomy—at a moment when such autonomy was increasingly under threat.

The Death of Abbas Mirza and the Intensification of Anglo-Russian Competition

The sudden death of Abbas Mirza on October 25, 1833, came as a profound shock to British policymakers. It disrupted carefully calibrated expectations and introduced a new level of uncertainty into an already fragile political environment. In particular, British officials feared that the balance of influence at the Qajar court would shift decisively, especially as the authority of Mirza Abolqasem Qaem-Maqam Farahani appeared poised to expand in the absence of his patron.

John Campbell, anticipating a contested succession among multiple Qajar princes, warned that prolonged instability could create opportunities for Russian intervention. To preempt such an outcome, he advocated immediate British support for Mohammad Shah Qajar—then still Mohammad Mirza, the son of Abbas Mirza. Campbell proposed that Britain provide military backing to secure his accession, thereby ensuring that the new ruler would remain closely aligned with British interests. As he bluntly suggested, such a policy would place the future Shah “firmly within British influence.”

This view was shared by other British officials, including Henry Willock, who likewise regarded the succession as a decisive moment for shaping Iran’s geopolitical orientation. Acting on these concerns, Lord Palmerston dispatched James Baillie Fraser to Iran to assess the situation and pursue negotiations for a new commercial treaty. British objectives included the expansion of consular representation and the securing of privileges comparable to those Russia had obtained under the Treaty of Turkmenchay.

However, these ambitions encountered determined resistance from Qaem-Maqam. In his discussions with Fraser, the vizier rejected the extension of foreign privileges in unequivocal terms. He argued that the concessions imposed under the Turkmenchay treaty had already inflicted significant harm on Iran’s sovereignty and economic independence, and that granting similar rights to Britain would only deepen that آسیب. In his view, the establishment of foreign consulates and the expansion of “open trade” would gradually undermine domestic production and reduce Iran to a position of dependency.

Qaem-Maqam’s reasoning reveals a striking awareness of the structural consequences of unequal economic integration. He warned that Iran, already weakened, could not withstand the simultaneous pressures of two great powers. The metaphor he employed—of a state caught between rival predators—captured his fear that unchecked Anglo-Russian competition would ultimately erode Iranian autonomy.

Fraser responded with a counterargument characteristic of British strategic thinking: if Russian privileges were indeed harmful, then granting equivalent rights to Britain might serve as a balancing mechanism. Qaem-Maqam rejected this logic. He maintained that compounding an existing vulnerability would not produce equilibrium but accelerate collapse. Instead, he pointed to Britain’s unfulfilled obligations under the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1814, arguing that genuine partnership required honoring commitments to support Iran against external aggression.

At the same time, Qaem-Maqam’s position was not one of isolationism. He indicated a willingness to deepen cooperation with Britain under different terms—particularly through military assistance and advisory support—provided that such engagement respected Iran’s sovereignty. What he resisted was not foreign interaction per se, but its asymmetrical and coercive form.

Campbell’s failure to secure agreement on a new treaty intensified frustration within British policy circles. Henry Ellis, writing to Palmerston, criticized Campbell’s handling of the situation and recommended the appointment of a special envoy with broader authority to negotiate directly with the Qajar court. Ellis himself emerged as a candidate for this role, reflecting both personal ambition and a broader shift toward a more assertive British approach following the Turkmenchay settlement.

Meanwhile, the succession crisis reached its resolution. Fath-Ali Shah Qajar died in October 1834, and with the coordinated support of British and Russian representatives, Mohammad Mirza ascended the throne as Mohammad Shah. Yet the consolidation of power came at a cost. Within months, the very statesman who had facilitated this transition—Qaem-Maqam—was arrested and executed in June 1835 at the Negarestan Palace.

In retrospect, British interpretations of these events became increasingly critical of the fallen vizier. In later reports, Campbell portrayed Qaem-Maqam as obstructive and even destabilizing, suggesting that he had fostered disorder and maintained closer ties with Russian representatives than with Britain. Such assessments, however, must be approached with caution. They reflect not only observations of court politics but also the frustrations of a diplomat whose strategic objectives had been repeatedly thwarted.

Qaem-Maqam’s execution thus marked a decisive turning point. It removed a key figure who had sought—however imperfectly—to mediate between external pressures and internal استقلال. In his absence, the میدان was opened to new configurations of power, both within the Qajar court and in the broader contest between Britain and Russia for influence over Iran.

The Premiership of Haji Mirza Aghasi

The premiership of Haji Mirza Aghasi remains one of the most contested and misunderstood periods in modern Iranian history. Many later historians have portrayed him as an inept and simplistic figure, allegedly preoccupied with irrigation works, canal construction, and rudimentary military manufacturing. However, such depictions often rely heavily on European diplomatic accounts and tend to overlook the broader geopolitical constraints under which he governed.

A more careful reading of both Iranian and European sources suggests a more complex figure. When viewed alongside major European statesmen such as Klemens von Metternich, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, and Lord Palmerston, Aghasi appears less as a caricature of incompetence and more as a cautious political actor navigating intense imperial rivalry. His correspondence and political conduct indicate an awareness of the structural vulnerability of the Qajar state and the pressures created by Anglo-Russian competition.

His diplomatic writings to British officials reveal a statesman capable of irony, strategic ambiguity, and calculated restraint. At times, he appeared to adopt an intentionally understated or even self-deprecating tone. This may be interpreted not as ignorance, but as a defensive rhetorical strategy designed to reduce pressure, preserve autonomy, and maintain flexibility in negotiations with far more powerful empires.

At the core of Aghasi’s approach was the recognition that Iran’s survival depended on internal strengthening. His emphasis on irrigation, agriculture, and limited industrial production—often dismissed by later critics—should be understood in this context. Efforts to expand water management systems, improve agricultural output, and establish basic military manufacturing such as cannon and ammunition production represented early attempts at state-led modernization under severe financial and technological constraints.

With the assistance of figures such as Henry Lindsay Bethune, he facilitated the recruitment of foreign technical expertise to support mining and metallurgical development, particularly iron extraction. These initiatives were modest but reflected a broader effort to reduce dependence on imported military goods and strengthen domestic capacity.

His administration also created conditions in which capable officials—including Amir Kabir and Amir Nizam Zanganeh—were able to pursue administrative and reformist initiatives. Although his leadership style was often inconsistent, it nevertheless allowed a degree of institutional flexibility that later reformers would expand upon.

Much of the negative image of Aghasi derives from British diplomatic sources, particularly those of Henry Rawlinson and John McNeill. Rawlinson described him as ignorant and politically irresponsible, accusing him of fiscal mismanagement and neglect of the military. Yet such judgments must be treated critically, as they reflect imperial perspectives shaped by strategic interests rather than neutral observation.

Similarly, accounts by European envoys such as Édouard de Sercey emphasize his eccentricities—his sharp language, informal conduct, and rhetorical exaggerations. While vivid, these portrayals often obscure the strategic logic behind his behavior. His sarcasm and provocative statements can be interpreted as instruments of negotiation and expressions of resistance to foreign interference.

His reported remarks regarding military campaigns or maritime competition should likewise be understood in rhetorical rather than literal terms. They reflect frustration with foreign pressure and an attempt to reassert symbolic authority in asymmetric diplomatic encounters.

Aghasi’s suspicion of European educational and missionary activity further illustrates his sensitivity to cultural penetration. Schools and missionary institutions established by Europeans were often perceived not only as educational projects but also as instruments of influence. His remarks to visiting Europeans, sometimes humorous and sometimes confrontational, reflect concern over the erosion of cultural and political independence.

At the same time, Aghasi pursued what can be described as a balancing strategy between Britain and Russia. Rather than aligning exclusively with one power, he attempted to exploit their rivalry in order to preserve Iran’s autonomy. This approach is particularly visible during the Erzurum Conference, where Iranian negotiators adopted firm positions despite external mediation pressures.

Evidence suggests that Aghasi may have combined formal compliance with foreign demands with informal resistance, allowing Iranian representatives considerable latitude while maintaining diplomatic deniability. This dual strategy, though often frustrating to foreign diplomats such as Justin Sheil, reflects a pragmatic attempt to manage overwhelming external constraints.

In sum, the conventional portrayal of Haji Mirza Aghasi as merely incompetent does not withstand closer analysis. While his administration was constrained by financial weakness, institutional fragility, and external pressure, his policies reveal a consistent effort to preserve sovereignty and strengthen internal capacity within a highly constrained geopolitical environment.

Diplomacy at Erzurum and the Question of Haji Mirza Aghasi’s Political Judgment

A crucial dimension often overlooked in assessments of Haji Mirza Aghasi concerns his role in managing the complex negotiations surrounding the Erzurum talks. During these negotiations, serious unrest broke out in the city. Ottoman forces, reportedly assisted by local groups, attacked the quarters of the Iranian delegation. Several Iranian representatives were killed, and their property was looted. In response, Mirza Taqi Khan Farahani refused to return to the negotiating table until compensation was paid for the damages.

However, British and Russian representatives pressed for an immediate resumption of talks. The British envoy, Justin Sheil, urged Aghasi to instruct the Iranian delegation to resume negotiations without delay in order to avoid further escalation.

In this context, Aghasi addressed Mirza Taqi Khan in a letter emphasizing both urgency and flexibility:

He noted that delays in negotiation were becoming increasingly problematic and that mediating powers had assured him they would secure compensation for the damages inflicted upon the Iranian delegation. He further stressed that the continuation of talks should not be obstructed by procedural disputes, and that negotiations should proceed without postponing the drafting of treaty provisions. However, he also instructed that the final signing of any agreement should be withheld until full satisfaction was achieved regarding Iranian demands. He concluded by expressing confidence in Mirza Taqi Khan’s ability to implement these instructions faithfully and without deviation.

This correspondence illustrates Aghasi’s attempt to balance two competing pressures: on one hand, the urgency imposed by foreign mediators seeking rapid settlement; and on the other, the need to protect Iranian negotiating leverage.

In his influential study Amir Kabir and Iran, historian Fereydoun Adamiyat offers a critical interpretation of Aghasi’s conduct. He argues that Aghasi’s claim that, absent foreign intervention, he would have acted decisively is partly rhetorical exaggeration. According to Adamiyat, real negotiating pressure often came from Mirza Taqi Khan, who resisted external demands and refused to comply with instructions perceived as compromising Iranian interests.

Adamiyat further suggests that Aghasi’s core directive—rapid negotiation combined with delayed ratification—reflected a pragmatic attempt to maintain flexibility. However, Mirza Taqi Khan understood that once negotiations fully commenced under foreign observation, Iranian leverage would diminish significantly, making it difficult to reverse concessions later. As a result, he frequently resisted implementation of such instructions.

One of the most striking aspects of Aghasi’s diplomatic method was his use of transparent communication as a deliberate political instrument. In several instances, he reportedly transmitted copies of his correspondence with Iranian negotiators directly to Russian and British representatives. This practice, while criticized as a breach of confidentiality, also functioned as a signaling mechanism: it demonstrated to foreign powers that Iran was formally engaging with their concerns, even while preserving internal autonomy in execution.

Adamiyat critiques this approach, arguing that it reflected a lack of diplomatic secrecy and political discipline. He notes that Aghasi’s instructions were often openly circulated among foreign representatives, including even his most critical reprimands, which were shared without restriction. From a conventional diplomatic perspective, such practices undermined negotiation strategy and weakened internal cohesion.

However, Adamiyat also recognizes that these actions were not necessarily accidental. Aghasi appears to have operated within a distinct political logic—one that prioritized visibility, signaling, and controlled transparency over strict confidentiality. Even when his methods appeared unorthodox, they may have served the broader purpose of managing external pressures while maintaining internal authority.

Adamiyat ultimately characterizes Aghasi as representing a particular political style within the Qajar administrative tradition, one that combined rhetorical boldness with strategic improvisation. He suggests that Aghasi believed political judgment and prudence were best exercised through this flexible and adaptive approach, even if it appeared inconsistent by European bureaucratic standards.

In this light, Aghasi’s conduct at Erzurum should not be interpreted simply as incompetence or inconsistency. Rather, it reflects a distinctive mode of governance shaped by structural vulnerability, diplomatic asymmetry, and the necessity of navigating between imperial powers with limited institutional resources.

Mohammad Shah, Herat, and the Fragmentation of Afghanistan

The reign of Mohammad Shah Qajar coincided with the early crystallization of what later came to be known as the “Great Game” between the British and Russian empires. From the era of Ivan the Terrible onward, Russia had gradually transformed from a regional power into an expanding imperial state advancing southward into Central Asia. Under Peter the Great, imperial ambitions increasingly oriented toward access to warm-water routes through Iran and Afghanistan, with imagined pathways extending from the Caspian region through Herat, Ghazni, Kabul, and ultimately toward the Indian subcontinent.

Although Peter’s original strategic vision was never realized, later Russian rulers continued to pursue incremental expansion into Central Asia, reinforcing long-term geopolitical pressure on Iran’s eastern frontier.

Following the assassination of Nader Shah Afshar in 1747, imperial authority in Iran collapsed, creating a power vacuum that reshaped Afghanistan’s political landscape. In this context, Ahmad Khan Abdali seized the opportunity to consolidate power, taking control of Nader Shah’s treasury and retreating through Herat to Kandahar, where he convened a tribal council that laid the foundations of the modern Afghan state.

In the decades that followed, Afghanistan remained politically fragmented. Competing dynastic claims among the Sadozai rulers produced repeated cycles of conflict. Shah Shuja Sadozai briefly aligned himself with Britain, while Mahmud Shah Sadozai relied on internal military coalitions led by Fateh Khan Barakzai. The latter’s assassination in 1818 triggered a violent fragmentation of authority, as his Barakzai relatives seized control of key provinces including Kandahar, Ghazni, and Baluchistan.

By the 1820s, Afghanistan had effectively disintegrated into semi-independent principalities. Among the emerging power centers was Dost Mohammad Khan Barakzai, who consolidated control over Kabul with the support of Qizilbash factions and gradually emerged as one of the most significant regional actors.

Within this fragmented environment, Herat retained exceptional strategic importance. It was governed by Kamran Mirza Sadozai, whose position depended heavily on fluctuating alliances and external support, including intermittent Iranian influence.

By the mid-1830s, Herat had become a focal point of Anglo-Russian competition. In a report dated April 1, 1836, Henry Ellis informed Lord Palmerston that Afghan envoys had arrived at the court of Mohammad Shah Qajar seeking a treaty of alliance. Their aim was to secure Iranian support against Kamran Mirza in Herat, as well as against rival Afghan factions in Kandahar and Kabul.

Ellis reported that the Kandahar leadership sought a dual arrangement: internal autonomy within their own territories, combined with external alignment under Iranian protection. However, he also observed that their deeper strategic preference leaned toward British support rather than full incorporation into Iranian authority.

Subsequent intelligence suggested that Afghan factions were primarily motivated by regional rivalries rather than ideological alignment. Their objective was to counterbalance Kamran Mirza in Herat and to resist the growing influence of Sikh power under Ranjit Singh in the east. In this context, alliances with either Iran, Britain, or Russia were treated as tactical instruments rather than permanent commitments.

Dost Mohammad Khan, facing pressure from both Sikh expansion and internal fragmentation, adopted a flexible diplomatic posture. British agents, including Alexander Burnes, engaged with him in Kabul in 1837 in an attempt to shape his regional strategy. At the same time, British authorities in India, particularly under Lord Auckland, attempted to moderate his territorial ambitions, especially regarding Peshawar.

Simultaneously, Russian diplomatic activity increased. Ivan Simonich encouraged Afghan leaders to align with Iranian and Russian interests, particularly in relation to potential campaigns toward Herat. This overlapping network of British and Russian engagement further intensified Afghanistan’s fragmentation, transforming Herat into a symbolic and strategic battleground within the wider imperial rivalry.

Simonich’s Role in the Herat War

At this time, General Ivan Paskevich, commander of Russian forces in Asia, believed that the Russian Foreign Ministry under Count Nesselrode had effectively undermined Russia’s influence in Iran under British pressure, particularly after the death of Alexander Griboyedov, the Russian minister in Tehran. In contrast, General Vasily Alekseevich Perovsky, commander of the Orenburg military district, urged Simonich, the Russian minister in Tehran, to align his diplomatic actions with broader military objectives—namely, Russia’s strategic ambitions toward Khiva, Turkestan, and Bukhara.

Similarly, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rodofinikin and other senior Russian officials in the Asian department, in consultation with military leaders such as Paskevich and Vorontsov, sought to integrate Simonich’s activities in Iran into a wider imperial strategy. This strategy aimed at extending Russian influence toward Afghanistan and, ultimately, British India. Simonich himself, reportedly disinclined toward British influence, tended to prioritize the directives of military commanders over the more cautious approach of the Foreign Ministry.

According to later accounts by Dugamel, a subsequent Russian diplomat, Simonich was a committed Bonapartist who kept a portrait of Napoleon in his Tehran office, inscribed with a message implying vengeance against the British royal family. Whether literal or symbolic, such descriptions reflect the perception of Simonich as an aggressive and ideologically driven actor within the Russian diplomatic corps.

Thus, for the Russian Foreign Ministry under Nesselrode, which sought cautious economic engagement with Iran, balancing diplomacy with Russia’s expanding Asian ambitions proved increasingly difficult. Following Napoleon’s defeat and amid Metternich’s efforts to construct a European balance of power (das europäische Gleichgewicht) after the Congress of Vienna, Russia’s strategic attention gradually shifted eastward. In this context, Russia could not easily cede influence in its Asian borderlands to Britain or other European powers. Instead, it was drawn into what later strategic thinking would describe as emerging forms of Weltpolitik, or global geopolitical competition.

The Decision Toward Herat

By the winter of 1836 (1214 AH), tensions in Herat escalated when Kamran Mirza, son of Mahmud Shah Durrani, refused to continue paying the annual tribute of 10,000 tomans (approximately 5,000 pounds sterling) to the Qajar state. Mohammad Shah Qajar interpreted this refusal as both a financial provocation and a strategic opportunity. The proposed campaign against Herat was expected not only to restore tribute payments but also, in Iranian calculations, to potentially draw Russia into a broader confrontation with Britain in Central Asia.

Iranian statesmen therefore attempted to convince Simonich that Russia might share in the costs or strategic benefits of any conflict with Britain in the region. In this context, Hajji Mirza Aghasi appointed Mirza Masoud—who maintained particularly close relations with Simonich—as a senior diplomatic intermediary, replacing Mirza Hasan Khan Shirazi, who was viewed with suspicion due to his perceived pro-British sympathies.

However, despite Simonich’s belief that he could influence Iranian policy through his relationship with Mirza Masoud, the reality proved more complex. As subsequent events demonstrated, it was in fact Mirza Aghasi who exercised decisive control over Simonich’s diplomatic position in Tehran. Under these conditions, Mohammad Shah began preparing in earnest for the Herat campaign.

Declining British Influence in Iran

By this period, British influence in Iran had not yet fully declined, but it was increasingly contested. Iranian political consciousness, shaped by cultural experience and institutional memory, had grown wary of British duplicity, particularly following the conflicts in the Caucasus. As a result, British officers serving under Colonel Passmore faced growing resistance within both military and civilian circles.

Opposition was no longer limited to public sentiment; it increasingly extended into state institutions themselves. Iranian commanders began to openly challenge British military advisors, accusing them of exceeding their mandate. Initially invited to train Iranian forces, British officers were now criticized for making intrusive demands, including claims over troop payment systems, military promotions, and financial subsidies. These demands were widely perceived as violations of Iranian sovereignty and were increasingly ignored.

This shift proved costly for the British, whose officers were accustomed to hierarchical authority structures in colonial India. As Stephanie Cronin observes, the British presence in Iran provoked a combination of political resistance, wounded national pride, and professional resentment, which together undermined their influence across multiple spheres of governance and military organization.

As tensions escalated, even symbolic demonstrations of British naval power failed to achieve their intended effect. When British warships, including the 74-gun Wellesley, arrived at Bushehr to project strength, Iranian responses were defiant rather than submissive—ranging from military posturing to public acts of hostility, including stone-throwing by local populations.

Britain’s Attempt to Prevent Mohammad Shah’s Invasion of Herat

The writings of certain “masters” of historiography—who often reproduce, rather than critically interrogate, the assumptions of Western scholarship—frequently rest on the premise that the concepts of nation, homeland, and state are exclusively modern constructs emerging in the nineteenth century. However, a closer examination of ancient civilizations such as Iran, Rome, Greece, and China complicates this claim. In ancient Greece, for example, as I have discussed in detail in my history of ancient Iran, the pan-Hellenic vision of Isocrates—strongly influenced by Philip II, father of Alexander the Great—already articulated a form of collective political identity that, while not identical to the modern nation-state, clearly transcended purely city-based affiliations.

In this context, reports such as those of Henry Ellis, the British minister, indicate that Mohammad Shah Qajar and the inhabitants of Herat regarded Herat as an integral part of Iran. Iranian diplomatic correspondence with Britain repeatedly justified claims over Herat on the basis that the region had belonged to Iran since the Safavid period. This logic mirrored earlier Sasanian claims against the Roman Empire regarding territories along the eastern Mediterranean, which were historically associated—at least in imperial memory—with the Achaemenid sphere of influence. Such continuities suggest that the Qajar state perceived itself as the legitimate successor of earlier Iranian imperial traditions.

In a report to Lord Palmerston dated Friday, November 13, 1835 (1214 AH), Ellis wrote:

“It is unfortunate to observe that the Shah entertains extensive plans for the invasion of Afghanistan, and that, like many of his subjects, he regards Iran’s claim to Herat and Kandahar as extending to the imperial boundaries of the Safavid era, as previously asserted by Abbas Mirza in the campaigns of Khorasan and corroborated in reports by Colonel Borowski.”

The phrase “all the citizens of Iran” believing in such claims raises important conceptual questions: if such widespread belief existed in the absence of modern mass media—newspapers, radio, or television—then the assumption that national consciousness is exclusively a modern phenomenon becomes less certain. Indeed, even observers such as Colonel Broski noted that the belief in the “Iranian-ness of Herat” was not limited to elites but extended across social strata.

British Diplomatic Efforts and Strategic Calculations

Ellis made considerable efforts to dissuade Mohammad Shah from military action in Afghanistan. These efforts, however, ultimately proved ineffective. According to the ninth clause of the Treaty of Tehran (1814):

If war occurs between Iran and Afghanistan, the British government shall remain neutral and shall not assist either side, except in the case of mediation requested by both parties.

In practice, however, Britain interpreted this clause in ways that served its strategic interests. When Mohammad Shah advanced toward Herat, British authorities used the treaty as justification to prevent British officers serving in Iran from accompanying Iranian forces. At the same time, Britain refused to provide assistance to Iran and instead supported rival Afghan factions in order to weaken Iranian influence in the region. British actions also included threats such as the occupation of Kharg Island and potential military movements toward Bushehr and northern Iran.

Ellis reported to Palmerston on December 30, 1835:

“I deemed it necessary to communicate to His Majesty’s Government’s representatives in Tehran, particularly Hajji Mirza Aghasi and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the British Government would regard with serious displeasure any large-scale Iranian expedition into Afghanistan…”

He further noted that Iranian ministers consistently regarded Afghanistan not as an independent political entity but as a region historically linked to Iran. As Hajji Mirza Aghasi reportedly stated, the recovery of Herat was only the first step, to be followed by Kandahar.

Ellis also recorded a conversation in which he attempted to assess Iranian territorial conceptions:

“When I sought to determine the extent of their understanding of Iranian territory, they replied: ‘as far as Ghazni.’ In a previous meeting, Hajji Mirza Aghasi had stated that the capture of Herat was only the first stage, and that Kandahar would follow shortly thereafter.”

Anglo-Russian Rivalry and the Herat Question

Despite the formal neutrality stipulated in the Treaty of Tehran, Britain increasingly sought to detach Afghan territories from Iranian influence, aiming to transform Afghanistan into a buffer state against Russian expansion toward India. Ellis attempted, in the first instance, to prevent Mohammad Shah’s campaign against Herat. In his report of January 8, 1836, he wrote:

“Yesterday I informed Hajji Mirza Aghasi and the Minister of Foreign Affairs that, based on my experience in India, the British Government would view any large-scale operation against Afghanistan with grave concern…”

He further warned that Britain would not tolerate unilateral territorial expansion in Afghanistan without diplomatic consultation.

Iranian ministers responded sharply. Hajji Mirza Aghasi questioned whether Afghan collaboration with Turkmen groups in raiding Iranian territory justified military retaliation. Mirza Masoud emphasized Afghan breaches of prior agreements. Ellis, while acknowledging Iranian grievances, insisted that such disputes should be resolved through diplomacy rather than warfare.

Aghasi ultimately expressed conditional openness to negotiation, stating that Iran preferred any solution that would avoid large-scale conflict and humanitarian loss.

Russian Involvement and Strategic Ambiguity

Ellis concluded that neither Mohammad Shah nor his ministers placed meaningful trust in British intentions. In contrast, Russian diplomatic representatives—particularly Count Simonich—were perceived as more supportive of Iranian ambitions in Afghanistan. Simonich reportedly expressed willingness to assist Iran militarily or diplomatically in securing Herat, seeing such developments as advantageous to Russian influence in Central Asia.

Ellis warned that if Herat were incorporated into Iran under a Russo-Iranian framework, it could become a strategic platform for Russian intelligence and commercial expansion throughout Afghanistan. He further argued that any Iranian advance in Afghanistan would inevitably strengthen Russian geopolitical positioning.

At the same time, he acknowledged that under existing treaty obligations, Britain could not directly intervene unless requested by both Iran and Afghanistan. This constraint, he argued, effectively limited British ability to counter Russian influence in the region.

Strategic Consequences

By early 1836, Ellis reported that Kamran Mirza of Herat had engaged in violent reprisals against pro-Iranian groups, further escalating tensions. Mohammad Shah, in turn, accused Britain of inconsistency and duplicity, arguing that British merchants and interests were consistently protected while Iranian sovereignty was disregarded.

In a subsequent report dated June 25, 1836, Ellis criticized Britain’s reliance on Iran as a buffer for India while simultaneously limiting Iranian strategic autonomy. He noted that British policy had effectively abandoned all intermediary states between the Caspian and India except Iran, relying on it as a defensive barrier against Central Asian powers.

He further observed that Russian advisers encouraged Iranian campaigns against Turkmen and Afghan groups under the justification of suppressing slavery and restoring order, while simultaneously expanding Russian influence in the region.

British Strategic Dilemma

Ellis concluded that British policy in the region faced a structural contradiction: Iranian success in Afghanistan would strengthen Russian influence, while Iranian failure would destabilize the frontier regions protecting India. Britain thus found itself unable to fully support or fully oppose Iranian ambitions.

He ultimately advised that, under prevailing conditions, Britain should no longer treat Afghanistan as a unified buffer state, but rather adopt a more flexible approach toward fragmented regional powers, including Afghan principalities.

The Financial Approaches and the Provision of Expenses for the Herat Campaign

Financing the Herat campaign posed severe difficulties for Iran in the aftermath of the Caucasian wars and the heavy financial burden imposed by the Treaty of Turkmenchay. Hajji Mirza Aghasi, who was reluctant to increase taxation on the population, understood both Count Simonich’s hostility toward Britain and Russia’s broader strategic ambition to extend influence toward India. He therefore sought to use Simonich’s position to persuade St. Petersburg that Russia should bear at least part of the financial burden of the Herat expedition.

According to Simonich’s own account, when Khosrow Mirza visited the court of Tsar Nicholas to formally apologize for the killing of Alexander Griboyedov, the Tsar agreed to cancel approximately 10 million tomans of Iran’s war indemnity under the Treaty of Turkmenchay and suspended an additional 40 million tomans for four years. Nevertheless, Abbas Mirza remained deeply suspicious of Russian intentions, fearing that once Iran’s weakened treasury reached the point of repayment, Russia might extract territorial concessions—potentially even targeting frontier cities such as Khoy.

Simonich, dissatisfied with Abbas Mirza’s mistrust, sought to demonstrate goodwill toward the Iranian court. He proposed to St. Petersburg that the repayment schedule for Iran’s debt be extended by an additional two years. After the death of Abbas Mirza and the accession of Mohammad Mirza (later Mohammad Shah), the question of repayment again became pressing, as the deadline approached under renewed financial strain.

Hajji Mirza Aghasi was acutely aware that Britain feared Russia might use Iran’s financial vulnerability as a lever for political and commercial concessions. British officials understood that Russian diplomatic pressure in Tehran could be translated into economic advantage and potentially reshape trade arrangements in a way unfavorable to Britain. Ellis, therefore, sought to use the issue of debt repayment as a means of inducing Iran toward a new commercial treaty with Britain.

Aghasi, in turn, carefully managed this triangular diplomacy. While maintaining communication with Ellis, he also ensured that Simonich remained informed of British pressures. Simonich subsequently urged St. Petersburg to grant Iran further flexibility in repayment, particularly given that the Shah was preparing for military operations in Herat, which required substantial financial resources.

British Pressure and Iranian Suspicion

The Shah, irritated by repeated British references to the debt issue, eventually responded dismissively. Ellis, however, continued to insist on the urgency of the matter. He warned that Russian silence should not be interpreted as neutrality, arguing that Simonich might later exploit the debt issue strategically once Iran was financially exposed. He further suggested that if Iran failed to repay, Russian forces stationed near the frontier could use the situation as a pretext for intervention—a scenario he compared to Abbas Mirza’s earlier anxieties.

At Aghasi’s instruction, Mirza Masoud—who maintained close relations with Simonich—raised the issue diplomatically with the Russian minister. He explained that while neither the Shah nor the Prime Minister fully accepted Ellis’s warnings, they nevertheless sought clarification. Simonich responded calmly, asserting that Russia already possessed sufficient military capability to seize cities such as Khoy, Tabriz, and Rasht if it so desired, but had no intention of doing so. Mirza Masoud, aware of the delicate European balance of power, was uneasy with this remark and declined to relay it directly to Aghasi.

Simonich then agreed to repeat his position personally to the Prime Minister. During the meeting, he reassured Aghasi that Russia had no immediate hostile intentions and accepted the proposed repayment arrangement. Aghasi, satisfied with this outcome, suggested that Iran would pay 150,000 tomans in April 1836, followed by semiannual installments until the debt was fully settled. Privately, however, he remained convinced that Russia would ultimately subsidize Iran’s military operations in Herat.

Diplomatic Maneuvering in Tehran

Simonich, in his own account, expressed satisfaction with the arrangement, noting that he had not expected such favorable terms. He also remarked that, given the emptiness of the Iranian treasury, any payments made would effectively function as indirect Russian financial support for Iran’s broader objectives.

At the same time, Simonich emphasized that his authority was limited to the instructions of his government, though he retained discretion in interpreting them. He framed Russia’s position as one of formal neutrality regarding Iran’s fiscal obligations, while simultaneously acknowledging that treaty compliance required repayment. In his view, any flexibility he granted did not exceed his mandate but rather reflected practical diplomacy.

Ellis, by contrast, became increasingly frustrated as his attempts to dissuade Mohammad Shah from advancing toward Herat proved unsuccessful. In a report to Lord Palmerston dated April 16, 1836, he wrote:

“Afghanistan must be regarded as the frontier of the British Indian Empire; and no European power has established commercial or political relations there. Therefore, any interference in Afghan affairs—direct or indirect—must inevitably be interpreted as a challenge to British strategic interests.”

The Advance of Mohammad Shah’s Forces Toward Herat

Based on the testimony of contemporaries familiar with Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, he was often regarded as a politically astute but deeply pragmatic statesman, inclined toward covert diplomacy, indirect pressure, and the strategic use of financial and political leverage abroad. Some later writers—among them Victor Hugo and Turgenev—portrayed him as a stern, uncompromising, and occasionally ruthless figure. Upon becoming Foreign Secretary in 1830, Palmerston is said to have exercised unusually direct control over Foreign Office correspondence, personally shaping many diplomatic instructions.

Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, who served as French ambassador in London during Palmerston’s early tenure, acknowledged his intelligence in matters of commerce and finance, while also expressing reservations about his temperament. He reportedly observed that Palmerston’s strong emotional attachment to national interest could distort judgment, leading him to subordinate broader strategic considerations to immediate political instincts.

As will be seen, Palmerston’s correspondence and instructions during the Herat crisis reflect precisely this combination of strategic calculation and political sensitivity. In an earlier speech to the House of Commons on June 1, 1829, he had articulated a flexible interpretation of international law, arguing that intervention short of direct military force could still fall within the accepted norms of interstate conduct when justified by national interest.

This position raises broader questions about the evolving concept of the “law of nations,” frequently invoked in exchanges between British diplomats and the Iranian Foreign Ministry. In the absence of a formal international organization such as the United Nations, nineteenth-century European diplomacy operated within what Reinhart Koselleck and other historians of political thought describe as the framework of the Jus Publicum Europaeum. Within this system, sovereignty implied the right of states to wage war as legitimate political actors, while moral accountability remained primarily internal to each state rather than externally adjudicated.

Within this conceptual order, war was regulated not by universal authority but by a shared European equilibrium (Europäisches Gleichgewicht), in which rival powers recognized one another as legitimate adversaries (justus hostis). It was within this intellectual and diplomatic framework that Palmerston expected British representatives in Tehran—such as Henry Ellis and subsequent envoys—to manage the delicate balance between Iran, Afghanistan, and Russia through indirect influence rather than direct intervention.

The Herat Expedition and Diplomatic Escalation

When Mohammad Shah Qajar advanced toward Afghanistan in the winter of 1836 (1215 AH), the move provoked immediate concern in London. According to Count Simonich, Iranian forces successfully subdued Turkmen groups en route to Herat, which significantly enhanced the Shah’s prestige among the khans of Khorasan.

Simonich later reported an exchange in which the British ambassador approached him on the basis of rumors alleging Russian instigation of the Shah’s campaign and suggesting that Russian forces were preparing to move toward Astarabad. Simonich denied these claims, stating that he had received no instructions from St. Petersburg and advising the British to address their concerns directly to the Russian capital if they believed such reports.

He further emphasized that the Shah had not requested Russian assistance, nor had he been offered any such commitment. Regarding the expedition itself, Simonich argued that, from a moral and political perspective, the Shah’s actions could be interpreted as a response to repeated Afghan incursions into Iranian territory. He cited ongoing raids from Herat, including slave-taking and border incursions into Khorasan, as well as earlier conflicts involving Kamran Mirza’s forces in Baluchistan and Qaen.

From this perspective, he questioned whether it was reasonable for the Iranian monarch to refrain from military retaliation in the face of sustained frontier insecurity.

British Alarm and Policy Response

Alarmed by Iran’s military momentum, Palmerston instructed Dr. John McNeill in a dispatch dated June 13, 1836, to discourage further Iranian advances toward Herat and instead encourage negotiation with the Afghan authorities. He emphasized the need to prevent escalation while maintaining British strategic influence in the region.

Earlier correspondence from Ellis had suggested that the Shah might be persuaded to pursue diplomatic solutions to regional instability, particularly in relation to Central Asian slave raids, rather than embarking on a full-scale military campaign.

McNeill was therefore instructed to present a more forceful diplomatic alternative to military action, while maintaining British influence over the direction of Iranian policy.

The Astarabad Epidemic and the Retreat

Shortly thereafter, a sudden cholera outbreak occurred among Iranian forces stationed near Astarabad. The epidemic caused significant casualties and severely disrupted military operations. By early November 1836, Mohammad Shah was compelled to abandon the expedition and withdraw toward Tehran for the winter season.

Reports from British observers, including military correspondence, noted that the army’s advance toward Herat had effectively ceased. The Russian envoy, meanwhile, reportedly expressed dissatisfaction with the abandonment of the campaign, though without effect.

Leadership Transition in British Representation

Following these developments, Henry Ellis was replaced by Dr. John McNeill in February 1836 (as recorded in British administrative correspondence). McNeill had previously served as secretary to Sir John Campbell and had also worked as a medical officer for the East India Company in Iran. His dual experience in diplomacy and military medicine shaped a more assertive outlook on Anglo-Russian rivalry.

Unlike his predecessor, McNeill advocated a more confrontational stance toward Russian expansion. In his reports, he argued that Russian imperial strategy in Central Asia was based on a long-term and systematic plan of territorial and political penetration. He therefore concluded that British policy must respond with firmness, rejecting passive containment in favor of active strategic resistance.

Mohammad Shah’s Second Expedition to Herat and His Alliance with the Khans of Kandahar and Kabul

By this stage, the British Foreign Office—relying heavily on the increasingly alarmist reports of its newly appointed envoy, Dr. John McNeill—had come to the conclusion that Russia was pursuing a coordinated strategy of cooperation with Iran and with the Afghan khans of Kabul, Kandahar, and possibly Bukhara. According to this interpretation, Russian policy aimed not only at securing commercial access to the Persian Gulf but also at establishing strategic positions for potential advances toward Khiva, Herat, and ultimately the northwestern frontiers of British India.

This scenario deeply alarmed British policymakers. It appeared to align not only with the longstanding geopolitical vision associated with Peter the Great but also with emerging Russian nationalist doctrines that viewed Asia as a sphere of historical and civilizational expansion.

British Strategy in Afghanistan

In response, Britain sought to prevent Dost Mohammad Khan from consolidating relations with Iran by offering him alternative political incentives, including potential influence over Kandahar and Herat. Simultaneously, British policy aimed to keep him strategically dependent on British support by maintaining his rivalry with Ranjit Singh, the ruler of the Sikh Empire.

As McNeill himself argued:

“With a limited degree of British assistance, Kandahar and Herat could be brought under Dost Mohammad Khan’s influence. I earnestly hope that he is not deprived of such support. A financial subsidy may enable him to secure these cities while keeping him firmly within our sphere of control. He must also be discouraged from receiving foreign agents of any description, and all external relations should be conducted exclusively through British intermediaries. Until such an arrangement is achieved, our position cannot be considered secure.”

British Political Reassurance and Internal Debate

On June 11, 1837 (11 June 1216 AH), Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston wrote to McNeill expressing satisfaction with British diplomatic progress in Tehran:

“We are pleased with your reports and observe with satisfaction that British influence is beginning to assert itself more effectively at the Persian court. We fully recognize the difficulties you have faced in countering Russian influence, but your judgment and perseverance will ultimately prevail.”

However, within the broader imperial administration, caution persisted. In a letter dated September 15, 1837, George Eden, 1st Earl of Auckland advised McNeill that while strong warnings to Iran regarding Herat were permissible, diplomatic balance remained essential. He cautioned that McNeill’s position in Tehran was still fragile and that excessive pressure might jeopardize Britain’s influence.

Auckland emphasized that Iranian political conduct was unpredictable and often shaped by both strategic calculation and misjudgment. While acknowledging McNeill’s improved standing, he advised restraint, noting that premature confrontation could undermine long-term British interests. In his view, diplomatic engagement should remain flexible, allowing Britain to “work with events” rather than force a direct rupture.

The Afghan Frontier and British Intervention

At the same time, British officials concluded that Dost Mohammad Khan was abandoning moderation and moving toward a destabilizing regional strategy. In response, Captain Burnes was instructed to warn him that Persian promises of military and financial support were unreliable and that continued reliance on such assurances would jeopardize his position.

Burnes was further instructed to make clear that Britain did not recognize any Iranian right to interfere in Afghan frontier affairs.

When Burnes arrived in Kabul, he succeeded in persuading Dost Mohammad Khan to reconsider his alignment with Iran on the condition that Britain would provide full support against Ranjit Singh. However, at the same time, Dost Mohammad received correspondence from his envoy in Tehran, Haji Ibrahim, which included a message attributed to Count Simonich.

Russian-Iranian Signals and Afghan Diplomacy

According to this message, Mohammad Shah intended to dispatch an envoy to Ranjit Singh to demand the return of Afghan territories, including Peshawar, warning that refusal would lead to military confrontation. It further stated that, following the reconquest of Herat, Iran would provide Dost Mohammad Khan with financial and military assistance.

The Russian envoy, Count Simonich, was reported to have added that Russia supported these arrangements and would be prepared to provide additional assistance if necessary. The underlying implication of the message was that Russian policy sought expanded access routes toward British India, and therefore regarded cooperation with Afghan rulers as strategically advantageous.

This correspondence reached Kabul in November 1837 (1216 AH). Shortly thereafter, further envoys arrived from Kandahar and other Afghan centers, including additional communications attributed to Simonich’s network. One such message reportedly stated:

Russia exercises significant influence over Iran, and the Khans of Kabul and Kandahar should seek financial and military support through the Shah. Any obligations arising from such arrangements would ultimately be secured by Russian backing. However, such cooperation must exclude any alignment with British interests, which are viewed as strategically incompatible with Russian objectives.

McNeill’s Failure to Sign a Trade Treaty with Iran and His Proposal to Subdue Iran

Dr. John McNeill, having failed both to conclude a trade treaty with Iran and to prevent Mohammad Shah’s advance toward Herat, came under criticism in Britain. His private correspondence suggests growing frustration, and he was increasingly portrayed in parts of the press as an ineffective representative of British interests in Tehran.

In a detailed letter to the British Governor-General in India, McNeill attempted to explain the causes of his diplomatic failures. He argued that Hajji Mirza Aghasi had skillfully posed as sympathetic to British interests while simultaneously exploiting both British and Russian rivalries. He also claimed that Count Simonich believed he could influence Iranian policy in any direction he desired. McNeill, however, believed that he himself retained decisive leverage over Aghasi’s conduct and the broader direction of Iranian policy.

In a report sent to Lord Auckland on March 5, 1838, McNeill wrote at length on these dynamics:

He described Mohammad Shah’s accession as a moment when neighboring powers misinterpreted the internal consolidation of Qajar authority as a sign of extraordinary imperial strength. Early successes against rival dynastic factions and the execution of internal opponents reinforced this perception. At the same time, rumors that Fath Ali Shah had left behind substantial financial reserves encouraged expectations of renewed imperial expansion among regional actors.

Among the most active figures in this regional response were Dost Mohammad Khan and his allies in Kandahar. McNeill noted that the Shah, having rapidly transformed from a relatively obscure provincial ruler into a sovereign of expansive ambitions, now appeared to command the political imagination of Central Asia. After his earlier failure to seize Herat, Iranian alignment with certain Afghan factions appeared to offer him a renewed opportunity for success against Kamran Mirza.

McNeill further argued that the Russian envoy, Count Simonich, actively encouraged Iranian ambitions toward Herat, while simultaneously warning against British influence and portraying British policy as obstructive. In McNeill’s interpretation, this diplomatic strategy was designed to align Iranian and Russian strategic interests while undermining British credibility. Over time, McNeill claimed, these arguments influenced the Shah’s perception of regional politics and reinforced the perceived compatibility of Iranian and Russian interests, while portraying Britain as an adversarial force.

McNeill also reflected on his own position in Tehran, stating that upon arrival he found the Shah disillusioned following earlier military setbacks and observed internal divisions within the Iranian court between pro-British and pro-Russian factions. He claimed that Simonich had attempted—without success—to remove Hajji Mirza Aghasi, and instead cultivated influence through Mirza Masoud, the Iranian foreign minister. McNeill, by contrast, aligned himself with Aghasi and supported his consolidation of power against rival factions.

He further emphasized his personal relationship with the Shah, arguing that their connection—established during the Shah’s youth—gave him unique influence at court. He believed the Shah expected British diplomatic support to align with his own strategic ambitions, particularly regarding Herat, and that this expectation had been reinforced by earlier British ambiguity on the issue.

However, McNeill acknowledged that this expectation proved incompatible with British policy. While he had temporarily adopted a more conciliatory approach to the Herat question, British strategic concerns ultimately required him to oppose Iranian military expansion. Once he began to express opposition to the Herat expedition, relations with the Shah deteriorated. Iranian officials, in McNeill’s account, initially believed they could secure British acquiescence, but later interpreted his resistance as hostility and attempted to pressure him accordingly.

McNeill further reported that negotiations over a commercial treaty collapsed as Iranian demands increasingly reflected a desire to incorporate British financial obligations into the agreement. When discussions turned to Herat and the position of Kamran Mirza’s envoy, Fateh Mohammad Khan, tensions escalated further. McNeill concluded that Iranian expectations of British compliance were fundamentally incompatible with British strategic interests.

At this stage, Mohammad Shah resumed preparations for the Herat campaign, moving toward Khorasan while temporarily halting at Shahrud. McNeill noted that internal developments, including the escape of certain Qajar princes from Ardabil, further complicated the political situation and contributed to fluctuating royal intentions regarding the expedition.

Despite temporary hesitation, the Shah ultimately proceeded, encouraged in part by perceived Russian support and the absence of decisive British counterpressure. According to McNeill, Iranian ministers, influenced by Russian advisers, eventually abandoned earlier diplomatic caution and adopted a more confrontational posture, even directing personal hostility toward him in court settings.

Simultaneously, Russian envoys arrived in Kandahar and Kabul, where they reportedly criticized the Shah’s expedition while simultaneously promoting closer Iranian-Russian alignment. According to McNeill, Russian diplomatic communications suggested that if Herat were successfully captured, part of Iran’s debt to Russia might be forgiven as compensation for military cooperation. Count Simonich was also reported to have facilitated financial arrangements that indirectly supported Iranian military preparations.

In his concluding remarks to Lord Auckland, McNeill warned that British and Iranian interests were becoming structurally incompatible in Afghanistan. He argued that the lack of a coherent long-term strategy for managing Anglo-Iranian relations over Afghanistan had created a persistent strategic fault line between Britain, Iran, and Russia. Even if immediate tensions were resolved, he believed that underlying rivalry would continue to shape regional politics.

McNeill further argued that if Britain failed to assert its position decisively, Iranian perceptions of British dependency on Persian cooperation for Indian security would persist, undermining British deterrence. He therefore recommended a more forceful demonstration of British military readiness as a means of correcting Iranian misperceptions and reinforcing strategic boundaries.

Simonich’s Counter-Account

In contrast, Count Simonich reported that McNeill was actively working to prevent diplomatic reconciliation between Iran and Afghanistan and to block any negotiated settlement at Herat. He argued that McNeill’s conduct was designed to isolate Iranian diplomacy and reinforce British influence over Afghan affairs.

According to Simonich, Kamran Mirza’s diplomatic proposals were shaped by British guidance, including demands for treaty revision, tribute arrangements, and political concessions such as coinage reform, religious protections, and hostage guarantees.

Simonich further claimed that McNeill deliberately excluded him from mediation efforts and discouraged Afghan envoys from engaging directly with him. He interpreted McNeill’s actions as an attempt to monopolize diplomatic channels and prevent any independent Russian-Iranian-Afghan coordination.

The mutual hostility between McNeill and Simonich was widely noted by contemporaries. According to Dugamel, their relationship was characterized by profound mistrust and incompatibility. He observed that had Simonich remained in Tehran longer, the escalating tensions between Russian and British representatives might have led to direct imperial confrontation.

By late 1836, McNeill was already reporting to London that Simonich was actively pushing Persia toward Herat and aligning Iranian policy with Russian strategic objectives. Simonich, in turn, viewed McNeill’s influence as obstructive and antagonistic. Both men thus interpreted the same events through fundamentally opposing geopolitical frameworks, reinforcing the broader escalation of Anglo-Russian rivalry in the region..

Letters from Dost Mohammad Khan and Kohan Dil Khan to Mohammad Shah

On February 20, 1837 (Sunday), Dr. John McNeill forwarded to Lord Palmerston English translations of letters exchanged between the rulers of Kabul and Kandahar and Mohammad Shah, which British intelligence agents had intercepted. McNeill also reported his dissatisfaction to Hajji Mirza Aghasi, questioning why Mirza Masoud, the Iranian foreign minister, had allowed the Kandahar envoy Taj Mohammad Khan to meet Count Simonich while denying him access to the British legation. He further noted that the Russian minister had received envoys from Kandahar and had sent both correspondence and gifts in return.

In a broader report on Afghanistan, sent to William Hay Macnaghten on January 22, 1837, McNeill provided a detailed assessment of the political structure of the region. He argued that although the Durrani imperial order had formally collapsed, its dynastic legacy persisted. The Barakzai faction had displaced the Sadozais in Kabul and Kandahar, while the Sadozai line retained influence in Herat. Meanwhile, the Sikhs controlled Peshawar, though without securing the allegiance of the broader Durrani tribal confederation.

McNeill further noted that Dost Mohammad Khan, ruler of Kabul, had maternal ties to the Qizilbash community, which had settled in Afghanistan in earlier generations. He argued that this Shiite group maintained enduring cultural and religious connections with Iran, which distinguished it from other Afghan factions. In Herat, meanwhile, political fragmentation and ongoing military pressures had weakened local authority, with Yar Mohammad Khan, the vizier, and elements of Kamran Shah’s household reportedly mobilizing forces toward Kandahar and even contemplating expansion into Sistan.

Letter of Dost Mohammad Khan to Mohammad Shah

McNeill transmitted to London an English translation of a letter from Dost Mohammad Khan to Mohammad Shah, which he described as a significant diplomatic document:

Dost Mohammad Khan expressed long-standing loyalty to the Iranian monarchy, describing himself as a devoted subject of the Qajar dynasty and affirming that Afghanistan historically formed part of the Iranian imperial sphere. He referred to earlier correspondence sent via Haji Ibrahim and explained that his present communication was motivated by worsening regional instability.

He emphasized the disruptive influence of Sikh expansion in the region, which he described as a destabilizing force undermining Islamic governance. He claimed to command large forces of cavalry and infantry, but lamented his inability to fully mobilize them due to ongoing conflict and fragmentation. He described continuous warfare with the Sikh state, portraying it as both militarily overwhelming and religiously hostile.

Despite these challenges, he insisted that the cities of Kandahar, Kabul, and surrounding regions of Khorasan historically belonged within Iran’s broader political and civilizational sphere. He argued that instability in these territories could not be separated from Iranian strategic concerns.

Dost Mohammad Khan further warned that if he were unable to withstand Sikh pressure, he might be compelled to seek British support, though he portrayed such an alignment as a last resort. He therefore urged the Shah to take the regional situation into account and to act in defense of shared religious and political interests.

Response of Mohammad Shah

In February 1837 (1215 AH), Mohammad Shah responded in formal and ceremonious terms. He acknowledged receipt of the letters delivered by Haji Ibrahim and Mohammad Husain Khan, and expressed appreciation for Dost Mohammad Khan’s declared loyalty to the Iranian monarchy.

The Shah affirmed that Kabul and its surrounding territories were historically regarded as part of Iran’s sphere of influence, and he praised Dost Mohammad Khan’s resistance against non-Muslim forces, particularly the Sikhs. He characterized the Afghan ruler as a defender of Islam and indicated that such loyalty justified Iranian consideration and support.

Mohammad Shah further stated that, even before receiving the Afghan correspondence, he had already resolved to proceed toward Herat and provide assistance to friendly forces in the region. He described the departure of his army from Tehran and its movement toward Khorasan, interrupted temporarily by reports of a cholera outbreak.

He also reported military operations against Turkmen groups near the Gorgan frontier, describing their defeat at the hands of Iranian forces under Prince Fereydun Mirza. Following these operations, he stated that preparations continued for a renewed campaign in Khorasan and Herat, with additional troops and artillery being mobilized for a spring offensive.

The Shah concluded by sending gifts and envoys, including a ceremonial dagger, to reinforce diplomatic ties and to signal goodwill toward allied Afghan leaders.

Kandahar Correspondence and Broader Implications

Letters from Kohan Dil Khan and Mehr Dil Khan, the governors of Kandahar, conveyed similar assurances of loyalty to Mohammad Shah. They pledged cooperation and declared their readiness to execute the Shah’s directives with full allegiance.

Taken together, these exchanges indicated a growing rhetorical alignment between Kabul, Kandahar, and the Iranian court. From the British perspective, however, McNeill interpreted these developments as part of a broader Russian strategy of influence, allegedly coordinated through Count Simonich, aimed at drawing Afghanistan into an anti-British geopolitical alignment and facilitating Russian access toward India.

Paving the Way for Simonich’s Expulsion from Iran

Dr. John McNeill reported to Lord Palmerston in a dispatch dated December 16, 1837 that Russian diplomatic channels were actively linking the Herat campaign to broader financial and strategic arrangements. According to his report, the Russian Foreign Ministry had informed its representatives that, should Iran succeed in capturing Herat, Russia would consider cancelling the remaining balance of Iran’s indemnity under the Treaty of Turkmenchay. This concession was reportedly justified on the grounds that the Russian Emperor sought to contribute indirectly to the costs of the Persian campaign.

McNeill further noted intelligence suggesting that Husayn Khan, upon returning from the Shah’s camp to Tabriz, had informed Prince Qahraman Mirza that the Russian envoy had provided the Shah with a loan of approximately 50,000 tomans to support the military expedition.

British Policy Shift and Strategic Reassessment

By mid-1838, British policy toward Iran had begun to harden. On July 18, 1838, shortly after the coronation of Queen Victoria, Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston informed John Hobhouse, President of the Board of Control, that the existing Anglo-Iranian treaty framework had become strategically counterproductive.

Palmerston argued that the treaty, originally intended to secure Iran as a stabilizing buffer protecting British India, was now facilitating Russian influence and undermining Britain’s defensive position in the East. He therefore proposed that McNeill formally notify the Iranian court that Britain could no longer adhere to the existing treaty arrangements. He also recommended informing the Governor-General of India, George Eden, 1st Earl of Auckland, of this policy shift.

Russian Diplomatic Recalibration

Under mounting diplomatic pressure, Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode eventually adjusted his position. In correspondence with the Russian ambassador in Paris, he indicated that Count Simonich had been instructed to facilitate a reconciliation between Iran and Herat, rather than encourage further escalation. He also proposed the replacement of Simonich with Dugamel, describing the latter as a more moderate and diplomatically reliable representative whose appointment would signal a recalibration of Russian policy.

Despite these instructions, Count Simonich reportedly continued to act in accordance with military and strategic directives rather than diplomatic restraint. According to his own account, he succeeded in reinforcing Iranian commitment to the Herat campaign and personally traveled from Tehran toward the front in April 1838 to join the Shah’s forces near the city. He was accompanied, according to some accounts, by irregular Russian military elements and by the Polish adventurer Józef Wittkiewicz (known in Persian sources under the pseudonym “Omar Beg”), whose activities were associated with exploratory Russian engagement in Afghanistan.

British Counter-Operations in Kabul

At the same time, Captain Alexander Burnes was stationed in Kabul, where he attempted to prevent Dost Mohammad Khan and his allies in Kandahar from aligning with Iranian forces. In December 1837, Burnes reportedly assured Afghan leaders that British forces would support them against external threats. However, British officials in India, including Hobhouse and Auckland, later regarded such assurances as premature and diplomatically damaging.

In a letter to Hobhouse dated May 3, 1838, Auckland wrote that Burnes’s presence in Kabul had contributed to maintaining divisions between Kabul and Kandahar, although he acknowledged that this alone might not be sufficient to secure British strategic objectives in Herat.

Competing Imperial Pressures

During this period, British authorities in India continued to instruct McNeill to pressure Mohammad Shah to abandon the Herat campaign and to confine Iranian military activity within recognized borders. Simultaneously, the British government in London exerted diplomatic pressure on Russia to restrain Simonich’s actions in Iran.

In a dispatch dated June 30, 1837, McNeill reported a conversation with Simonich in which the Russian envoy claimed that he had previously received instructions from St. Petersburg not to encourage Iranian military action. However, McNeill asserted that Simonich’s actual conduct contradicted these instructions, as he continued to support the Shah’s ambitions in Herat.

McNeill further argued that Simonich’s interpretation of his orders allowed him considerable discretionary space, which he used to promote Iranian military engagement rather than restrain it. He concluded that Russian policy, as implemented on the ground, diverged significantly from its formal diplomatic instructions, thereby intensifying Anglo-Russian rivalry in the region.

Reconciliation Talks: Fateh Mohammad Khan, Kamran Mirza’s Envoy to the Iranian Court

At this time, Fateh Mohammad Khan arrived in Iran to conduct reconciliation negotiations. In a note dated Saturday, May 23, 1216 (June 3, 1837), Haj Mirza Aghasi responded to McNeill’s repeated representations that Asaf al-Dawla, the governor of Khorasan and uncle of Mohammad Shah, had compelled Yar Mohammad Khan, Kamran Mirza’s vizier, to accept reconciliation. He further suggested to Kamran Mirza that he should submit to the Shah and send a number of hostages to Iran as a guarantee of good faith. The Prime Minister also warned McNeill in firm terms that if Kamran Mirza hesitated to comply with Iran’s demands:

His Majesty will march without delay toward Khiva, Merv, Maimana, Herat, and beyond, to liberate the population from oppression, and to put an end to plunder and enslavement.

In his conversations with Persian statesmen, Fateh Mohammad Khan expressed support for McNeill’s position. In a report to Palmerston on the reconciliation talks, McNeill referred to Kamran Mirza as “Kamran Shah” and wrote that, in his correspondence with Mohammad Shah, he had adopted “the style and language of sovereign authority.” Although he addressed the Shah with outward humility, he did not acknowledge him as his sovereign, and his seal—used by several generations of the Afghan royal house—bore the title “Shah of the Durranis.”

Fateh Mohammad Khan, during his visit to McNeill in Tehran, stated that:

The government of Herat has no intention of relinquishing its independence, and Kamran will neither accept the recitation of the Friday sermon nor the minting of coins in the name of Mohammad Shah. Even if he were personally willing to accept such terms, he would not have the authority to impose them upon the Afghan tribes. Nevertheless, he assured that Herat sought a compromise with Iran to end hostilities, and that if Iran supported Yar Mohammad Khan’s proposals, a settlement could be reached. However, he expressed doubt regarding the Iranian government’s reliability.

According to McNeill, both the Shah and his ministers rejected the negotiated arrangement proposed by the Afghan delegation and Asaf al-Dawla. However, Asaf al-Dawla claimed that he had been authorized by the Shah to negotiate and had already acted on the basis of such authority.

McNeill further reported that the Herat envoy had requested British participation in the negotiations, expressing confidence in British intentions. He argued that the refusal of British officers to accompany the Iranian army in the previous year’s Herat campaign had demonstrated Britain’s reliability, and that Britain remained the only power capable of ensuring a credible settlement.

A few days after this meeting, McNeill visited Haj Mirza Aghasi. During their discussion, the Prime Minister stated that he believed the Afghan delegation had been sent merely to gain time and to weaken Iran’s military position. McNeill replied that this interpretation was incorrect. Haj Mirza Aghasi, pretending ignorance of McNeill’s prior meeting with Fateh Mohammad Khan, urged him to meet the envoy directly and assess his proposals. He added that if McNeill abandoned “his doubts about their sincerity,” he would be satisfied.

McNeill subsequently met the envoy of Herat once again and assisted him in drafting, in written form, a list of proposed terms for reconciliation, which he then forwarded to Palmerston. The proposals were as follows:

Afghan Proposals:

1. Plunder and warfare shall cease, and the trade in slaves shall be abolished.

2. If the Shah of Iran undertakes a campaign toward Turkestan and requires assistance, Kamran Shah shall provide troops according to his capacity and support the governor of Khorasan in such expeditions.

3. Annual tribute (baha’i money) shall be paid to the Iranian government during Nowruz.

4. Merchants entering Herat and its territories shall be protected, and their property and lives shall not be harmed.

5. One son of Kamran Shah and several relatives of Yar Mohammad Khan and Sher Mohammad Khan shall be held as hostages in Mashhad for two years, after which they shall be released if conditions are observed.

6. A permanent representative of Kamran Shah shall reside at the Iranian court.

Iranian Conditions:

1. The Shah of Iran shall treat Kamran Shah as a brother and with due respect.

2. The Iranian government shall not interfere in the succession of Kamran Shah, provided agreements are observed.

3. No Iranian army shall be sent into Herat, and internal autonomy shall be maintained, while Herat acknowledges submission and discontinues slave raiding and warfare.

4. Britain shall mediate between the two sides and ensure implementation of the agreement.

McNeill forwarded these proposals to Haj Mirza Aghasi on Friday, June 16, 1837, urging acceptance of the reconciliation plan, arguing that Herat had shown willingness to abandon slavery and raiding. He further suggested that rejection would undermine the possibility of peace.

Haj Mirza Aghasi, however, responded with political acuity, using McNeill’s draft as a legal instrument to expose contradictions in the Afghan proposals. He concluded that the entire framework implicitly recognized Iranian sovereignty over Herat, and therefore could not be accepted as a treaty between equal states. In his reply, he wrote:

• Peace and cessation of war would follow naturally from submission.

• Herat, as part of Iran, must contribute troops and resources like any other province.

• The notion of Kamran Shah as a sovereign equal was fundamentally unacceptable; there cannot be “two kings within one realm.”

• Tribute, coinage, and Friday sermons in the Shah’s name were obligatory expressions of sovereignty, not negotiable terms.

• Hostages would only be temporary guarantees of obedience, and could be extended if necessary.

• Internal autonomy could not be absolute, as deviation would require imperial correction.

• Britain’s role as mediator would be accepted only within the framework of Iranian sovereignty.

He further dismissed Fateh Mohammad Khan’s assurances as inconsistent with earlier Afghan correspondence and concluded that no reliable foundation existed for trust in such declarations.

Two days later, on June 20, 1837, Haj Mirza Aghasi sent a follow-up reply emphasizing that Asaf al-Dawla had requested military support for an advance on Herat, and that repeated Afghan promises of compliance had historically been accompanied by continued raiding, slave trading, and instability in Khorasan. He concluded that such contradictions rendered further negotiation ineffective, and questioned McNeill’s alarmist assumptions regarding future developments:

The distance between our countries is vast, and relations have remained uninterrupted. On what basis, then, are such fears and improbable predictions advanced?

McNeill’s Response and the Advance of Mohammad Shah Toward Herat

Haj Mirza Aghasi’s firm and uncompromising reply deeply angered McNeill. He forwarded both the Prime Minister’s correspondence and copies of his own diplomatic exchanges to Palmerston, writing:

It is clear enough that the real issue between the two parties is the status of Herat. The Shah of Iran considers it his rightful possession, whereas Kamran Shah refuses to relinquish it. This, in my view, is a matter of vital concern to the security of British India. Herat must not fall under Iranian control, nor should it be subjected to any European power capable of challenging British strategic interests in the region.

On Tuesday, June 27, 1837, McNeill recorded an increasingly frustrated memorandum in response to Haj Mirza Aghasi, writing:

Regarding the predatory conduct of the governors of Herat and their treatment of Iranian subjects, it is evident that such practices will not cease unless firm and binding arrangements are imposed. Only through a clear and uniform settlement can these disturbances be brought to an end and the population assured of security. Yet it appears that the ministers of this government are reluctant to pursue measures that would genuinely resolve these disorders.

As for the alleged “fear of the British government,” McNeill rejected the accusation outright, stating that the expression had not appeared in his correspondence:

Thank God, the British government has never feared any power. It has not been defeated in any conflict and has consistently emerged victorious in all its engagements.

McNeill further declared that he would not object if Iran were to assume control of Herat or even remove Kamran Shah. He wrote to Palmerston that although he had initially regarded the Shah’s campaign as just, the conditions later presented by Herat had altered his judgment:

The war, which was initially just in its purpose, has, under the current circumstances, become unjust on the part of Iran.

He nevertheless continued to challenge Haj Mirza Aghasi, who responded in a firm yet sardonic tone. The Prime Minister wrote, in substance:

Your expressed desire for the prosperity of Herat is consistent with the wishes of this government, and we appreciate that you regard such an outcome as desirable.

With respect to previous grievances: when Mr. Ellis, your predecessor, arrived, he was shown every sign of goodwill. Had the situation been otherwise, he would have raised complaints. We also possess his correspondence, which reflects his satisfaction upon departure.

Regarding commerce, all measures requested by Mr. Ellis were implemented, and tensions were formally resolved. If satisfaction was not achieved, it was not due to any neglect on our part.

Furthermore, this government has not failed in fulfilling any agreed obligations, and all offices—high and low—continue to support amicable relations with Britain.

As for Afghanistan, historical records and recent correspondence from Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat demonstrate that their rulers have repeatedly acknowledged their connection and subordination to Iran. Letters from Yar Mohammad Khan, Kohan Dil Khan, and Mehrdel Khan confirm this fact.

The heat is severe, and this response is therefore sufficient. I shall not prolong correspondence further.

According to McNeill, on Sunday, July 23, 1837, the Shah advanced with his army toward Herat. McNeill refrained from accompanying the expedition, noting that he considered it inappropriate to display open disapproval. Lieutenant Colonel Stoddart reported that the Shah had stated:

“My sole intention in this campaign is to end slavery. Nearly three million captives remain in Bukhara, Khiva, and surrounding regions. This objective is fixed in my mind, and I shall not abandon it until it is achieved.”

McNeill acknowledged receipt of these remarks and conveyed them to the British authorities.

On Friday, September 28, 1837, McNeill reported that the Shah had departed from Abbasabad on the road toward Mashhad, intending to proceed rapidly toward Sabzevar, despite severe logistical shortages. He warned that the army was critically undersupplied and unlikely to sustain prolonged operations.

He estimated Afghan strength at approximately 18,000 cavalry and 9,000 infantry, while the Shah’s forces were considerably weaker and poorly organized. Even under optimistic assumptions, McNeill assessed the Iranian army at no more than 10,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 30 artillery pieces, many of which were operationally ineffective.

On October 16, 1837, Stoddart further reported from the Iranian camp near Nishapur that soldiers had not received full wages, leading to widespread dissatisfaction and partial mutiny. Intelligence also indicated that a Russian agent, Captain Vucevich, had traveled through Rasht, Tehran, and Nishapur and was proceeding toward Kandahar via eastern routes, raising concerns about coordinated Russian activity in the region.

McNeill additionally reported that Afghan forces had adopted scorched-earth tactics, burning crops and evacuating settlements around Herat to deprive the Shah’s army of supplies. He warned that the approaching winter, combined with logistical collapse, made a successful siege highly improbable. He further predicted that a failure at Herat could destabilize Iran’s internal provinces.

Despite these difficulties, the Shah reportedly maintained ambitions of extending operations beyond Herat toward Maimana and Balkh, and potentially toward Khiva and the Oxus frontier, where Russian and British strategic interests intersected. McNeill also noted the presence of European officers and intelligence agents within the wider theatre, underscoring the increasing internationalization of the conflict.

Russian and British Foreign Ministers Discuss Simonić’s Role in the Herat Crisis and His Recall

On Friday, April 14, 1837, Lord Palmerston addressed a letter to Durham, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, reporting that Count Simonich had been actively assisting Iran in its campaign concerning Herat. Palmerston instructed Durham to seek clarification from Count Nesselrode as to whether the conduct of the Russian envoy in Tehran aligned with the directives of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

In earlier communications in London, Nesselrode had expressed the expectation that Russian and British representatives in Iran would act “in harmony and in a spirit of reconciliation and unity.” According to Urquhart, Nesselrode later replied that if Count Simonich had acted as reported, such behavior would indeed fall within his instructions, since he had been ordered to discourage warlike escalation by the Shah “at all times and in all places.” Any contrary impression, he suggested, must have resulted from misinformation.

Despite this diplomatic clarification, McNeill was unwilling to abandon his broader objective regarding Herat. In subsequent reports to Palmerston, he emphasized that his assessment of Simonich’s influence derived primarily from Persian officials, particularly Haj Mirza Aghasi, the Iranian Prime Minister.

In a letter dated June 25, 1838, McNeill wrote:

Herat is the key to all Afghanistan to the north. The country between the frontiers of Iran and India is far more fertile than I had anticipated; and I can confidently assert that there is no natural barrier to the advance of a large army from the borders of Georgia to Kandahar, nor, indeed, any substantial obstacle as far as the Indus River.

Palmerston, however, initially accepted Nesselrode’s assurances with satisfaction and did not treat Simonich’s actions as an immediate diplomatic crisis. In a draft note dated October 26, 1838, he reiterated that Nesselrode’s explanation appeared “simple, direct, and unambiguous,” and that Simonich, if acting as described, had done so in accordance with his instructions.

Nesselrode even suggested that Durham be shown the relevant directives issued to Simonich. Following these exchanges, Durham concluded that Simonich would likely be recalled. In practice, however, no such recall occurred immediately, and tensions between Simonich and McNeill continued to intensify.

Simonich, who had not accompanied the Shah’s expedition to Herat and remained in Tehran, reportedly objected to McNeill’s growing influence over Persian decision-making. McNeill, in turn, viewed Simonich as actively encouraging the Shah’s military ambitions.

Although Durham informed Palmerston on May 2, 1837, that Simonich would be summoned to St. Petersburg, no formal reprimand had yet been issued. The rivalry between the two envoys therefore remained unresolved and increasingly destabilizing.

The Arrest of Fateh Mohammad Khan and Rising Tensions

On Friday, July 28, 1837, McNeill reported an incident that significantly heightened tensions between Iran and Britain. According to his dispatch, Fateh Mohammad Khan, the envoy of Herat, departed Iranian territory without reaching any agreement with the Iranian government and began his return journey.

Sensing the possibility of interception, McNeill ordered one of his trusted political aides—an experienced rider attached to the British diplomatic mission—to accompany the envoy discreetly toward Mashhad, with instructions to observe developments and report any obstruction.

The rider was to ensure that if the envoy were detained, immediate notice would be transmitted to McNeill, who intended to protest such an act as a violation of international norms.

Subsequently, on October 16, 1838, McNeill sent Ali Mohammad Beg, a long-serving employee of the British mission, to Herat for intelligence-gathering purposes. However, during his return, Ali Mohammad Beg was intercepted by Iranian forces. His clothing was partially removed, his horses confiscated, and he was forcibly taken to the military camp.

Although he attempted to invoke his diplomatic association with the British mission, he was initially detained. Only after intervention by Colonel Stoddart, the sole British officer present in the Shah’s camp, was his case brought to the attention of Haj Mirza Aghasi. Even then, the Prime Minister did not immediately release him, and further searches were conducted for correspondence believed to be in his possession.

Reports indicate that Ali Mohammad Beg was subjected to harsh treatment, including threats and humiliation by certain Iranian officers, notably Haji Khan Qarabaghi.

McNeill’s Protest and Diplomatic Escalation

McNeill expressed strong dissatisfaction with the incident, interpreting it as a deliberate affront to British authority. In his report of November 25, 1837, he wrote:

I had dispatched a trusted horseman to Mashhad to await any communication from Mohammad Fateh Khan from Herat. Given the movement of Iranian forces into Khorasan, such precaution was necessary, as it would have been impossible for an Afghan messenger to reach Tehran safely.

He further noted that Fateh Mohammad Khan may have hesitated to transmit sensitive messages, fearing interception, or alternatively sought to reassure McNeill regarding developments in Herat. Ali Mohammad Beg ultimately became involved in the transmission of correspondence between Herat and British representatives.

McNeill emphasized that the messenger’s treatment constituted a serious diplomatic violation. Colonel Stoddart’s report corroborated elements of this account, describing the seizure of documents, confiscation of property, and verbal abuse directed at the British envoy’s agent.

Ali Mohammad Beg’s Testimony

Upon his return to Tehran, Ali Mohammad Beg provided a detailed account of his arrest. In his testimony, he stated that he was intercepted near Mashhad by Iranian cavalry and brought forcibly to the Shah’s camp. There, he was interrogated regarding his mission and detained under suspicion of carrying correspondence.

He described being brought before Haj Mirza Aghasi and a group of military officials, where he was questioned extensively about his journey and his association with British officers. At one point, he was threatened with execution and subjected to coercive interrogation aimed at extracting hidden documents.

Despite the severity of the treatment, he maintained that he had served the British mission for over thirty years and had no intention of betraying his duties. His statement was partially corroborated by Mr. Borowski, who was present in the camp and confirmed aspects of his identity and journey.

Eventually, after further discussions between Iranian officials and Colonel Stoddart, Ali Mohammad Beg was released, though some of his belongings were not immediately returned.

Concluding Observation

The incident became emblematic of the broader breakdown in Anglo-Iranian diplomatic relations during this period. McNeill interpreted it as part of a systematic pattern of hostility toward British representatives, while Iranian officials framed their actions as legitimate measures taken within their sovereign jurisdiction and in response to perceived espionage.

The episode further deepened mistrust between the British mission and the court of Mohammad Shah, reinforcing McNeill’s conviction that Iran’s internal politics were increasingly shaped by competing foreign influences and that the Herat question had become inseparable from the broader Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia.

Russian and British Foreign Ministers Discuss Simonich’s Role in Herat and His Recall

On Friday, April 14, 1837, Lord Palmerston sent a dispatch to Durham, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, informing him that Count Simonich had actively assisted Iran in its campaign against Herat. Palmerston instructed Durham to inquire of Count Nesselrode whether the conduct of the Russian envoy in Tehran was consistent with the official directives of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Nesselrode had previously stated in London that the Russian government expected “the representatives of Russia and Britain in Iran to cooperate in harmony and reconciliation.” According to Urquhart, Nesselrode replied that if Count Simonich had acted as reported, his conduct would still fall within his instructions, which allegedly required him to prevent the Shah from embarking on military expeditions. Any deviation, he suggested, must therefore stem from misinformation or misinterpretation.

McNeill, however, was not prepared to abandon his campaign regarding the “separation” of Herat from Iranian influence. In a later report to Palmerston, he insisted that his understanding of Simonich’s conduct was based primarily on the testimony of Iranian officials, particularly Haj Mirza Aghasi. In a dispatch dated June 25, 1838, McNeill argued that:

“Herat is the key to all Afghanistan to the north. The territory between the borders of Iran and India is far more fertile than I had previously assumed; and I am convinced that there exists no natural barrier capable of preventing the advance of a large army from Georgia to Kandahar, nor any significant obstacle to reaching the Indus.”

Despite these concerns, Palmerston initially accepted Nesselrode’s assurances and did not immediately treat Simonich’s actions as a serious diplomatic breach. In a draft memorandum dated October 26, 1838, he noted that Nesselrode’s explanation appeared “simple, direct, and satisfactory,” and suggested that Simonich had indeed acted within the general scope of his instructions.

Nesselrode even proposed that Durham be shown Simonich’s original directives. Following this exchange, Durham concluded that Simonich would likely be recalled to St. Petersburg. In reality, however, the tension between Simonich and McNeill was only beginning to intensify.

Simonich, who had not yet accompanied the Shah on the Herat campaign and remained in Tehran, continued to encourage Iranian action, allegedly against the spirit of British objections. McNeill, for his part, was increasingly frustrated that Simonich appeared to operate with de facto authority in support of the expedition. Although Durham reported on May 2, 1837, that Simonich’s recall was imminent, no formal reprimand had yet been issued by St. Petersburg.

Arrest of Fateh Mohammad Khan and the Escalation of Tensions

On Friday, July 28, 1837, McNeill reported an incident that significantly heightened tensions between Britain and Iran. According to his dispatch:

The envoy of Herat, Fateh Mohammad Khan, having failed to reach an agreement with the Iranian government, departed for his return journey. Fearing that he might be detained, I instructed one of my trusted agents, a cavalry officer attached to the British political mission, to accompany him to Mashhad and ensure that any interference with his movement would be immediately reported.

Shortly thereafter, Iranian forces intercepted the envoy on the road. His belongings were searched, his horses seized, and he was taken into custody. Although he initially reached Colonel Stoddart, the only British officer present in the Shah’s camp, and was briefly brought before Haj Mirza Aghasi, he was again detained. His correspondence was confiscated, and he was subjected to harsh treatment by Iranian officers, including Brigadier General Haji Khan Qarabaghi.

McNeill expressed deep indignation at what he considered a violation of diplomatic norms. In subsequent correspondence, he demanded formal apologies, the dismissal of Haji Khan, and assurances that such conduct would not be repeated. He warned Palmerston that failure to address the incident would constitute a serious affront to British authority.

Ali Mohammad Beg Mafi and the Question of Diplomatic Immunity

McNeill also transmitted Colonel Stoddart’s detailed account of the incident. Stoddart confirmed that Ali Mohammad Beg Mafi, a long-serving employee of the British mission, had been arrested, stripped, threatened, and interrogated, allegedly under suspicion of carrying correspondence between Herat and the British envoy.

Stoddart reported that Ali Mohammad Beg was repeatedly mistreated, deprived of his belongings, and forced to surrender letters addressed to McNeill. Although he was eventually released, several of his possessions were not returned, and he was subjected to continued intimidation.

McNeill used the incident to argue that Iran had failed to respect the privileges of British diplomatic personnel. He characterized the treatment of Ali Mohammad Beg as a “serious violation of international practice” and warned that such actions endangered relations between the two states.

The Testimony of Ali Mohammad Beg

Upon his arrival in Tehran, Ali Mohammad Beg was interviewed and provided a detailed account of his arrest. His narrative, however, contained inconsistencies when compared with Stoddart’s version. He stated that he had been detained near Mashhad by Iranian cavalry, interrogated, and brought to the Shah’s camp, where he was questioned extensively by Haj Mirza Aghasi and other officials.

According to his testimony, he was stripped, threatened with execution, and accused of espionage. He maintained that he had acted in the service of the British mission for over thirty years and had no intention of betraying his duties.

During interrogation, Haj Mirza Aghasi reportedly asked him why he served Britain rather than Iran, offering him a position in the Iranian service and a monetary stipend if he would defect. Ali Mohammad Beg refused, stating that he could not abandon his long-standing obligations.

Iranian Response and Legal Justification

In a formal reply dated January 6, 1838, Mirza Ali, the deputy foreign minister, responded to McNeill’s complaints. He reaffirmed that British officials were not entitled to interfere in military operations against Afghanistan and defended the actions of Iranian officers on the grounds of sovereignty.

He argued that Ali Mohammad Beg had been moving in a politically sensitive region during active military operations, and that his detention was therefore justified. He further emphasized that correspondence and movement in such circumstances required authorization from the Iranian state.

Mirza Ali also rejected McNeill’s demand for the dismissal of Haj Mirza Aghasi, asserting that the Iranian prime minister had acted within his authority and had no grounds for punishment. In a pointed passage, he contrasted European and Persian systems of governance, arguing that Iranian monarchs exercised absolute authority over life, property, and governance, whereas European states operated under different legal assumptions.

He concluded that individuals such as Ali Mohammad Beg were Iranian subjects and that their actions fell under Iranian jurisdiction, not British protection.

Breakdown in Diplomatic Relations

Despite these exchanges, McNeill remained dissatisfied. His correspondence with Iranian officials continued in a confrontational tone, and mutual distrust deepened. The Shah eventually decided to dispatch an envoy to Britain to request McNeill’s recall and replacement.

This episode marked a significant deterioration in Anglo-Iranian relations during the Herat crisis. What had begun as a contest over regional influence increasingly evolved into a broader confrontation over diplomatic immunity, sovereignty, and the limits of imperial intervention.

Reports of the Siege of Herat and the Conduct of the British Mission

During the siege of Herat, McNeill advised the British officers attached to the Persian forces—who had ostensibly been sent only to train the Iranian army, not to participate directly in combat—to maintain strict neutrality and avoid involvement in hostilities with the Afghans. He further instructed them to endure any personal insults or provocations from the Shah, while he himself refrained from reacting openly to royal displeasure. Lord Palmerston, by contrast, had ordered McNeill to adopt a firm stance toward the Shah, while simultaneously avoiding any rupture in Anglo-Iranian relations.

According to McNeill’s confidential dispatches sent to London on Monday, November 27, 1837, Mohammad Shah’s forces at the Torbat-e-Jam camp were organized into four principal divisions:

1. The first division, numbering approximately 12,000 troops with ten cannons under Asaf al-Dawla, was tasked with securing supply lines and coordinating with Hazara tribes in the Herat region.

2. The second division, consisting of 8,000 troops with six to eight cannons, was dispatched to capture the fortress of Ghorian, located approximately 60 kilometers from Herat.

3. The third division, led by Hamza Mirza and Hasan Khan under the Shah’s direct supervision, advanced toward Herat as the main assault force.

4. The fourth division was assigned logistical duties, securing provisions along the right flank of the advancing army before joining the main encampment at Ghorian.

As previously noted, McNeill’s early assessments of the Persian military campaign were highly pessimistic. He consistently emphasized the logistical weaknesses of the Iranian army and predicted that the approaching winter—marked by snow, storms, and severe cold—would severely undermine its operational capacity.

However, after two months of siege operations, McNeill was compelled to revise several of his assumptions. The Iranian forces successfully captured the strategic fortress of Ghorian, and Shams al-Din, the former governor of Farah, defected to the Shah with approximately 7,000 troops familiar with the surrounding terrain. This development significantly strengthened the Iranian position, enabling the Shah to sustain a force of nearly 40,000 troops, supported by approximately eighty domestically produced cannons, in a prolonged siege against Herat.

In the early phase of the siege, Persian artillery reportedly fired approximately 16,000 shells against the city’s fortifications, causing extensive structural damage. In a report dated Friday, February 23, 1838, McNeill wrote:

“In the past two months, Iranian forces have conducted extensive foraging operations around Herat. However, these expeditions have often degenerated into disorder and excess, leading even some Shiite villagers to flee or resist, treating the Persian troops as hostile. The winter, however, has been unusually mild, and the army has not suffered the hardships initially anticipated.”

Despite his attempts to emphasize Afghan resistance and logistical difficulties, McNeill could not fully obscure the military realities on the ground. He acknowledged that the Shah had succeeded in sustaining a large siege army for an extended period, demonstrating that even a substantial force could operate in the region without catastrophic supply failure. He further observed that this fact underscored Herat’s strategic vulnerability and its potential importance to any European power seeking regional influence.

McNeill also reported that Asaf al-Dawla’s forces had advanced as far as Maimana, where they had succeeded in pacifying several tribal groups between Herat and that region. In retrospect, McNeill attributed the Iranian army’s operational endurance partly to these auxiliary campaigns, suggesting that without them the Hazara tribes might have supported Herat more actively and disrupted Persian supply lines.

He further noted an engagement involving Brigadier General Haji Khan Qarabaghi, who reportedly crossed a defensive trench and engaged Afghan forces directly. However, the attack resulted in significant casualties, including approximately forty-five men killed and Haji Khan himself wounded. McNeill nevertheless later concluded that Haji Khan’s conduct was problematic, and—as subsequent developments indicate—advocated his dismissal.

McNeill also reported that Iranian artillery had begun to suffer from ammunition shortages, resulting in reduced firing intensity, while Afghan defenders had repaired much of the damage caused by earlier bombardments. He further claimed that Persian reinforcements numbering approximately 70,000 men had been ordered from the provinces, although he doubted both their timely arrival and their actual mobilization capacity. He also suggested that British intelligence sources, including agents such as Rawlinson in Kermanshah, were actively disrupting Persian recruitment efforts through bribery and influence over local governors.

Despite these claims, McNeill acknowledged that Iranian forces continued to press the siege. On Sunday, June 24, 1838, Persian troops reportedly breached part of Herat’s fortifications, inflicting significant losses on Kamran Mirza’s defenders. Yar Mohammad Khan and Colonel Pottinger were forced to intervene rapidly to stabilize the situation, and Afghan artillery succeeded in temporarily repelling the assault. Meanwhile, the city was increasingly affected by shortages of food and supplies, and civilian suffering intensified as conditions deteriorated.

British Policy Shift and Palmerston’s Instructions

On Friday, March 16, 1838, Lord Palmerston—angered by McNeill’s increasingly inflammatory dispatches regarding the Persian court—wrote to him indicating that the British mission might be closed and that McNeill should be prepared to withdraw from Iran if necessary. However, Palmerston simultaneously emphasized caution, instructing him not to escalate tensions unnecessarily.

He wrote that McNeill must avoid both extremes:

• on the one hand, not to widen the rupture between Britain and Iran beyond necessity;

• on the other, not to allow the Persian government to believe that British demands had been abandoned or weakened.

Palmerston further instructed that if the Shah refused to comply with British demands, McNeill was to decide whether to suspend negotiations or formally break diplomatic relations. In the event of a rupture, McNeill was authorized either to remain temporarily in Tabriz to allow for possible de-escalation or to withdraw to Ottoman territory pending further instructions.

At the same time, Palmerston reaffirmed that the ultimate objective of British policy was not the severance of relations with Iran, but rather the prevention of such a rupture through carefully calibrated diplomatic pressure consistent with British imperial interests.

McNeill’s Visit to the Shah’s Camp and the Escalation of Strategic Calculations

From McNeill’s correspondence with both London and Calcutta, it becomes evident that he sought to exploit the long communication delays between Iran and the British authorities, using this temporal gap to implement policies that reflected his own strategic preferences. In a dispatch dated Thursday, March 8, 1838, he informed Lord Palmerston that the British government in India had effectively instructed him to compel the Shah either to withdraw from Herat through negotiation or by alternative diplomatic means. Interpreting Herat as a strategic imperative for British interests in India, McNeill therefore resolved to proceed to the Shah’s camp and attempt to persuade him to conclude a settlement with Kamran Mirza—whom McNeill himself frequently styled “Kamran Shah”—thereby bringing the siege to an end.

Lord Palmerston, eager to terminate the protracted conflict at Herat but wary of confrontation with Lord Auckland in India, did not oppose McNeill’s mission. In a dispatch dated Monday, May 21, 1838, Palmerston formally endorsed the journey, while carefully balancing encouragement with caution. He wrote:

If you succeed in persuading the Shah to withdraw from Herat, whether through agreement with the ruler of Herat or otherwise, you will have achieved a significant service to British interests in the East. In that case, you should communicate His Majesty’s Government’s satisfaction with the Shah’s cooperation.

At the same time, Palmerston made clear that failure was also a possibility. If the Shah remained engaged in the siege—or extended his operations beyond Herat into Afghanistan—McNeill was instructed to convey that Britain could not accept any expansion of Iranian military action in the region. He was further directed, in such circumstances, to present a firm diplomatic warning.

McNeill’s Departure and Early Reports from the Field

On Saturday, March 10, 1838, McNeill departed Tehran for Herat. By March 22, he had reached Mazinan, approximately 295 kilometers from Mashhad, informing Palmerston that he expected to arrive at the Shah’s camp within ten to twelve days. He enclosed copies of correspondence addressed to the Shah, the Prime Minister, and Asaf al-Dawla, notifying them of his intention to join the camp. He also reported that Count Simonich had allegedly influenced Mirza Mas’ud to issue a warning discouraging his departure.

In a letter dated March 9, 1838, Mirza Mas’ud cautioned McNeill against proceeding to the Shah’s headquarters, arguing that his presence during the siege would intensify the conflict and further destabilize the situation. He urged him to reconsider or postpone the journey, warning that it could negatively affect both the military situation and Anglo-Iranian relations.

Conditions at the Siege of Herat

By April 11, 1838, after reaching the Shah’s camp, McNeill reported that the siege remained incomplete and that the possibility of a rapid Persian victory was increasingly doubtful. However, he also emphasized the remarkable endurance of the Iranian forces despite severe logistical constraints. He described the army as operating under extreme hardship:

“The Iranian troops suffer greatly from deprivation. Many survive on wild vegetation gathered from the surrounding countryside. Yet they continue to hold their trenches with remarkable discipline and endurance, showing a degree of perseverance rarely observed in Asian armies.”

He noted that soldiers remained entrenched for days in waterlogged positions, exposed to continuous bombardment and suffering daily casualties. Despite this, morale, in his estimation, had not yet collapsed.

McNeill nevertheless argued that unless the Shah secured reliable supply lines, the campaign would ultimately become unsustainable. He also began to emphasize more strongly the strategic implications of a potential Persian victory, warning that success at Herat could shift the balance of power across Central Asia and threaten British interests in India.

Appeals for Intervention and Strategic Alarm

On the same day, McNeill sent a separate and urgent dispatch to Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India, requesting military support from Kandahar to break the Persian siege. The tone of the letter suggests increasing frustration and political pressure, as McNeill attempted to demonstrate both the urgency of the situation and the consequences of inaction.

In his report, he also sought to present himself as having acted prudently and in accordance with instructions, while simultaneously portraying the strategic environment in increasingly alarmist terms. He argued that even rural populations in Khorasan were beginning to interpret the conflict as a broader contest between Britain and Russia.

In a further elaboration, McNeill wrote:

The question of Herat is no longer local; it is the question of Afghanistan as a whole. Its resolution here will determine the fate of the region. The awareness that Britain seeks to prevent Persian expansion, while Russia supports it, is now widely understood even among the rural population.

He concluded that the conflict had effectively become a symbolic contest between European powers in Central Asia, regardless of the intentions of local actors.

Strategic Advocacy for British Military Pressure

McNeill then advanced a more explicit strategic argument, suggesting that even limited British intervention could decisively alter the outcome. He proposed that a small force capable of disrupting Persian supply lines might compel the Shah to abandon the siege, while a larger expeditionary force could fundamentally reshape political alignments across Central Asia.

He wrote that such a display of force would signal to regional powers that they were within the strategic sphere of British influence. Although he acknowledged that such measures were controversial within official circles, he argued that the coordination between Persia and Russia in Afghanistan justified a more assertive posture.

Ultimately, McNeill concluded that preventing the capture of Herat was strategically preferable to responding after a Persian victory, which he believed would force Britain into a far more disadvantageous position.

Kharg Island and the Expansion of British Pressure

At the same time that Mohammad Shah Qajar was engaged in the siege of Herat, British naval forces seized Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf. On Friday, April 6, 1838 (1217), McNeill arrived at the Shah’s camp in Herat, warning that any Persian advance would constitute a breach of the Anglo-Persian understanding and would compel Britain to adopt measures to safeguard its interests in the region.

As Hobhouse wrote to Auckland on April 4, 1838, Palmerston had already authorized the dispatch of a naval force to the Persian Gulf and had even contemplated punitive operations along the southern frontiers of Iran. Soon after, the British ship Wellesley, acting under orders from the East India administration, occupied Kharg Island. The formal declaration regarding the suspension of aspects of the Anglo-Persian treaty—previously discussed within Palmerston’s office—reached McNeill on July 27, 1838.

By this stage, imperial coordination between London and Calcutta had hardened into a coherent strategic posture. On July 30, Hobhouse reported to Queen Victoria on the expanding Persian Gulf operation, while reaffirming British unwillingness to tolerate any Iranian advance toward the Indus frontier. On August 2, 1838, he communicated the relevant dispatches to Auckland, along with Palmerston’s official instructions concerning the treaty framework.

Although the Foreign Office and the East India administration maintained procedural caution, both had effectively endorsed the emerging strategy: containment of Persian influence in Afghanistan through indirect pressure and maritime demonstration.

Strategic Reorientation and Afghan Policy

By late August 1838, Palmerston was openly advocating a restructuring of British policy in Afghanistan. In correspondence with Hobhouse, he suggested that rather than relying on Persian containment alone, Britain should cultivate a friendly Afghan polity aligned with British India, supported by Ranjit Singh’s Sikh state. Afghanistan, in this conception, would serve as a buffer more reliable than Iran itself in blocking Russian influence.

This logic marked a decisive shift: from diplomatic containment to geopolitical engineering.

On October 9, 1838, Palmerston formally instructed Auckland to expedite military preparations designed to expel Persian forces from Herat if necessary.

McNeill’s Advance to the Shah’s Camp

Against this backdrop, McNeill departed Tehran on March 10, 1838, and by March 22 had reached Mazinan on the road to Mashhad. From there, he informed London that he expected to arrive at the Shah’s camp within days. He enclosed copies of his correspondence with the Shah, the Prime Minister, and Asaf al-Dawla, noting that Count Simonich’s influence had already begun to complicate diplomatic communication.

A letter attributed to Mirza Mas‘ud cautioned McNeill against proceeding to the camp, warning that his presence during the siege of Herat would intensify tensions and potentially destabilize ongoing negotiations. McNeill nevertheless continued his advance.

By April 11, 1838, he reported from the camp that the siege remained unresolved and that Persian forces were suffering severe logistical strain. Yet he also acknowledged their remarkable endurance:

“The Iranian troops endure hunger, mud, and constant bombardment with a persistence rarely observed in Asian armies…”

Despite such observations, McNeill increasingly argued that Herat’s strategic position made it unacceptable for any hostile power to control it, particularly given its proximity to India.

On the same day, he sent a separate and more forceful memorandum to Lord Auckland, urging consideration of a British-supported intervention from Kandahar to break the siege. His tone, marked by urgency and frustration, reflected growing concern over both Persian persistence and Russian diplomatic presence in the region.

The Broader Imperial Logic

McNeill’s dispatches reveal a dual narrative: on one hand, admiration for Persian resilience; on the other, a sustained argument that Herat must not fall under Iranian influence. He framed the siege not as a local conflict but as a geopolitical fulcrum linking Persia, Central Asia, and British India.

In his analysis, even limited Persian success would alter the strategic balance of the region, drawing Russia and Britain into direct competition across Afghanistan and the wider frontier zone.

Understood — here is your fully corrected and polished version of the section, with improved academic tone, corrected terminology, chronology, and consistency, while preserving your argument and narrative structure.

---

The Concert of Europe after Napoleon’s Defeat and the Eastern Question: Europe, the Ottoman Empire, and Iran

From the rise of the Osman Bey dynasty in the fourteenth century, the Ottoman domains—later known as the Ottoman Empire—became a persistent source of concern for their western European neighbors, extending in European imagination as far as the North Sea. Early modern thinkers such as Martin Luther and Erasmus even described the Turks as instruments of divine punishment against Christendom.

Through a combination of military discipline and the effective mobilization of economic and human resources across a vast imperial space, the Ottoman Empire ruled for centuries over territories stretching from Hungary and the Crimean Peninsula in the north to Yemen in the south, and from Algeria and Tunisia in the west to Iraq in the east.

Over time, the Ottoman Empire became an essential component of the European balance of power. It had to be incorporated into the strategic calculations of European diplomacy. France under Francis I viewed the Ottomans as a useful counterweight to Habsburg dominance, while Queen Elizabeth I similarly considered Ottoman power a stabilizing factor against Spanish and Habsburg pressure in Europe. In this framework, Ottoman strength was not only feared but also strategically instrumentalized within European statecraft.

The Eastern Question and the Decline of Ottoman Power

By the eighteenth century, however, the Ottoman Empire had entered a phase of structural decline, intensified by European technological advancement and the rise of Imperial Russia under the Romanovs. While the Austrian Habsburg Empire welcomed Ottoman weakness in principle, it feared even more the expansion of Russian power. Vienna therefore faced a strategic dilemma: opposing the Ottomans risked strengthening Russia, while cooperating with Russia in dismantling Ottoman territories risked provoking Prussia and other German powers. This unresolved tension became known as the “Eastern Question”—a problem that would gradually extend beyond the Ottoman Empire to include Iran and, indirectly, the security architecture of India.

The Concert of Europe and Post-Napoleonic Order

Following Napoleon’s defeat and exile in 1814, Europe entered a new phase of political organization under what became known as the Concert of Europe. This system, established through the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) and reinforced by subsequent congresses in Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822), sought to preserve continental stability through consultation among the great powers and collective restraint.

The Concert system rested on the cooperation of five principal powers: Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Its guiding principles included the prevention of unilateral territorial expansion, the management of revolutionary movements, and the maintenance of a European balance of power through diplomacy rather than continuous warfare.

Within this framework:

• Britain and Austria consolidated many of their post-Napoleonic territorial interests;

• Russia expanded its influence into Poland, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Ottoman periphery;

• France and Prussia sought to reassert their positions within the restored European hierarchy.

It was within this evolving structure that the Eastern Question became a central organizing principle of nineteenth-century European diplomacy.

Ottoman–Russian Rivalry and European Intervention

During the final phase of the Napoleonic Wars, shifting alliances between Britain, France, and Russia reshaped the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia’s confrontation with the Ottoman Empire intersected with broader European diplomacy, in which great powers repeatedly intervened to prevent any single state from dominating the Straits or the eastern Mediterranean basin.

British diplomacy, particularly through figures such as Stratford Canning, 1st Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, increasingly aimed at preserving the Ottoman Empire as a strategic buffer against Russian expansion toward the Mediterranean and, indirectly, toward British India.

The Black Sea and Russian Expansion

The strategic importance of the Black Sea had already been transformed in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Under Peter the Great, Russia broke Ottoman maritime exclusivity by capturing Azov, initiating a prolonged struggle for naval access and regional dominance.

This rivalry intensified under Catherine II, who pursued a broader imperial strategy aimed at expanding Russian influence in the Black Sea region and weakening Ottoman control. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) marked a decisive turning point by granting Russia significant commercial and naval privileges, while later gains were consolidated through the Treaty of Jassy (1792).

These developments permanently altered the geopolitical structure of the Black Sea, transforming it into a contested imperial frontier.

Britain, Continental War, and Ottoman Realignment

During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain—lacking large continental armies—relied primarily on naval power and indirect strategies. It supported various coalitions and local actors against France, although many of these interventions produced unstable or temporary alliances.

Following the Treaty of Tilsit (1807), which temporarily aligned Russia and France, Britain intensified its diplomatic engagement with the Ottoman Empire, fearing a consolidation of continental power against its interests. British diplomacy under Foreign Secretary George Canning, and through envoys such as Robert Adair and Stratford Canning, gradually restored Anglo-Ottoman relations.

The Dardanelles Convention of 1809 formalized this realignment, restricting foreign naval access to the Straits and reinforcing Ottoman territorial integrity as a British strategic interest.

Expansion of the Eastern Question

By the early nineteenth century, the Eastern Question had evolved into a systemic feature of European geopolitics. Britain feared Russian access to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf; Austria feared Russian influence in the Balkans; and Russia sought expansion into both Ottoman and Iranian spheres of influence.

This triangular competition placed the Ottoman Empire at the center of European strategic calculations, while Iran increasingly entered the same geopolitical framework due to its position between the Caucasus, Central Asia, and British India.

Thus, the Eastern Question was no longer confined to the fate of the Ottoman Empire alone. It had become a wider imperial structure encompassing the Ottomans, Iran, and the strategic approaches to India.

The Concert of Europe after Napoleon’s Defeat and the “Eastern Question” in Relation to the Ottomans and Iran

From the rise of the Osman Bey dynasty in the 14th century, Ottoman power in southeastern Europe gradually expanded into a vast imperial formation that later became known as the Ottoman Empire. For centuries, this empire was perceived in Western Europe—from the Mediterranean to the North Sea—as both a strategic challenge and a civilizational threat. Thinkers such as Martin Luther and Erasmus famously portrayed the Turks as instruments of “divine punishment” upon Christendom. Yet, through military organization and the effective mobilization of vast human and economic resources, the Ottomans succeeded in governing a transcontinental empire extending from Hungary and the Crimean Peninsula in the north to Yemen in the south, and from Algeria and Tunisia in the west to Iraq in the east.

Over time, the Ottoman Empire became a central variable in the European balance of power. It was increasingly incorporated into what later came to be known as the European “Concert of Europe”—the post-Napoleonic diplomatic system designed to maintain equilibrium among great powers. Even earlier, European monarchs had treated the Ottomans as a geopolitical counterweight. Francis I of France famously described France as a force preventing Europe from falling under the domination of Charles V, while Queen Elizabeth I viewed the Ottoman Sultan as a useful counterbalance to Habsburg power, particularly Spain.

By the eighteenth century, however, the Ottoman Empire had entered a period of structural decline, exacerbated by technological stagnation and the rise of rival powers, especially Romanov Russia. Austria, while benefiting from Ottoman weakness in the Balkans and northern Italy, simultaneously feared Russian expansion more than Ottoman decline. This produced a strategic dilemma: direct partition of Ottoman territories between Austria and Russia would dangerously empower one rival over the other. This geopolitical tension became known as the “Eastern Question,” which would gradually expand to include not only the Ottoman Empire but also Iran and even India within the wider imperial competition.

After Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, Europe entered a new diplomatic era defined by the Concert of Europe, formalized through the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) and subsequent congresses at Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822). This system sought to preserve continental stability through collective consultation, restraint in territorial expansion, and the suppression of revolutionary movements.

Within this framework, Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and (increasingly) France functioned as the principal guarantors of European order. Britain and Austria consolidated their wartime objectives: Belgium was incorporated into the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a buffer state, while Austria strengthened its position in northern Italy. Russia expanded its influence over Poland and sought a strategic presence in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and parts of the Ottoman sphere. France and Prussia, meanwhile, monitored these shifts with equal concern. It was within this fragile equilibrium that the “Eastern Question” acquired renewed significance.

During the Napoleonic era and its aftermath, Britain’s naval supremacy allowed it to pursue a strategy of indirect pressure on continental adversaries through alliances with local actors. However, such policies often produced unintended consequences and diplomatic backlash. In the Ottoman context, British intervention alternated between cooperation and coercion depending on strategic necessity. The Treaty of Bucharest (1812), concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, reflected this broader struggle for influence, with Britain attempting to shape Ottoman-Russian relations in accordance with its own imperial priorities, particularly the security of India.

Maritime dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea also played a decisive role in British policy. From the late eighteenth century, Russia’s expansion under Catherine II had already challenged Ottoman control of the Black Sea, particularly after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), which granted Russia commercial and navigational privileges. Subsequent conflicts culminated in the Treaty of Jassy (1792), consolidating Russian gains in the region.

During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain oscillated between cooperation and confrontation with both Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The geopolitical instability of the period—including the Treaty of Tilsit (1807), the Anglo-Ottoman rupture, and subsequent rapprochement efforts—illustrated the fluidity of alliances. British diplomacy, led by figures such as George Canning and Stratford Canning, ultimately sought to re-anchor the Ottoman Empire within a British-led balance of power system designed to counter both French and Russian expansion.

The renewal of Anglo-Ottoman relations culminated in the 1809 Dardanelles Treaty, which guaranteed British naval access while recognizing Ottoman sovereignty over the straits. Nevertheless, the broader strategic concern remained unchanged: preventing Russian access to the Mediterranean and safeguarding the route to India. In this context, the “Eastern Question” evolved into a long-term structural feature of European diplomacy, shaping interactions across the Ottoman, Iranian, and Central Asian spheres.

The End of Russian Support for the Battle of Herat and the Recall of Simonich

In 1837, Tsar Nicholas I visited the Caucasus and, from Tbilisi, sent a letter to Mohammad Shah inviting him to a personal meeting. At the time, the Shah was en route to the campaign of Herat and declined the invitation, sending instead his seven-year-old crown prince, Nasser al-Din Mirza, who was then in Tabriz. The prince’s entourage carried gifts that included a pair of Kashmiri Rezaei shawls, five strings of pearls, and fourteen Turkmen horses, accompanied by several high-ranking Iranian officials, including Mohammad Khan Zanganeh, Amir Nizam, Haji Mulla Mahmud Nizam al-Ulama, Mirza Taqi Khan Farahani (then vizier of the administration and later known as Amir Kabir), Isa Khan Qajar, and Mirza Mohammad Hakimbashi.

Shortly thereafter, seven Russian officers arrived in Yerevan in October, and Tsar Nicholas himself arrived in the city one day later. The following day, the crown prince and Amir Nizam were received by the Tsar in a formal carriage procession. During this meeting, Nicholas demanded that Iran dismantle the corps of Russian deserters serving in its army and return them to Russia. He regarded this unit not only as a source of embarrassment to the Russian army but also as a dangerous precedent that encouraged further desertions from the Tsar’s forces.

The Tsar warned that if Mohammad Shah failed to comply within six months, the Russian envoy Count Ivan Simonich and the entire Russian diplomatic mission would be withdrawn from Iran. In line with this pressure, Simonich conveyed that Russia would pardon Samsun Khan, commander of the Russian deserters in Iranian service, and that even those who returned would be granted financial rewards and permitted to choose between remaining in Iran or returning to Russia.

At this stage, Simonich increasingly found himself constrained by the broader diplomatic pressure exerted by Britain, particularly through Lord Palmerston. Eventually, Tsar Nicholas recalled him to St. Petersburg.

Palmerston wrote to McNeill on Saturday, June 10 (1216/1837), noting: “We have pinned Russia’s back to the wall regarding Simonich. The Emperor had no choice but to recall him or admit that Selrod’s mission had been compromised.” In a further letter dated Sunday, June 11 (July 2, 1837), he added:

“Dugamel is to succeed Simonich, and he may prove a more effective agent, for he is less subtle. Simonich has overshot his mark. Dugamel will aim more carefully, but you may open the Shah’s eyes to his true interests, which should incline him to reconcile with Russia while freeing himself from her influence.”

Palmerston further noted intelligence received from Lord Durham, according to which Selrod had mentioned that the Emperor had provided or loaned two warships for operations in the southeastern Caspian Sea, ostensibly as a gesture of goodwill toward the Shah. He speculated whether these vessels would sail under the Russian or Persian flag, indicating the ambiguity of Russian intentions in the region.

Upon Simonich’s replacement by A. Duhamel (Dugamel), Tsar Nicholas is reported to have remarked that the issue of Russian deserters in Iran had escalated to nearly 2,000, though their number had allegedly decreased to around 400. He expressed concern that such fugitives, if organized, could undermine discipline within the Russian army and encourage further desertions.

The Tsar emphasized that he could not tolerate the existence of organized Russian military units under foreign command near his borders. He therefore insisted that either the Iranian government comply fully with his demand or the Russian diplomatic mission would be withdrawn from Tehran. He also ordered that any returned deserters should not be reorganized in Iran under any circumstances.

Ultimately, Mohammad Shah accepted Nicholas’s demand. Arrangements were made for the return of Russian deserters to Russian custody, and in June 1217 (June 1838), a Russian officer, Captain Lebranch (Le Brant), arrived in Iran to oversee their repatriation to Russia.

Sending Hossein Khan Ajudanbashi to the British Embassy

Mohammad Shah was now compelled to dispatch an envoy to Britain in order to improve relations between Iran and the British government. At the same time, convinced that confronting both Britain and Russia required access to European military knowledge and technology, he also considered France as a potential source of assistance.

Accordingly, he selected Mohammad Hossein Khan Moghaddam Ajudanbashi as ambassador to the courts of Austria, France, and Britain. His mission had a dual purpose: first, to formally convey congratulations on Queen Victoria’s accession to the throne; and second, to express Mohammad Shah’s dissatisfaction with McNeill’s conduct in Iran, as well as to reject the compensation demands made by McNeill in connection with the arrest of a British messenger and subsequent diplomatic tensions. The envoy was also tasked with requesting the British Foreign Office to address these grievances. A further objective of the mission was to seek French technical and military assistance.

When McNeill learned of Hossein Khan’s intended embassy, he became deeply concerned. He understood that both the Shah and Haji Mirza Aghasi were likely to use the mission as an opportunity to summon him for accountability before Iranian authorities. As a result, McNeill attempted—unsuccessfully—to delay or obstruct the envoy’s departure.

In his report dated Saturday, December 30, 1837, he wrote:

“I have come to understand that Husayn Khan is preparing to depart for his embassy to England. Although I have advised him to postpone his journey until the matter of the British messenger has been resolved, it appears he is determined to proceed, and I shall no longer attempt to prevent him.”

In practice, however, McNeill’s earlier reports—detailing alleged mistreatment of British agents and the Shah’s refusal to offer formal apology—had already inflamed Palmerston’s position and hardened British resistance to receiving the Iranian envoy.

Consequently, in instructions sent to McNeill on Saturday, March 16, 1838, Palmerston stated regarding Hossein Khan’s mission:

“If the Iranian ambassador arrives before His Majesty’s Government has been informed that the Shah has paid adequate compensation for the insult committed against a British subject, I must inform him that I cannot present him at Court, nor receive him in any official capacity, nor hold any political discussions with him. He may remain in Britain only in a private capacity.”

Earlier, on Tuesday, March 20, 1838, Palmerston had also written to Sir Frederick Lamb, the British ambassador to Austria, and Earl Granville, the ambassador to France, outlining the government’s position:

He reported that Iranian officials, allegedly acting under direct orders from the Shah, had arrested a British diplomatic courier returning from Herat to Tehran, seized his correspondence, and mistreated him. In response, the British envoy in Tehran had demanded compensation, and the Shah’s reaction would determine whether diplomatic relations would continue.

Palmerston further noted that Hossein Khan, already designated as Iranian ambassador to congratulate Queen Victoria, had likely begun his journey. He added that British policy would not allow his reception unless the Shah fulfilled the required conditions.

In a Persian-language instruction appended to the letter, Palmerston reiterated that no Iranian envoy could be received at Court until full redress had been provided, and ordered his diplomats to monitor Hossein Khan’s movements closely, including Vienna and Paris, and to inform him immediately upon arrival in Europe.

Hossein Khan and his entourage departed Tabriz for Istanbul on Thursday, September 13, 1838 (22 Shahrivar 1217). In a letter dated August 31, 1838, Palmerston further instructed Viscount Ponsonby, the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, to prevent Hossein Khan from proceeding to London.

Ponsonby subsequently reported, in a letter received on December 10, that Mirza Ja‘far Khan Mushir al-Dawla, the Iranian ambassador in Istanbul, had informed him of the envoy’s arrival in Trabzon aboard a steamship and raised concerns regarding Iranian princes reportedly seeking passage to London while residing in Ottoman territory.

In his French-language correspondence dated October 31, 1838, Mushir al-Dawla argued that allowing fugitive Iranian princes to travel to Britain would contradict the principles of friendship between the two states and undermine diplomatic trust.

Ponsonby replied that the British government had been misinformed and that no Iranian princes had been formally received or admitted to travel onward to London. He reaffirmed that Britain’s position was grounded in the “law of nations” and insisted that Iran had yet to provide satisfactory redress for previous diplomatic incidents.

In further correspondence, he emphasized that Britain would not accept an Iranian ambassador until full satisfaction had been provided, while also expressing hope that relations between the two states might eventually be restored on a stable and amicable basis.

From the Iranian side, Mushir al-Dawla responded with frustration, noting that had Iran anticipated such treatment, it would not have dispatched an ambassador in the first place. He requested clarification on Britain’s demands, pointing out that Hossein Khan was already en route and that Iran still considered relations formally intact.

Ponsonby replied that British instructions were binding and non-negotiable, though he expressed hope for eventual reconciliation once the outstanding issues were resolved.

According to Kenneth Simonich, one factor influencing Palmerston’s reluctance to receive Hossein Khan was McNeill’s argument that Iranian embassies to Russia had been accompanied by princes such as Khosrow Mirza and Nasser al-Din Mirza, thereby elevating their diplomatic prestige. Accepting Hossein Khan—who was not of comparable royal rank—might therefore diminish Britain’s diplomatic standing.

Hossein Khan was, in fact, the nephew of Mirza Ja‘far Khan Mushir al-Dawla and had been raised in the court of Mirza Bozorg as a deputy official, later serving in administrative and military roles during the Russo-Iranian wars. Simonich also noted that Mohammad Shah, frustrated by McNeill’s persistent objections, reportedly responded that Hossein Khan would undertake the mission at his own expense, whereas selecting an alternative candidate favored by the British would have required 15,000–20,000 tomans—an amount not available in the royal treasury.

The Tension in Bushehr and the Departure of McNeill and the British Delegation from Iran

At the same time, tensions and clashes erupted in Bushehr between the East India Company’s representatives (acting on behalf of the British administration in India) and the local population. These disturbances continued until the arrival of the British fleet in the waters off Kharg Island. Lord Palmerston, in correspondence with Haji Mirza Aghasi, emphasized that the British Government sought the security of its personnel in Iran and expected their protection to be ensured by the Persian authorities.

In this context, Britain severed diplomatic relations with Persia and ordered all its officials to leave the country. Dr. John McNeill departed Iran for Ottoman territory on Thursday, June 7, 1838. Even before his departure, he received news that the force he had requested from London had arrived from India and had seized Kharg Island. This detachment, however, was far smaller than the 6,000 troops he had originally requested; it consisted of only 387 soldiers and two cannons.

The British objective was not limited to Kharg itself. While the seizure of the island served as a pressure point against Iran in Bushehr, British strategists also hoped to create psychological leverage over the Shah in relation to Herat. Acting under Palmerston’s instructions, McNeill sent a strongly worded warning letter to the Shah’s camp through Colonel Stoddart:

I warn His Majesty, on the orders of His Majesty’s Government, that the British Government views His Majesty’s current policy toward Afghanistan as hostile to British India and contrary to the spirit of the Treaty of Friendship between England and Iran. Should this policy continue, the friendly relations between the two states will inevitably be terminated, and Britain will take whatever measures it deems necessary to safeguard its interests.

He further warned:

If Herat were to submit to His Majesty, the British Government would regard any advance into that city or other parts of Afghanistan as an act of hostility against Britain.

The British Government also reiterated its demand for compensation for the mistreatment of its messenger, separate from the issue of Herat. McNeill expressed confidence that the Shah would comply and thereby avoid further escalation.

He added that a British force accompanied by a squadron of five warships had entered the Persian Gulf and temporarily occupied Kharg Island. The Shah’s response, he stressed, would determine the future course of British actions. He further warned that unless Iran altered its conduct, British officials would withdraw and take all British subjects with them, though he expressed hope that wiser counsel would prevail and relations might still be restored.

The letter reached Mohammad Shah at a moment when he had already received funds that McNeill had previously sent to Kamran Mirza for the defense of Herat. At the same time, the activities of British officers Pottinger and Burnes had strengthened Afghan resistance to the Persian advance. Enraged by McNeill’s ultimatum, and now faced with his departure from Iran, the Shah saw little reason to continue accommodating British representatives.

Consequently, he authorized General Simonich to occupy the residence of Major Todd. On Saturday, November 10, 1838, Simonich moved his belongings into the house and, finding the door locked, ordered his men to scale the wall and enter forcibly. Lieutenant Colonel Justin Sheil, acting in McNeill’s absence, reported the incident, and McNeill forwarded the account to Lord Palmerston on December 5.

In his commentary, McNeill wrote with evident irritation:

The Iranian authorities, particularly the Prime Minister, deny any knowledge of or responsibility for General Simonich’s actions and have now ordered him to vacate the premises. While it is possible that Simonich acted under implicit instructions, the Iranian government’s swift disavowal leaves him personally responsible.

He further noted that the incident was a “serious affront,” as the seizure of a residence assigned to a British officer was unacceptable under diplomatic norms. The Prime Minister, he added, had effectively acknowledged the issue and ensured Simonich’s removal.

McNeill concluded that any return of the British mission to Tehran would require a formal review of Iranian conduct. Although he regretted any punitive consequences for Simonich, he suggested that he should be barred from service in Tehran for a period of time.

According to Colonel Sheil, when he reported the matter to Haji Mirza Aghasi, the latter was deeply angered and immediately instructed Mirza Massoud, the Foreign Minister, to order Simonich to vacate the house. Simonich reportedly claimed that he had acted on royal instructions, to which Aghasi allegedly replied: “How can the Shah not remember granting such a residence to Major Todd?”

McNeill’s difficulties, however, were not yet concluded. On March 3, 1839, he forwarded to Lord Palmerston a further complaint from Captain Hennell, the East India Company’s representative in Bushehr, concerning another incident involving local authorities and British personnel. McNeill suggested that if Prince Fereydun Mirza, the governor of Fars, failed to address the matter, the British agency in Bushehr might be relocated to Mid-Kharg, already under British naval control—an early indication of the strategic separation of Kharg from Iranian authority.

The Bushehr incident, as detailed in Captain Hennell’s report of November 21, 1838, began with accusations by Sheikh Hossein, the prosecutor of Bushehr, against Elias Sargari, whom he accused of misconduct and property damage. The unrest escalated when the city bazaar was closed in protest against the governor Mirza Abbas, particularly over disputes regarding tax obligations previously settled under Sheikh Kazem, the former governor.

On November 17, Mirza Abbas attempted to force the reopening of the bazaar by deploying armed guards and sending official carpets as a symbolic gesture of authority. Tensions escalated further when one of his guards, reportedly intoxicated, triggered a reaction in which Sheikh Hossein ordered the destruction of wine stocks in several houses, including those belonging to the local Jewish community. Ali Nami, previously mentioned in Hennell’s reports, carried out these actions, destroying goods that included alcohol intended for export, with losses estimated between 40 and 50 tomans. During the disturbances, the British agency building was also damaged, and its staff sought refuge for safety.

Hennell later reported that when he approached the governor seeking punishment for the rioters, he was told that the governor lacked sufficient authority and that the situation was rapidly deteriorating. He recommended that the matter be referred to Prince Fereydun Mirza, then in Kazerun. McNeill, while cautious about direct intervention, ultimately supported the idea of expelling Sheikh Hossein and his associates from Bushehr and imposing financial penalties on the instigators, warning that failure to respond decisively would undermine British authority in the region.

McNeill’s correspondence reveals a dual strategy: on the one hand, a firm insistence on British demands; on the other, a careful attempt to present himself as restrained in the face of criticism from London. In a reply to Hennell dated December 24, 1838, he wrote:

Given the realities of the Persian court, I see little prospect of securing satisfactory redress from the Shah or his ministers. Unless compensation is provided by the Governor of Fars, your position in Bushehr will remain insecure. I therefore consider it advisable that the agency be relocated to Kharg Island, where British authority is more effectively secured.

Colonel Justin Sheil and British Policy After the Herat Crisis

Colonel Justin Sheil, who had been appointed chargé d’affaires of the British embassy in Iran after Dr. McNeill’s departure for England, was compelled to remain in the Ottoman city of Erzurum until tensions between Iran and Britain subsided. Eager to demonstrate to Lord Palmerston his competence and understanding of British diplomatic strategy, Sheil submitted a detailed report concerning the fortress of Ghorian, arguing that Britain should adopt a firm and uncompromising stance to extinguish Mohammad Shah’s ambitions regarding Herat.

In a letter dated February 3, 1839, from Erzurum, he wrote:

The fact that the Shah has not yet concluded any formal arrangement with Herat, while continuing to hold the fortress of Ghorian, Furah, and other positions, and—according to our intelligence—intending to dispatch a commander to the Ghor region, demonstrates that he has by no means abandoned his designs upon Afghanistan.

The retention of Ghorian by Persian forces runs counter to British interests and constitutes, in effect, a preliminary step toward the conquest of Afghanistan itself. Although the fortress is not presently formidable, it could, with little effort, be strengthened into a defensive position capable of resisting any attack from Herat. Situated approximately sixty kilometers west of the city, and surrounded by fertile lands, it provides a strategic base from which supplies and reinforcements could be readily secured.

A well-positioned Persian garrison, operating from Ghorian, would be able to exert sustained pressure on Herat and exploit internal divisions among its inhabitants. As long as the Shah maintains such a forward base, he will not relinquish his ambition to dominate Herat. It therefore appears that the most effective and expeditious means of restoring relations between Iran and Britain is to eliminate this source of encouragement.

On Saturday, March 9, 1839, Palmerston instructed Sheil to deliver a formal note to the Iranian Foreign Minister demanding an official apology for General Simonich’s unauthorized seizure of Major Todd’s residence. In a separate communication issued the same day, Palmerston directed Sheil to raise the issue of the disturbances in Bushehr, demanding compensation for damages inflicted upon British personnel and property, as well as the punishment of those responsible.

Sheil, seeking to repair the fractured relationship between Iran and Britain, initially intended to reopen discussions regarding the earlier mistreatment of Mohammad Bey, the British embassy messenger. However, McNeill successfully persuaded Palmerston that no such negotiations should proceed. Accordingly, Palmerston wrote to Sheil on Monday, March 11, 1839:

I must inform you that His Majesty’s Government fully concurs with Mr. McNeill’s position on this matter, and I therefore instruct you to regulate your conduct accordingly.

Meanwhile, Prince Fereydun Mirza, the governor of Fars, responded to Captain Hennell’s complaint regarding the unrest in Bushehr in a tone that reflected both defensiveness and dismissal:

We have received the petition concerning the alleged mistreatment of a money-changer in Bushehr. Upon investigation, it has been determined that the individual in question is a Jew engaged in the sale of wine, an activity prohibited in Muslim lands, and thus he was prevented from continuing it.

Firstly, this individual is a resident of Bushehr and not a British subject. Secondly, even if the incident occurred as described, it is not of such significance as to warrant escalation to His Majesty’s Government or to the British Minister. There have been far more serious occurrences which I have not deemed worthy of such reporting.

Nevertheless, I have ordered Mirza Abbas to return, and I have appointed Mirza Asadullah, Chief Inspector of Revenue, to conduct a thorough investigation and impose appropriate punishments.

Captain Hennell forwarded this reply to McNeill on December 28, 1838, expressing deep skepticism:

Shortly after the arrival of the new governor, Mirza Asadullah, I received His Majesty’s reply to my complaint, which raised doubts as to whether it genuinely reflected the Prince’s considered judgment. I am compelled to conclude that it does not represent a serious engagement with the grievances presented.

It is entirely incorrect to assert that the injured individual was not connected with the British agency or that he was engaged in illicit trade. The goods destroyed at his residence were intended for export to Bombay.

I regret to say that the reasoning underlying this reply, and others of a similar nature, offers little hope that our complaints will be fairly considered under the present administration in Shiraz.

In a separate letter addressed directly to Prince Fereydun Mirza on the same date, Hennell wrote:

Relying on Your Highness’s justice, I submitted a report concerning the treatment of one of our dependents; yet I am disheartened to observe that no effective action has been taken. Mirza Asadullah has shown no meaningful inclination to address the matter.

While it is true that the individual in question was a Jewish resident of Bushehr, it is well understood that those employed by the British Government, and in receipt of regular salaries, are entitled to its protection regardless of origin.

Hennell further rejected the allegation that the individual had been engaged in selling alcohol locally, emphasizing:

Had such misconduct occurred, he would have been dismissed immediately. The considerable quantity of goods destroyed at his residence was not intended for local sale, but had been prepared for export to India.

Finally, on Monday, March 4, 1839, Sheil—acting on Palmerston’s instructions to suspend diplomatic engagement—wrote to Hennell advising him to refrain from further correspondence with Iranian authorities except where absolutely necessary. Any premature or excessive engagement, he warned, might complicate the orderly withdrawal of British representatives from Iran.

In practice, the absence of an active British diplomatic presence temporarily reduced external pressure on the Iranian government—an outcome that, from Tehran’s perspective, offered a brief but meaningful respite.

McNeill and the End of the Siege of Herat

Dr. John McNeill was deeply dissatisfied with the limited scale of Britain’s military response in the Persian Gulf. The small expeditionary force dispatched to seize Kharg Island fell far short of what he believed necessary to compel Iran into submission. In a letter dated August 5, 1838, he urged Lord Auckland to increase British troop deployments to approximately 5,000 and land them at Bushehr. From there, McNeill envisioned a bold advance northward—ultimately toward Tehran—in order to decisively coerce Mohammad Shah and shatter Persian resistance.

Yet this proposal rested on assumptions that London and Calcutta did not share. While McNeill advocated escalation, the Shah himself faced mounting pressures that pushed him in the opposite direction. The withdrawal of effective Russian backing—particularly the weakening of Ivan Simonich’s position, the uncertainty surrounding the Russian deserter brigade, and the pressure exerted by his successor Count Alexandre Duhamel—coincided with Britain’s naval demonstration at Kharg. These developments, combined with exaggerated reports spread by British agents regarding the scale of British troop landings and an imminent advance into southern Iran, heightened Mohammad Shah’s anxiety.

Confronted with the prospect of a wider conflict—possibly involving both Britain and Russia—the Shah ultimately concluded that continuation of the siege of Herat was strategically untenable. He was unaware that Britain was simultaneously preparing for a major intervention in Afghanistan, culminating in the installation of Shah Shuja Durrani on the throne of Kabul—an undertaking that would soon lead to the costly and ultimately disastrous First Anglo-Afghan War.

At the same time, developments elsewhere compounded his concerns. The expanding ambitions of Mehmet Ali Pasha and the activities of his commanders in the Persian Gulf region added to the sense of strategic encirclement confronting Tehran.

Auckland’s Restraint and the Limits of British Intervention

In response to McNeill’s proposals, Lord Auckland adopted a far more cautious approach. Writing on October 24, 1838, he acknowledged receipt of McNeill’s correspondence and expressed frustration at delays and disruptions in communication, noting that vital dispatches had been lost in transit. Nevertheless, he reassured McNeill that their general strategic outlooks were not fundamentally at odds.

Crucially, Auckland informed him that reports received by mid-September indicated that the Persian siege of Herat had already been lifted—a development he partly attributed to British pressure, including the occupation of Kharg. In his view, this outcome rendered further escalation unnecessary.

He also addressed McNeill’s criticism of the pace of British military mobilization, emphasizing the logistical realities faced by British forces in India:

You have considered our advance from India to be slow; yet we are bound by the dictates of season and climate, which we cannot disregard.

Auckland outlined the broader military preparations underway: a Bengal army of approximately 14,000 troops, supported by between 5,000 and 10,000 forces from Bombay, alongside the contingent of Shah Shuja under British command. These forces, however, were intended for operations in Afghanistan—not for an invasion of Iran.

With the withdrawal of Persian forces from Herat, Auckland saw no justification for a campaign against Iran itself. Indeed, he warned that such an invasion might prove counterproductive, potentially rallying domestic support around the Shah and transforming him into a symbol of resistance. While he noted that British forces under commanders such as Colonel Stoddart might be capable of seizing Bushehr if necessary, he explicitly rejected any premature or unauthorized action.

More fundamentally, Auckland recognized the strategic limits of British power in the region:

The permanent occupation of northern provinces of Iran would require a force far exceeding what we are presently capable of providing.

He remained skeptical of McNeill’s suggestion of a march on Tehran, particularly given Britain’s simultaneous commitment to the Afghan campaign. Instead, he placed his confidence in a combination of naval pressure in the Persian Gulf and the broader strategic leverage generated by British operations in Afghanistan.

Palmerston’s Strategic Preference: Afghanistan over Iran

Lord Palmerston similarly rejected McNeill’s more aggressive proposals. While he approved of the measures already taken—particularly the demonstration of force at Kharg—he regarded a direct intervention in Iran as both impractical and strategically risky.

In a letter dated September 26, 1838, Palmerston expressed general satisfaction with McNeill’s actions but emphasized that the primary theater of British strategy lay elsewhere:

Our operations in Afghanistan present a clearer and more direct line of action than any enterprise in Iran.

He warned that intervention in Iran carried significant dangers. Removing the Shah might destabilize the country without guaranteeing a favorable outcome, potentially exposing Britain’s local allies to retaliation. Even more concerning was the possibility of Russian intervention:

Should Russia choose to advance her forces, she might easily overcome our limited numbers and drive them back to the sea.

Palmerston contrasted this with Afghanistan, where British forces would operate closer to their logistical base and where their objectives—though ambitious—were more clearly defined. While acknowledging that operations in Afghanistan might prove costly, he believed they offered a more coherent and sustainable strategy than attempting to reshape Iran’s political order.

The Final Decision: Withdrawal from Herat

Against this backdrop of mounting pressure and shifting strategic calculations, Mohammad Shah ultimately chose to abandon the siege. The decisive moment is captured in Colonel Charles Stoddart’s report from the Shah’s camp.

Writing on August 14, 1838, Stoddart recorded the Shah’s response:

“We accept all the demands of the British Government. We will not pursue the war. Had it not been for our regard for their friendship, we would not have withdrawn from Herat. If we had foreseen that our expedition would endanger that friendship, we would never have undertaken it.”

Stoddart replied with diplomatic approval, framing the decision as one aligned with Iran’s true interests.

Conclusion: Coercion Without War

The end of the siege of Herat marked a significant, though temporary, success for British policy. Without engaging in large-scale warfare against Iran, Britain had managed—through a combination of naval pressure, diplomatic coercion, intelligence operations, and strategic signaling—to compel Mohammad Shah to retreat.

Yet this outcome also revealed the limits of British power. McNeill’s vision of decisive intervention in Iran was rejected in favor of a more cautious, indirect strategy. Instead of confronting Iran directly, Britain chose to secure its interests through Afghanistan—a decision that would soon draw it into a far more complex and costly conflict.

Thus, the Herat crisis stands as a pivotal moment in the evolution of the broader geopolitical contest later termed the “Great Game”: a conflict in which perception, pressure, and strategic positioning often proved as decisive as battlefield victory.

Mirza Husayn Khan Ajudanbashi in Austria: Diplomacy, Defiance, and the Metternich Encounter

On Saturday, 26 January 1839, John Milbank of the British embassy in Vienna informed Lord Palmerston that Mirza Husayn Khan Ajudanbashi had arrived in Trieste on 19 January and was expected to reach Vienna by mid-February. Milbank assured Palmerston that, in accordance with prior instructions relayed through Sir Frederick Lamb, he would communicate to the Persian envoy the British government’s refusal to receive him officially at court.

Palmerston, replying on 8 February, issued explicit instructions:

“…You are to inform the envoy that, as there are grounds to believe that the British mission in Persia has been compelled to reject the Shah’s assurances that he would comply with the demands of His Majesty’s Government, Husayn Khan cannot be admitted to the British Court, nor can His Majesty’s Government enter into any official communication with him. Should he nevertheless proceed to England, he will receive no formal reception and will be treated as a private individual, without diplomatic recognition.”

By 17 February 1839, Milbank reported that Ajudanbashi had arrived in Vienna and that he had personally conveyed Palmerston’s position. At first, Husayn Khan appeared unmoved. He insisted that he had been duly appointed as the Shah’s envoy and was bound to fulfill his mission regardless of British objections. He declared that he would proceed to London under any circumstances.

However, once the practical consequences of such a course were made clear—namely, diplomatic isolation and the absence of recognition—he reconsidered. Requesting a private conversation, he dismissed his attendants and spoke candidly. He revealed that the principal objective of his mission was to secure the recall of Dr. John McNeill from the British embassy in Tehran.

Husayn Khan explained that he carried a detailed memorandum in the Shah’s own hand, intended for presentation to Queen Victoria and her government, and that as long as McNeill remained in Tehran, no genuine reconciliation between the two states could be achieved.

He then offered a Persian account of the controversial incident involving McNeill’s messenger—an episode that had significantly contributed to the diplomatic rupture. According to Husayn Khan, McNeill had requested permission from Mohammad Shah to dispatch a courier ostensibly to Mashhad, who would then proceed toward Herat to exchange correspondence with Kamran Mirza. While the Shah had granted permission on this understanding, McNeill had allegedly instructed the messenger secretly to bypass Mashhad and proceed directly to Herat.

On the return journey, the messenger—accompanied by an agent of Kamran Mirza—was intercepted by Persian patrol forces under the command of a European (reportedly Polish) officer. When challenged, the pair attempted to flee, prompting pursuit. Though they initially escaped, they later reappeared disguised as horse traders. Their suspicious conduct led to their detention and eventual identification. The messenger was searched, and his documents—some concealed in his boots—were confiscated. However, once his identity as a British agent was confirmed, the documents were reportedly returned unopened, and he was released without harm.

Husayn Khan emphasized that the incident had been misrepresented to the British government and that the Shah remained committed to restoring amicable relations. He expressed a broader strategic vision, stating:

“Mohammad Shah desires that the friendship between the two nations return to its former strength, as it existed over past centuries. From the Persian perspective, British friendship is essential for the durability of the monarchy. Britain should assist Iran in strengthening itself to maintain an independent and stable position in the region.”

Milbank, in response, expressed skepticism, noting that the Shah’s actions appeared inconsistent with such professed intentions. Husayn Khan replied with notable frankness:

“Tell us plainly what you require, and I will undertake that your demands shall be fulfilled without delay—but let them be conveyed to us by someone other than Mr. McNeill.”

This statement encapsulated the core Iranian grievance: not opposition to British demands per se, but deep distrust of McNeill himself.

The following day, a British physician named Watson called upon Milbank, claiming to act on behalf of Husayn Khan. He conveyed the envoy’s concern that his previous explanations may not have been sufficiently clear and sought to reinforce the argument that McNeill’s reports had distorted the reality of events in Iran.

Milbank, wary of any perception of deviation from official policy, responded firmly. He reiterated that his communications were strictly governed by Palmerston’s directives and that no modification of British policy was possible unless the Shah first satisfied British demands, particularly regarding compensation and formal redress.

Watson then raised a critical question: whether the recall of McNeill might resolve the crisis. Milbank’s answer was unequivocal—there was no such intention.

Meanwhile, Husayn Khan pursued a parallel diplomatic strategy. Recognizing British sensitivity to the involvement of other European powers, he sought an audience with Prince Klemens von Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor and one of the foremost architects of European diplomacy.

According to Milbank’s report, Metternich later shared the substance of their conversation. The Persian envoy had presented arguments broadly consistent with those already conveyed to the British. Metternich, adhering to his customary diplomatic posture, advised moderation and reconciliation, encouraging both parties to resolve their differences through mutual accommodation. He also indicated a willingness, if necessary, to facilitate a diplomatic understanding.

Although Husayn Khan was not formally accredited as ambassador to the Austrian court, he was nonetheless treated with the courtesy typically extended to a diplomatic envoy in transit. He was granted an audience with the Emperor of Austria, to whom he presented a letter from Mohammad Shah.

Thus, while officially rebuffed by Britain, Husayn Khan demonstrated notable diplomatic agility—leveraging European rivalries, articulating Iran’s grievances with clarity, and attempting to reframe the crisis not as a structural conflict between states, but as a breakdown of trust centered on a single individual: McNeill.

Metternich’s Mediation and the Anglo–Persian Rupture

It soon became evident that the Persian court had deliberately arranged Mirza Husayn Khan Ajudanbashi’s engagement with Klemens von Metternich, one of Europe’s most influential statesmen, in order to elevate the envoy’s diplomatic standing and counterbalance British efforts to marginalize him. The move was calculated. Relations between Metternich and Lord Palmerston had long been strained over European affairs, and the Persian envoy’s presence offered Metternich an opportunity—subtle yet unmistakable—to assert diplomatic independence from British pressure.

On 25 February 1839, John Milbank, chargé d’affaires at the British embassy in Vienna, informed Palmerston that Metternich had received a memorandum from Mirza Husayn Khan concerning the arrest of the British embassy’s messenger. This document had been transmitted via Carl de Hummelauer, chargé d’affaires of the Austrian embassy in London. Shortly thereafter, Palmerston received Metternich’s accompanying letter, which summarized both his conversation with the Persian envoy and his broader assessment of the situation.

Metternich noted that the envoy, having realized the obstacles to his formal reception in London, had paused in Vienna and sought an audience with the Austrian Emperor, to whom he presented a customary letter of congratulation from the Shah. While the letter itself contained no political substance, Metternich emphasized that in private conversation Husayn Khan spoke with remarkable candor regarding the deteriorating relations between Iran and Britain.

The Austrian statesman distilled the Persian position into a coherent strategic doctrine:

“The Shah is sovereign in his own realm and seeks independence. Russia and Britain in India are the two great powers with which Persia must contend. The former possesses greater military strength; the latter greater overall power. Between them, Persia is exposed to both advantage and danger. The Shah therefore seeks to maintain amicable relations with both, free of tension. Should hostility arise with one, necessity would compel him to seek support from the other—not by preference, but by circumstance. His foremost desire is to preserve both his dignity and balanced relations with foreign powers.”

This formulation captured the essence of Qajar foreign policy: equilibrium between rival empires as a condition of survival.

When Metternich inquired about the specific causes of the Anglo–Persian estrangement, Husayn Khan responded without hesitation: the crisis, he insisted, was attributable to McNeill. The envoy reiterated that his mission would proceed despite obstacles, but, when confronted with the diplomatic consequences of rejection in London, he reconsidered and agreed to remain in Vienna pending further clarification. He entrusted Metternich with a written communication to be forwarded to the British government, thereby effectively transforming the Austrian chancellor into an intermediary.

Metternich accepted this role cautiously, emphasizing that his involvement was limited to transmission rather than advocacy. Nonetheless, he appended to his letter both the Persian memorandum and his own observations on the envoy:

“My impression of Husayn Khan is that he is an intelligent man, supported by a capable secretary well versed in European affairs. He expresses himself with clarity and composure; indeed, had he spent years among European societies, he could scarcely have acquitted himself better. In his manner one perceives the sharpness characteristic of an Oriental political mind.”

The memorandum itself constituted a detailed Persian rebuttal of British accusations. Husayn Khan argued that British perceptions had been shaped by misrepresentation, particularly in two key matters: the arrest of the British messenger and the siege of Herat.

On the first issue, he reiterated the Persian narrative: that McNeill’s agent had exceeded his authorized mission, traveled clandestinely to Herat, and been apprehended under suspicious circumstances. While initially detained, the agent had ultimately been released unharmed, with his documents returned. The Shah, Husayn Khan insisted, had acted with restraint and had no intention of jeopardizing relations with Britain over such an incident.

On the second issue—the Herat campaign—the envoy advanced a historical argument. Afghanistan, he claimed, had long fallen within the sphere of Persian authority, and previous interventions by Iranian rulers had not provoked British opposition. Only under McNeill’s tenure, he argued, had the campaign been reframed as a hostile act. He went further, accusing McNeill of duplicity: encouraging the Shah’s advance while simultaneously advising Kamran Mirza to resist, even providing financial support to Herat’s defenders.

Husayn Khan also described the Shah’s repeated efforts at conciliation. Envoys had been sent to apologize; Haj Mirza Aghasi himself had attempted to persuade McNeill to remain in Iran. These overtures, he claimed, were rebuffed, and McNeill instead escalated tensions, issuing ultimatums demanding the lifting of the siege, the dismissal of Persian officials, and the threat of British military intervention.

According to the Persian account, Mohammad Shah had ultimately complied—lifting the siege of Herat and dismissing Haji Khan—in order to preserve Anglo–Persian relations. Yet Britain, Husayn Khan argued, had no treaty-based right to intervene in Afghan affairs, and its continued hostility therefore appeared unjustified.

The memorandum concluded with a conciliatory yet pointed appeal: the Shah remained committed to restoring harmony and was prepared to meet British demands within the framework of existing treaties. However, he requested that Britain appoint a new envoy—preferably one native to England—to replace McNeill, whose conduct had, in Persian eyes, irreparably damaged trust.

Palmerston’s reaction was swift and unyielding. Writing to Milbank on 8 March 1839, he rejected the Persian narrative outright:

“…His Majesty’s Government finds no grounds for altering the position already communicated to Husayn Khan. The refusal to receive him remains in force until the Shah complies fully with the demands conveyed by Mr. McNeill. His account of the treatment of the British messenger is wholly inconsistent with the evidence before us, which derives from contemporaneous reports, including that of the messenger himself.”

On the question of McNeill’s recall, Palmerston was equally firm. Far from considering such a measure, he interpreted the Persian demand as proof of McNeill’s effectiveness and integrity.

Alarmed by Metternich’s involvement, Palmerston moved decisively to contain the diplomatic channel. He instructed Milbank to cease all further communication with Husayn Khan, whether direct or indirect, and to ensure that any future exchanges with Persia be conducted exclusively through British diplomatic channels in Paris—thereby excluding Vienna and neutralizing Austrian mediation.

The final episode in this exchange underscored the complete breakdown of dialogue. On 4 April 1839, Palmerston returned Husayn Khan’s memorandum—forwarded through Hummelauer—unanswered, instructing that it be sealed and sent back. He reiterated that no correspondence would be entertained so long as the Shah failed to meet British demands, and dismissed the Persian account as fundamentally distorted.

Thus, Metternich’s brief attempt at mediation—though diplomatically sophisticated—failed to bridge the widening gulf between London and Tehran. Instead, it revealed the extent to which the crisis had hardened into mutual distrust: Britain unwilling to reconsider its position, and Persia increasingly convinced that the conflict lay not in policy, but in the person of McNeill himself.

Memorandum of Foreign Minister Mirza Masʿud in Support of Mirza Ḥusayn Khan

At this critical juncture, an undated memorandum from Mirza Masʿud, the Persian Foreign Minister, reached the British embassy in Vienna. John Milbank forwarded the document to Lord Palmerston, who received it on March 14, 1839. The memorandum constituted a formal defense of Mirza Ḥusayn Khan Ajudanbashi’s diplomatic standing and a rebuttal to British attempts—largely shaped by Sir John McNeill—to diminish his status.

Mirza Masʿud rejected the British claim that Ajudanbashi’s rank was insufficient for reception at the British court. He emphasized that Ḥusayn Khan was a distinguished nobleman: a commander of the royal army, a recipient of multiple high decorations—including the Order of the Lion and the Sun—and a trusted intimate of the Shah. He further noted that Ajudanbashi had long enjoyed royal favor, had been educated alongside the monarch, and possessed both administrative and military experience befitting an envoy of high rank.

Crucially, the memorandum reaffirmed that Ajudanbashi had been granted full authority to accept British proposals—provided they were just and consistent with existing treaties—thus signaling Tehran’s continued openness to diplomatic reconciliation.

Diplomatic Stalemate in Vienna

In a subsequent dispatch from Vienna, received by Palmerston on March 23, 1839, Milbank reported that the British government remained firm in its refusal to admit Ajudanbashi. The envoy, he noted, was deeply frustrated:

“Ḥusayn Khan appeared greatly offended and expressed profound dissatisfaction at the refusal of His Majesty’s Government to receive him. Despite the Shah’s strong desire to restore relations, communication between the two courts now appears effectively severed.”

Uncertain of his next course of action, Ajudanbashi weighed several options: returning to Persia, proceeding to London despite the risk of humiliation, or continuing to Paris to deliver the Shah’s letter to the French court. Milbank anticipated that he would choose Paris—a decision shaped in part by the shifting political climate in France under Louis Philippe I.

Palmerston’s Reply and Escalation of Tensions

Palmerston’s reply to Mirza Masʿud, dated April 22, 1839, adopted a firm and admonitory tone. He dismissed the memorandum’s emphasis on goodwill, asserting that British policy was guided not by diplomatic language but by actions:

The British Government judges foreign powers by their conduct, not by the professions of friendship made by their envoys.

He argued that recent Iranian actions had been consistently hostile and that any restoration of trust required concrete changes in behavior—not merely diplomatic assurances or the appointment of a new envoy. The implication was clear: Ajudanbashi’s credentials were irrelevant so long as British demands remained unmet.

On the question of McNeill, Palmerston was unequivocal. He affirmed that the British government fully supported the envoy’s conduct, which he described as entirely consistent with official instructions. The Iranian demand for McNeill’s recall was therefore rejected outright.

Palmerston further stressed that Iran had failed to fulfill commitments it had previously indicated it would accept—particularly those communicated in August 1838. Until these obligations were honored in practice, Britain would not receive Ajudanbashi.

Ajudanbashi in France

By mid-April 1839, Ajudanbashi had arrived in France. On April 18, Granville Leveson-Gower, 2nd Earl Granville informed Palmerston that the Persian envoy had reached Vincennes, near Paris, and had presented his credentials to King Louis-Philippe. The French government appeared inclined to receive him with full diplomatic honors, placing him on a footing comparable to other recognized envoys.

Ajudanbashi’s arrival coincided with a period of political transition in France. Following the resignation of Prime Minister Louis-Mathieu Molé, a new government under Nicolas Jean-de-Dieu Soult was formed in May 1839. This instability, however, did not prevent France from exploring renewed engagement with Persia.

For Palmerston, this development was deeply concerning. He was already engaged in the broader “Eastern Question,” balancing British interests against those of France, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. The ambitions of Muhammad Ali of Egypt—particularly his expansion into Syria and Arabia—had further complicated the regional balance of power. Britain feared that any Franco-Persian rapprochement could undermine its strategic position, especially in relation to India and the Persian Gulf.

Renewed Diplomatic Maneuvering

On April 19, 1839, Lord Granville reported that Ajudanbashi had begun engaging with diplomats in Paris but had initially avoided substantive discussion of Anglo–Iranian tensions. Shortly thereafter, however, he requested a private meeting, indicating that he had received new instructions from Tehran, including letters from the Shah to Queen Victoria and to Palmerston himself.

Granville, adhering to strict instructions, refused to engage in negotiations unless the Shah had formally accepted all British demands. Nevertheless, he agreed to forward any documents Ajudanbashi wished to submit.

In his communication, Ajudanbashi emphasized the Shah’s continued commitment to friendship with Britain. He conveyed that the monarch deeply regretted the incident involving the British courier and was prepared to take steps to restore relations. The Persian Foreign Ministry echoed this conciliatory stance, expressing a desire to resolve all outstanding disputes.

Despite this, Palmerston remained unmoved. In a reply dated April 30, 1839, he reiterated that no change in British policy was warranted and that Ajudanbashi would not be received in London until Iran fully complied with prior demands.

Final Maneuvers and Strategic Implications

Following this rebuff, Ajudanbashi decided to remain temporarily in Paris, awaiting the consolidation of the new French government. After Marshal Soult formally presented his cabinet in May 1839, the Persian envoy made a striking diplomatic move: he requested a French passport to travel to London.

This unusual request surprised French officials. As a Persian envoy already recognized by France, he had no need for such documentation. Yet the gesture was calculated—it signaled both persistence and a willingness to leverage French recognition to pressure Britain.

During his stay, Ajudanbashi also explored the possibility of expanding Franco-Persian relations. He encouraged French involvement in Iran’s commercial and military development, including the provision of military instructors and technical expertise. Implicit in these discussions was a broader strategic aim: to counterbalance British influence and reduce Iran’s dependence on London.

For Palmerston, these developments confirmed his fears. The Persian mission had evolved from a simple diplomatic dispute into a broader geopolitical contest, intersecting with the rivalries of the great powers. What had begun as a crisis over Herat and a diplomatic incident had now become part of the wider struggle shaping the politics of the Near East.

British Fleet Clashes and the Bushehr Unrest

Frederick Maitland

On Tuesday, June 18, 1839, a letter from the British Admiralty—signed by John Barrow—reached Henry Fox-Strangways, requesting that he forward to Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston three dispatches from Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland, Commander of the British naval forces in the Indian Ocean. These reports detailed the evolving situation in the Persian Gulf and, in particular, the unrest that had gripped Bushehr since November of the previous year. As previously discussed, Bushehr had been thrown into turmoil following disputes involving the British consulate—ostensibly over the handling of goods (notably wine consignments)—which ultimately escalated into a direct confrontation with the British fleet.

Rear Admiral Maitland had been dispatched—reportedly at the urging of John McNeill—aboard the 74-gun ship Wellesley. His mission was multifaceted: to deter Mohammad Shah’s advance on Herat, to support British forces occupying Kharg Island, and to counter the growing influence of Muhammad Ali of Egypt in the Persian Gulf, particularly in Bahrain.

Even before reaching the Persian Gulf, Maitland had demonstrated a readiness to employ overwhelming force. Sailing from Bombay with the Wellesley and the frigate Algerine, accompanied by approximately 3,000 troops, he arrived at Karachi. There, a ceremonial or precautionary cannon shot from the fortress—likely intended as a signal—was interpreted by Maitland as hostile fire. In response, he ordered a bombardment that reduced the fort to ruins. The local governor, faced with this display of force, abandoned the city. Later accounts, including that of Henry Pottinger, suggested that the initial firing had merely been a customary salute. Nevertheless, the British government accepted Maitland’s justification, claiming he had been compelled to act due to a perceived threat.

Following this episode, Maitland proceeded to Muscat and then toward Bushehr.

The Bushehr Incident

In his principal report, written aboard the Wellesley near Kharg on April 1, 1839, Maitland described his arrival at Bushehr on March 20 and the tensions that had arisen between himself and the local authorities. He framed the conflict as a response to “insulting and unfriendly behaviour” by the governor, asserting that his actions were necessary to uphold British prestige and protect national interests.

At the core of the dispute lay a seemingly minor issue: the handling of goods intended for the admiral’s personal use. Due to inclement weather, these goods were sent to the customs house rather than directly to the British consulate. Iranian officials insisted that proper documentation be provided before their release, in accordance with local regulations. For Maitland, however, this was unacceptable. He argued that British personnel had long enjoyed the privilege of landing goods directly at the consulate without interference from customs authorities.

The disagreement quickly escalated. During a meeting with the governor of Bushehr, Mirza Asadullah, Maitland insisted on what he viewed as established British rights. The governor, by contrast, maintained that all ships were required to dock at the customs house and comply with local procedures. The issue was not merely administrative—it became a question of sovereignty versus imperial privilege.

When the governor refused to yield, Maitland resolved to assert his authority by force. He ordered armed boats to escort him ashore the following day, determined to land at the consulate regardless of local opposition.

The Skirmish of March 24–25, 1839

The situation reached a breaking point on March 24–25, 1839. As British boats approached the shore, Iranian guards stationed near the consulate attempted to prevent their landing. According to Maitland’s account, a confrontation ensued when a guard threatened to fire upon the landing party. British officers disarmed him, whereupon local troops and civilians responded by throwing stones and opening fire.

British vessels retaliated with cannon and musket fire. Although the exchange was brief, it marked a significant escalation, effectively transforming a dispute over customs procedures into an armed clash. Order was eventually restored, but only after the British had demonstrated their military superiority.

Following the incident, Maitland reinforced the consulate with marines and insisted that his actions had been both justified and restrained. He argued that failure to respond forcefully would have emboldened local authorities and undermined British prestige.

Withdrawal to Kharg and Escalation

Despite a subsequent attempt by the governor to offer apologies through intermediaries, Maitland deemed these insufficient. He demanded a formal written apology on his own terms. When this was not immediately forthcoming—and amid reports that new defensive positions were being constructed—he ordered the evacuation of the British consulate.

On March 29, British personnel withdrew from Bushehr to Kharg Island under naval protection.

In a follow-up report dated April 7, 1839, Maitland claimed that the governor of Bushehr had misrepresented events to higher authorities, including Fereydun Mirza Farmanfarma. He further reported that reinforcements were being dispatched to Bushehr and that a large Persian army—reportedly 40,000 strong—was preparing to march toward Herat under Kamran Mirza.

From Maitland’s perspective, the Bushehr incident was part of a broader pattern of hostility linked to the Shah’s Herat campaign. He interpreted the governor’s actions as deliberate attempts to undermine British influence and restrict the privileges long claimed by British representatives in Persia.

Aftermath and Strategic Implications

Subsequent communications suggested that Persian authorities sought to de-escalate the situation. Letters from regional officials, including Baqir Khan of Tangestan, expressed a desire to restore normal relations. A senior officer, Mohammad Hassan Khan, was dispatched to Bushehr to investigate the incident and negotiate a settlement.

Nevertheless, Maitland remained deeply skeptical. He argued that as long as the siege of Herat continued, any reconciliation would be temporary and fragile. The underlying conflict—between British strategic interests and Persian assertions of sovereignty—remained unresolved.

British actions in Kharg further underscored the coercive nature of their policy. Contemporary Persian accounts note that British forces stockpiled supplies on the island and openly threatened to seize additional coastal territories if Persia did not abandon its campaign against Herat.

Conclusion

The Bushehr incident reveals the volatile intersection of local governance, imperial ambition, and geopolitical rivalry during the early phase of the Great Game. What began as a dispute over customs procedures quickly escalated into a ռազմական confrontation, exposing the fragility of Anglo-Persian relations.

British sources, including Maitland’s reports, portray the episode as a necessary defense of national honor and established privilege. Yet a closer reading suggests a different interpretation: a deliberate assertion of imperial power in the face of Persian resistance.

Lord Palmerston’s subsequent alignment with Maitland’s actions confirms that the British government viewed such coercive measures not as excesses, but as integral instruments of policy in safeguarding its strategic interests in the region.

Hussain Khan’s Meetings and Conversations with Palmerston in London

On Tuesday, May 28, 1839, Earl Granville wrote to Lord Palmerston:

Marshal de Soult’s secretary informed me this morning that Hussain Khan, the Persian ambassador accredited to the French court, had requested a passport from the French government in order to proceed to England. Before granting this request, Marshal de Soult—wishing to signal his displeasure toward the British government—asked for my opinion on the matter. I replied that I had no authority to oppose Hussain Khan’s journey to England, but that the manner in which the Marshal had approached the issue left me in an awkward position.

Granville added that Mirza Husayn Khan was expected to depart for London on Sunday or Monday. A few days later, he indeed arrived in London on a French passport and took residence at Mivart’s Hotel (now Claridge’s), near Buckingham Palace.

On Friday, June 7, 1839, Lord Palmerston received a letter from Mirza Husayn Khan informing him that he had received royal dispatches confirming British demands had been accepted. He further stated that the Persian court had instructed him to proceed to London and personally deliver the Shah’s letter to the Queen of England.

He wrote:

“After receiving this royal decree, which I had previously declined to execute, I found myself in a position where refusal would have been considered a grave offence by my government, endangering both my life and property. For this reason, I left my staff and all official escorts in Paris and proceeded to London relying solely on the authority of my mission.”

Husayn Khan further expressed his hope that the documents he carried would satisfy the British government and that he would be received at court as the accredited Iranian ambassador.

Palmerston, now confronted with this unexpected diplomatic maneuver, replied briefly on Saturday, June 8, stating that he would soon send someone to examine and copy the documents.

On Sunday, June 9, 1839, Palmerston also received a dispatch from Justin Sheil, the British chargé d’affaires in Iran, then stationed in Erzurum. This letter, written nearly two months earlier, responded to Husayn Khan’s accusations—made in Vienna at the suggestion of Metternich—regarding Sir John McNeill’s alleged disrespect toward the Shah.

Sheil firmly rejected these claims:

He stated that McNeill had consistently shown the highest respect toward the Shah of Iran and that during all audiences prior to the Shah’s departure for the Herat campaign, nothing had been observed but diplomatic decorum. He further noted that McNeill’s correspondence had been translated by him personally, and that any harsh expressions in the original Persian had been softened in translation to preserve diplomatic tone.

Sheil also dismissed Husayn Khan’s account of McNeill’s alleged misconduct as inaccurate, including claims regarding the circumstances of the envoy’s movements and the arrest of individuals at the frontier. According to Sheil, the events had been misrepresented and lacked factual foundation.

Following this, Husayn Khan requested that a Persian-language expert be assigned to assist in translating the documents in his possession. Palmerston agreed, instructing that Mirza Ibrahim carefully verify all documents and ensure that only authenticated copies were translated.

On Tuesday, June 11, 1839, Husayn Khan responded:

He thanked Lord Palmerston for his courtesy and for appointing Mirza Ibrahim. He stated that he had instructed copies of royal and ministerial letters to be prepared for the Foreign Office. He also emphasized that he possessed additional confidential documents which he was not authorized to surrender, though he might allow limited inspection under supervision.

Husayn Khan’s diplomatic firmness left Palmerston with little choice but to agree to a formal meeting. A short note was sent requesting his presence at Stanhope Street the following day at 1 p.m.

The Meeting of June 19, 1839

The report of this lengthy meeting, recorded by J. B. Fraser, describes in detail the negotiations between Palmerston and the Persian envoy.

Palmerston opened the discussion by outlining British grievances against the Persian government, particularly the alleged insult to the British mission and the treatment of its personnel. He then set out three principal demands:

1. The dismissal of Brigadier-General Haji Khan Qarabaghi;

2. A formal apology from Prime Minister Haj Mirza Aghasi;

3. A formal decree guaranteeing full protection for all British agents and dependents in Persia.

The third demand effectively amounted to full diplomatic capitulation.

Palmerston argued that these demands had not been adequately met. Although Haji Khan had been dismissed, this had been officially attributed to military misconduct rather than any insult to the British mission. No apology had been issued by the prime minister, and the Shah’s letter—though conciliatory in tone—did not, in British eyes, constitute an admission of responsibility.

Husayn Khan responded that the Shah had expressed regret and goodwill, but denied any intentional wrongdoing. He insisted that the incident had been misinterpreted and that those detained at the frontier had not been clearly identified as British agents.

Palmerston rejected this interpretation, stating that ignorance could not excuse the treatment of an accredited envoy.

The discussion then turned to the principle of diplomatic immunity for messengers. Husayn Khan argued that the individuals involved had no formal passport identifying them as British agents, while Palmerston countered that such protection was inherent in diplomatic service and did not depend solely on documentation.

The debate continued over conflicting versions of letters and translations, particularly concerning Mirza Ali’s correspondence and the Shah’s official statement. Palmerston insisted that British intelligence and parliamentary testimony were consistent, while Persian accounts were contradictory.

The conversation then shifted to broader political grievances, including alleged Persian interference in Afghanistan and British military actions at Kharg Island. Husayn Khan protested that British intervention had violated diplomatic norms, while Palmerston justified it as a necessary response to Persian advances toward Herat, which Britain viewed as a threat to India.

The exchange became increasingly confrontational. Neither side accepted the other’s interpretation of events, particularly regarding territorial claims in Afghanistan and the status of Herat and the Ghurian fortresses.

After several hours of discussion, Palmerston concluded that Britain could not accept Persian proposals under the current conditions and insisted that substantive concessions were required before diplomatic relations could be normalized.

Conclusion of the Negotiations

Despite further exchanges and attempts at clarification, Palmerston maintained his position. The Persian envoy’s arguments were rejected, and no agreement was reached.

The meeting ended without resolution, marking a moment of diplomatic deadlock between Britain and Persia—one shaped by mutual suspicion, conflicting narratives, and competing imperial interests in Central and South Asia.

McNeill and Sayyid Mohammad Baqir Shafti

Seyyed Mohammad Baqir Shafti, who was known for his opposition to the corruption of Khosrow Khan Gorji, the governor of Isfahan, also possessed considerable financial acumen. He appears to have had a strong understanding of commerce and financial management. According to Muhammad ibn Suleiman Tonekaboni in Qasas al-‘Ulama:

One of the Khans of Shaft sent a sum of money to the Sayyid. The Sayyid allocated part of it for his own use, and stipulated that for the remainder of his life he would benefit from it, while the principal would, after his death, be used for designated purposes. The Sayyid invested this money in trade and commerce and, in a short time, made substantial profits.

Hamed Algar writes about him in Religion and State in Iran:

After the death of Mirza Abu’l-Qasim Qummi (c. 1807), three figures became especially influential: Mulla Ali Nuri (d. 1831), Haj Muhammad Ibrahim Kalbasi (d. 1846), and Hujjat al-Islam Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Shafti. Among them, Shafti was the most prominent. In him, we see an early example of a wealthy and decisive mujtahid whose judicial, economic, and political authority exceeded that of the temporal government, to the extent that state authority often operated only with his consent.

Regarding his judicial practice, numerous accounts portray him as a firm and capable judge who, when necessary, consulted learned scholars. According to Tonekaboni:

A man produced a deed for a village in Isfahan, sealed with the stamps of notable figures such as Aqa Jamal Khansari and Aqa Hossein Majlisi. He used this document to bring a legal claim against the village’s inhabitants, some of whom had lost possession of their land. The case continued for several months. Eventually, the Sayyid consulted the jurists of Julfa and expert calligraphers. Examining the paper under sunlight, they determined the age of the seal and found it inconsistent with the claimed date. It became clear that the document was forged, whereupon the Sayyid immediately annulled it and ruled in favor of the defendants.

At this time, the governor of Isfahan was Khosrow Khan Gorji, a eunuch of the Qajar court. His original name was Andrei Ivanovich—he had been captured near Yerevan in 1804 and converted to Islam, as did another eunuch, Manuchehr Khan Gorji (born Changor Anikovich), who later also served as governor of Isfahan.

At the beginning of Mohammad Shah’s reign, Khosrow Khan presented him with the treasury of Fath Ali Shah and the royal sword, after which Mohammad Shah appointed him governor of Isfahan. During the first half of the nineteenth century, Isfahan had become a major center of clerical influence. The ulama, particularly figures such as Shafti, resisted the perceived moral laxity of Qajar princes as well as the increasing influence of Russia and Britain.

The appointment of Khosrow Khan Gorji—and later Manuchehr Khan Gorji—was partly intended to counterbalance clerical power. Seyyed Mohammad Baqir Shafti, aware of Khosrow Khan’s controversial record during his governorship in Gilan (which had provoked local unrest), played an active role in mobilizing opposition against him.

Shafti’s teaching sessions were irregular; he often taught only two or three days a week, and on some days not at all. At times, scholarly debate would break out during his sessions, disrupting the lesson. These interruptions became so frequent that some of his students, such as Mulla Jafar Nazarabadi, noted in their writings: “This was during a time when the class was crowded and discussion delayed the lesson.”

As noted earlier, Mirza Husayn Khan Ajudanbashi complained to Palmerston that McNeill had written to Sayyid Shafti requesting a fatwa against the Herat campaign. Shafti’s response reflects the intellectual and moral framework of the clerical establishment at the time:

While a full response would require extensive discussion, we write briefly, trusting in the understanding of the honorable British government. We hope that you will reflect justly and rely on sound reason in your judgment. [...]

He then described at length the suffering inflicted upon the people of Khorasan by Turkestani forces, accusing them of massacres, enslavement, and widespread destruction:

For over a century, the people of Turkestan have inflicted grave oppression upon Khorasan. Wherever they entered, they killed, enslaved, and plundered. Entire provinces were devastated. In Herat, their cruelty exceeded all bounds: they burned servants of God in cauldrons, dismembered them, and enslaved their families. Such actions represent not mere injustice, but extreme tyranny, which it is both just and necessary to repel. [...]

He further argued that resistance to such forces was a legitimate obligation of justice, and that any government facing such threats would be compelled to act. He warned against misinterpreting the expedition as unjust aggression:

If your intention is to oppose the movement toward Turkestan, such a request at this time is contrary to prudence. After all expenditures, hardships, and military organization, to halt the campaign before its objectives are achieved would be unreasonable. [...]

Shafti also criticized the logic of treating regional conflict as a justification for hostility between Iran and Britain:

What connection exists between the disputes of the borders of Turkestan and the relations between our governments? To transform such matters into grounds for enmity is contrary to reason and prudence. Indeed, one of the aims of all prophets has been the removal of hostility, not its creation. How then can wise statesmen act in a manner that so clearly contradicts this principle? [...]

He concluded by suggesting that McNeill’s communication was not merely informational but strategic in intent, designed to influence clerical opinion and political outcomes.

Ajudanbashi’s Return to Iran with the French Delegation

Félix Édouard, Comte de Sercey

Mirza Husayn Khan Ajudanbashi returned to Paris after completing his mission in London. Having previously succeeded in persuading Louis-Philippe and the government of Marshal Soult to establish commercial, political, and educational ties with Iran during his earlier stay in France, he now requested that France send a group of military officers to Iran to replace the British presence, as well as specialists to help establish educational institutions.

France agreed to provide officers for the reorganization of the Persian army and, on the other hand, entrusted the establishment of educational institutions to the Catholic mission. Accordingly, Ajudanbashi departed for Persia in September 1839, accompanied by Félix Édouard, Comte de Sercey, the French ambassador, and a group of twelve French nationals. Among them was a priest, Father Félix Scafi, who had previously accompanied General Gardanne during his earlier mission to Iran.

Father Scafi, himself a Lazarist, had become acquainted in Istanbul with another Lazarist, Eugène Boré. Boré was a scholar fluent in Turkish and several other West Asian languages, and had been sent to the Ottoman Empire by François Guizot, then Minister of Public Instruction, in the government of Marshal Nicolas-Jean de Dieu Soult. In addition to mastering Turkish and other regional languages, Boré studied history, medicine, physics, astronomy, and fencing. In June 1838, he produced a report on the Armenians of Istanbul.

Boré believed that Catholicism, in its French interpretation, had a promising future in both the Ottoman and Persian empires, particularly among the Armenian population. In 1834, the French government had sent him to Venice to study Armenian communities, where he came into contact with the Mechitarists. Mechitar was an Armenian monk (Peter Manuk) who had converted to Catholicism in an effort to bridge the divide between the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Roman Catholic Church. Boré regarded the Armenian clergy of Aghtamar and Echmiadzin as poorly educated and attributed their institutional weakness—and even Armenia’s broader decline—to the historical separation of the Armenian Church from Rome following the Council of Chalcedon.

In the middle of winter, Ajudanbashi and the French delegation crossed the Armenian highlands and entered Persia on Saturday, 11 January 1840. Three weeks later, Comte de Sercey proceeded to Isfahan and reached the Shah and Haj Mirza Aghasi on Wednesday, 8 April 1840.

In a letter dated Sunday, 26 January 1840, sent from Tabriz, Eugène Boré listed the members of Comte de Sercey’s entourage as follows: Lavalette, first secretary of the embassy; Chazelle; Cyrus Gérard; Desgranges (professor of Turkish at the Collège de France); Biberein (a colleague of Boré); Lachaise (physician to the mission); Flandin (painter); Coste (architect).

By this time, however, the Iranian treasury was depleted, and the Shah was discouraged and frustrated by the failure of the Herat campaign. During the two months that Sercey spent in Isfahan, the Shah frequently spoke of the “Great Game” between Russia and Britain. Yet, lacking the resources to maintain the French military advisers, he treated them with increasing reserve and, at times, open indifference.

Meanwhile, Russia and Britain carefully monitored these developments. The French officers—most of whom were of modest rank and limited experience—were often met with irony by European officers already serving in the Persian army, including Polish, Russian, and other veterans who had brought with them uniforms and customs from the Napoleonic era.

In 1840, the French mission was divided into three groups: two officers were sent to Shiraz and the Persian Gulf region, as well as Baghdad and Mesopotamia, for surveying work. Another group proceeded toward Tabriz and Georgia. Comte de Sercey himself traveled to Kermanshah and Kurdistan, accompanied by Chazelles, Lachaise, Kasimirski, and Father Scafi.

The Principle of Religious Freedom and the Establishment of the First European and American Schools in Iran

During the reign of Mohammad Shah Qajar, the principle of freedom of belief, combined with the establishment of the first European and American-style schools, enabled a growing number of Iranians to acquire literacy and formal education. This development, together with the revenues generated by printing presses established in Azerbaijan by Christian missionaries in Shusha, Tabriz, and Urmia, contributed to the emergence of early journalism in Tehran and Tabriz.

Upon his arrival in Iran to promote Christianity through education and missionary activity, Eugène Boré observed that Armenians in Iran were in a significantly better condition than those in Russia or the Ottoman Empire. He attributed this difference to Iran’s long-standing tradition of relative religious tolerance. In one of his letters from Iran, he wrote: “In Iran, Armenians are like Iranians, and Iranians are like Armenians.”

Boré established a school and a small church in Tabriz (which he still refers to as “Taurus” in his correspondence). In a letter dated Monday, 26 November 1838, he describes Tabriz as a cosmopolitan city inhabited by Europeans—particularly British and Russian residents—as well as Armenians, Arabs, Assyrians, and Turks. He notes that his own residence in Tabriz was built by a French architect, while a German baker was employed in his household.

In a letter to his brother dated January 1839, Boré requested the recruitment of a young French physician who was also a committed Christian, preferably someone trained in chemistry, physics, and botany, and with sufficient technical and industrial knowledge to assist in educational work. In a letter addressed to the president of the Academy of Literature in Paris on Wednesday, 6 February 1839, he announced his intention to establish a university in Tabriz, stating that he would initially teach alone until additional professors arrived from France.

He further suggested that textbooks in French could be compiled using manuscripts in Persian, Arabic, and Turkish. In a separate letter written the same day to the French Minister of Public Education, he proposed that instruction at the planned University of Tabriz should be conducted in French. This proposal received the approval of Ghahraman Mirza and was also endorsed by Hassan Mirza, the son of Fath Ali Shah. According to Boré’s plan, philosophy, literature, and the natural sciences would be taught at the institution. He reported that the youth of Tabriz had welcomed the initiative and were eager to learn French in preparation for studying at the new center of learning. He also noted that French instruction had already begun under a Swiss chef residing in Tabriz. Boré further expressed hope that Lazarist missionaries in Istanbul would send additional instructors during the summer to assist in organizing the university along European lines.

According to Boré’s correspondence, he also prepared a French–Persian grammar and sent a copy to Mohammad Shah. He adds that the Shah had expressed interest in reading the history of Napoleon—whom he greatly admired—and had reportedly read an abridged version of Walter Scott’s biography of the emperor. Boré suggested that, if complete works on Napoleon were sent to Iran along with a copy of the Shahnameh translated by M. Jules Mohl, as well as Étienne Quatremère’s History of the Mongols and other useful works, the Iranian elite would be more inclined to support French scholarly and educational initiatives in Tabriz.

Boré further notes that Prince Ghahraman Mirza wished to organize workshops in Tabriz with French artisans in textile production, glassmaking, and porcelain manufacture. This initiative reflected a growing awareness among segments of the Iranian elite that industrial and technical knowledge was essential for national progress.

As these developments indicate, Ghahraman Mirza—brother of Mohammad Shah and governor of Azerbaijan—was genuinely committed to promoting education and industry in Iran. He therefore supported Boré’s initiatives and petitioned the Shah to issue official authorization for the establishment of schools and the proclamation of religious freedom for Christians. On 20 April 1840, Mohammad Shah issued a decree permitting the establishment of schools and affirming the rights and equality of Christians. This document became known as the “Charter of Religious Freedom” and was translated into French, Armenian, and Assyrian. According to its provisions, Catholics were permitted to build and repair churches, bury their dead, engage in trade, and establish schools for the education of children.

Although Boré had not awaited the decree—having already opened his school at the end of 1839—only a small number of Armenians enrolled initially. The majority of students were Muslims, though many were unable to attend due to lack of space. Boré placed strong emphasis on teaching French, believing that linguistic training would enable students to serve as interpreters for incoming Vincentian missionaries. Father Scafi supported Boré’s educational plans but eventually returned to Europe. Boré also wrote to François Guizot requesting financial assistance.

After discussing Boré’s plans with both ecclesiastical and governmental authorities in France, Father Scafi returned to Iran in January 1840 and informed Boré that he had successfully secured the dispatch of a group of Vincentian priests to assist in educational work, with the support of the French government.

In April 1841, three Vincentian missionaries—Fournier, Darnis, and Cluzel—arrived in Iran to begin teaching. Boré also succeeded in obtaining a grant of 22,400 francs from the Société pour la Propagation de la Foi in France. These achievements encouraged him to expand his activities toward Chaldoran and other parts of Azerbaijan, which in turn led to growing inter-denominational tensions among Christian communities. American missionaries, along with Assyrian and Orthodox Armenian clergy, became increasingly concerned about Boré’s influence and sought to counter his expansion.

According to Stafford Poole, Boré’s worldview—maintained consistently throughout his life—can be summarized in five key principles: (1) the renewal of society through the restoration of Catholicism; (2) the belief that separation from the Roman Church had led to the decline of Armenian society and its loss of cohesion and vitality; (3) the conviction that all major positive developments in history originated in Christianity; (4) the view that knowledge and education are essential instruments for attaining truth; and (5) an absolute commitment to religious freedom as a universal and timeless right. At the same time, Boré remained a devoted French patriot and consistently worked to advance French interests in West Asia. He believed that Iran sought to balance Western powers against one another in order to acquire technological and institutional capacity sufficient to resist imperial domination.

Emergence of American Presbyterian Church Schools

In 1830, two American missionaries, Dr. Gray Otis Dwight and Dr. Eli Smith, arrived in Urmia, dressed in local turbans and cloaks, representing the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in Boston. Their mission was to investigate the condition of Christianity in Iran and the surrounding regions.

According to Julius Richter in A History of Protestant Missions in the Near East, they found among the Nestorian Assyrians approximately 20 to 30 literate men and only one literate woman. Worship services were conducted in an ancient Assyrian liturgical language understood by only a small number of priests. The Neo-Assyrian vernacular, rooted in ancient Aramaic traditions, had not yet developed into a fully standardized written language.

Richter further notes that Catholic missionaries had earlier made contact with Nestorian communities west of the Zagros Mountains in Mesopotamia, though without significantly improving their doctrinal or institutional conditions. In response, the American missionaries established a school for about forty students, teaching mathematics, English, and biblical hymns.

Shortly thereafter, Justin Perkins and his wife Charlotte Perkins were appointed as missionaries to Iran. However, upon reaching the banks of the Aras River, they were temporarily detained by Russian Cossack authorities. Justin Perkins later wrote:

“We were several kilometers away from any village, and neither our guards nor ourselves were able to leave the location in search of provisions. The only means by which we survived was by persuading an Iranian boatman on the opposite bank of the river to bring us food from a village approximately six kilometers inland. By paying a considerable price, we were able to receive bread and melons every two or three days. We had no idea how long our detention would last, as it depended entirely on the Russian officers, who themselves appeared uncertain of the situation…”

Perkins expressed frustration at what he perceived as arbitrary Russian authority, noting that his status as an “American clergyman” was viewed with suspicion in the Russian Empire. He contrasted this with what he described as the relative openness of the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran, where, in his view, Protestant missionaries encountered fewer institutional obstacles.

Following diplomatic intervention, Perkins received assistance from Sir John Campbell, the British minister in Iran. With Russian cooperation under Count Simonich, arrangements were made for his passage across the border. Perkins and his party were escorted safely to Tabriz, arriving on Saturday, 23 August 1834. Three days later, Mrs. Perkins gave birth to a daughter, assisted by physicians attached to the British mission in Tabriz.

Shortly thereafter, Perkins traveled to Urmia, where he engaged an Assyrian bishop, Mar Yohannan, to assist him in learning the local language.

Perkins’ writings reflect his missionary interpretation of regional conditions, including his belief that epidemic disease in Azerbaijan was providentially significant. He also expressed critical views of local Assyrian communities, describing them as socially vulnerable, economically constrained, and religiously distant from his own Protestant ideals, while nevertheless acknowledging their resistance to conversion to Islam or Catholicism.

By 1835, after acquiring proficiency in the Assyrian language, Perkins, together with Dr. Asahel Grant and his wife, established a mission base in Urmia. Teaching initially began in the basement of Perkins’ residence with seven male students under the supervision of Pastor Abraham, later expanding to approximately fifty students.

In the autumn of that year, Prince Gahreman Mirza, governor of Azerbaijan and brother of Mohammad Shah Qajar, visited Urmia. He delegated his uncle, Malik Qasim Mirza, to inspect the mission school. Malik Qasim Mirza reportedly treated Perkins with courtesy and submitted a favorable report to the prince. As a result, a royal decree was issued in September 1835:

“Since the honorable gentlemen Perkins and Grant are engaged in educating the people of Urmia and imparting European knowledge, three soldiers are assigned to guard them. The governor of Urmia, Najaf Qoli Khan, is instructed to ensure their protection, and each soldier shall receive a monthly stipend of three tomans…”

The American Presbyterian missions in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan aimed to reform the Assyrian Nestorian Church according to Protestant principles and to create new centers of evangelization in Iran and Central Asia. Although they considered themselves culturally and intellectually superior, their influence on local communities remained limited. The deep-rooted religious and cultural traditions of the Assyrian population proved resilient.

In contrast, figures such as Eugène Boré, associated with French Catholic missions, adopted a different strategy emphasizing cultural engagement and institutional integration. Boré’s approach, unlike that of the American missions, placed greater emphasis on language, education, and state collaboration, rather than direct doctrinal transformation alone.

Ultimately, missionary activity in this period contributed to the establishment of educational institutions in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. While Iranian officials initially viewed these schools as potential instruments for modernization and access to European knowledge, their deeper cultural and ideological consequences were more complex. They introduced new intellectual frameworks that encouraged reflection on Iran’s position in relation to Europe, technology, and historical development.

For many students educated in these institutions, European advancement appeared linked to scientific progress, industrial organization, and political power. This perception contributed to emerging debates within Iranian intellectual circles regarding modernization, tradition, and cultural reform—debates that would later shape major intellectual currents in modern Iranian thought.