Chapter Nine: Artaxerxes II – Artaxšaça the Wise (404–359 BC): The Architect of the King’s Peace over the Greek City-States

  

 

Introduction: The Dawn of a Complex Reign

The accession of Artaxerxes II (Old Persian: Artaxšaça) marked the beginning of one of the longest and most politically intricate reigns in Achaemenid history. Known to the Greeks as 'Artaxerxes the Wise' (ὁ σοφός Ἀρταξέρξης), his rule was defined by the consolidation of Persian hegemony across Asia Minor and the Greek world, the continued promotion of ancient Iranian Mithraic religious traditions, and the ongoing challenges of dynastic rivalry and imperial administration.

Artaxerxes II inherited the throne at a moment of both unprecedented opportunity and latent peril. His father Darius II's cautious yet ultimately successful diplomacy had shattered Athenian naval supremacy and established the foundation for Persian ascendancy throughout the Greek world. Yet this promising new chapter began immediately with fraternal strife: an audacious usurpation attempt by his younger brother Cyrus the Younger, who commanded not only their mother's passionate support but also the military backing of seasoned Greek mercenaries. This rebellion, culminating dramatically at the Battle of Cunaxa (401 BC), would fundamentally shape both the character of Artaxerxes' rule and the future trajectory of Persian-Greek relations for generations to come.

What distinguishes the reign of Artaxerxes II is not merely its extraordinary length—spanning over four tumultuous decades—but its remarkable complexity: a reign perpetually entangled with court conspiracies, satrapal revolts, and a calculated return to ancient Iranian religious motifs. For the first time since the great Darius I, royal inscriptions invoked not only Ahura Mazda but also Anahita and Mithra, reflecting a strategic shift toward the revival of Mithraic and Zoroastrian symbols as pillars of legitimacy and divine favor. This theological transformation represented far more than mere religious preference; it constituted a deliberate ideological repositioning of the monarchy within the broader cultural framework of the Iranian world.

Succession and Dynastic Tensions: The Rise of Artaxerxes II

King Darius II (Ochus) fathered four sons by his formidable queen, Parysatis (Parišyātiš): the eldest, Arsaces (Aršaka, rendered as Arsikas [Ἀρσίκας] by Ctesias and Oarses [Ὀάρσης] by Dinon, both cited by Plutarch in his biographical accounts), the younger Cyrus (destined for fame as Cyrus the Younger), and two additional sons, both bearing the name Oxyathres (Axathres), of whom regrettably little historical detail survives. Upon Darius II's death in 404 BC, Arsaces ascended the throne under the carefully chosen regnal name Artaxerxes II, thereby establishing continuity with the glorious reign of his great predecessor.

The Greek sources present divergent accounts of these crucial succession events, reflecting the political biases and limited access of their respective authors. Xenophon, who maintained close alignment with Cyrus the Younger and actively participated in his campaign as both observer and chronicler, mentions only two sons in his narrative. Plutarch, however, drawing extensively on the now-lost but historically valuable works of Ctesias—the royal physician and trusted confidant of Queen Parysatis—provides a broader and demonstrably more reliable account of the succession crisis. Although Xenophon's account is undoubtedly biased in favor of Cyrus, his detailed descriptions of the motivations behind Cyrus's rebellion offer invaluable insight into the complex political dynamics and personal ambitions that dominated the Persian court during this transitional period.

According to Xenophon's detailed account (Anabasis 1.1.2), as Darius II lay dying in his final illness, he summoned both of his sons to his bedside for what would prove to be a fateful final audience. Artaxerxes, by fortunate circumstance, was already present at court, while Cyrus was hastily recalled from his influential satrapy in Asia Minor, where he had simultaneously been entrusted with supreme command over the Persian forces stationed in the strategically vital plains of Castolus. Cyrus arrived at court accompanied by his powerful ally Tissaphernes and a formidable escort of three hundred Greek hoplites under the experienced command of Xenias of Parrhasia. It was under these tense and emotionally charged circumstances that the seeds of the devastating rebellion that would soon follow were inexorably sown.

The Arrest and Release of Cyrus the Younger

Plutarch's account reveals that soon after Darius II's death and the completion of the funeral rites, Tissaphernes—acutely aware of Cyrus's burning ambitions and dangerous potential—formally accused him of plotting regicide against his elder brother. Based on these serious allegations, which may have contained elements of truth, Artaxerxes ordered Cyrus's immediate arrest and confinement. However, due to the passionate and persistent intercession of their mother Parysatis, who openly favored Cyrus over her elder son and possessed considerable influence at court, Cyrus was soon released from captivity and his charges dismissed.

According to Plutarch's detailed account, drawing on Ctesias's intimate court knowledge, Parysatis advanced a sophisticated legal argument that challenged the very foundations of Artaxerxes' succession. She contended that since Artaxerxes had been born before Darius II ascended the throne, Cyrus—born during his father's actual reign—possessed a more legitimate claim to royal succession. This argument consciously echoed the reasoning advanced by Demaratus on behalf of Xerxes in Herodotus's historical account, though in this particular case, Darius II remained unmoved by such legal subtleties and firmly confirmed Artaxerxes as his chosen successor. The king's decision reflected not only his personal preference but also his assessment of which son would prove more capable of maintaining imperial stability.

 According to Ctesias, Tissaphernes' father was Hidarnes III. He was the great-grandson of Hydarnes, one of the six conspirators who supported the rise of Darius the Great. It bears noting that in Plutarch's portrayal, heavily influenced by Ctesias's court perspective, Tissaphernes emerges as a fundamentally unsavory and duplicitous character, motivated primarily by personal ambition rather than loyalty to the crown. While this characterization may be somewhat exaggerated for dramatic effect, the undeniable role of court intrigue and personal rivalries in the succession crisis cannot be dismissed. The Persian court, like all great centers of power, was a hotbed of competing factions and shifting alliances.

Coronation and Religious Revival: A Return to the Gods of Light

Ctesias's vivid description of the coronation rites, carefully preserved by Plutarch, offers a rare and invaluable glimpse into the ancient Achaemenid ritual tradition that had been maintained for centuries. Shortly after the death of Darius II and the completion of the mourning period, Artaxerxes II undertook the sacred journey to Pasargadae to undergo the traditional investiture ceremony at the temple of the "warrior goddess"—whom Plutarch, following his predictably Hellenic worldview, speculatively identifies with Athena. However, this identification is demonstrably mistaken and reflects the common Greek tendency to interpret foreign deities through familiar mythological frameworks.

It is far more probable, based on both archaeological evidence and religious context, that the ceremony took place within the sacred precincts of Anahita's temple, dedicated to the great Iranian goddess of fertility, water, and divine sovereignty, who had become closely associated with Mithra in post-Darius I Achaemenid theology. According to the detailed account preserved by Ctesias, the king was required to remove his upper garments, don the sacred tiara (likely the tilsana) once worn by the legendary Cyrus the Great, consume a specially prepared fig cake, chew a twig of the sacred plant haoma (possibly misrendered by Greek scribes as angoum), and drink a ceremonial cup of sour milk. These ancient rites served to reaffirm the king's divine election and invoke the protective favor of the traditional triad: Ahura Mazda, Anahita, and Mithra.

Artaxerxes II, great-great-grandson of Darius I, continued the theological innovations that had begun during his great-grandfather Artaxerxes I's reign. The practice of naming Anahita and Mithra alongside Ahura Mazda in royal inscriptions, which had been revived during Artaxerxes I's rule after the strict Ahura Mazda-focused theology of Darius I and Xerxes I, was maintained and further developed under Artaxerxes II. On a stone base discovered in the ancient city of Ecbatana, inscriptions in both Elamite and Babylonian invoke all three deities with unprecedented clarity. An exemplary inscription from Artaxerxes I's reign reads:

"I, Artaxerxes the King, son of Xerxes the King, grandson of Darius the Great, of the House of Vishtaspa, have built this Apadana by the grace of Ahura Mazda, Anahita, and Mithra. May they preserve me from sin and destruction. May they not allow what I have built to perish."

This theological framework, originally established during Artaxerxes I's reign, represented a calculated departure from the earlier religious policy of Darius I and Xerxes I. While Darius I had established the relative monotheistic exaltation of Ahura Mazda as the supreme deity, the later Artaxerxes kings deliberately repositioned the monarchy within a broader and more inclusive divine framework, consciously drawing from more ancient and possibly Mithraic religious traditions deeply rooted in Iranian cultural memory. Under Artaxerxes II, this theological approach was not merely ceremonial but reflected a sophisticated understanding of the diverse religious expectations of his vast empire's population.

The Ambitions of Cyrus the Younger: Prelude to Cunaxa

The Royal Rebellion

The first serious threat to Artaxerxes' reign emerged from within the royal family itself. Cyrus the Younger, though initially pardoned for his earlier transgressions, remained restless and ambitious. As Plutarch observes, "from his youth, Cyrus was rebellious and impetuous, while Artaxerxes was mild in manner and composed in his judgments." Xenophon adds that upon returning to Sardis, Cyrus resolved never again to submit to his brother's authority and began secretly preparing for open rebellion.

With his mother Parysatis's support, Cyrus cultivated the Persian nobility and presented himself as more generous and kingly than Artaxerxes II. To conceal his preparations, he claimed to be defending the Ionian cities against a possible attack by Tissaphernes—whose satrapy included many of these cities. Using this pretext, he secretly recruited Greek mercenaries from across the Peloponnese. According to Xenophon, Cyrus promised the Spartan leaders lavish rewards if they aided his cause: horsemen would receive additional mounts, foot soldiers would gain estates, and generals would be granted cities.

Cyrus's military buildup in Sardis included an army of exiled Milesians—those whom Tissaphernes had expelled or  persecuted for plotting to defect to Cyrus. Under the guise of restoring these exiles to Miletus, Cyrus assembled additional forces. Meanwhile, he demanded control over the Ionian cities, ostensibly for tax collection purposes, while continuing to win support among Greek cities and mercenaries. His correspondence with Sparta sealed the military alliance that would culminate in his dramatic but ultimately doomed bid for the throne.

The Spartan–Cyrus Alliance

In 404 BC, when Artaxerxes II ascended to the Persian throne, the Spartan general Lysander brought the long and devastating Peloponnesian War to an end by defeating Athens. As previously noted, Lysander's success was largely due to Persian support—specifically, the financial and military backing of Cyrus the Younger, granted with the approval of his father, King Darius II. Following Athens' defeat, the city lost its small empire, was forced to dismantle its fortifications and defensive walls, and was permitted to maintain only a small fleet. Meanwhile, Persian support helped Sparta achieve naval supremacy in the Aegean for the next five years.

According to the 412 BC treaty between Persia and Sparta, the Spartans were to return the Greek cities in Asia Minor to Persian control. However, by 404 BC this had not occurred, as both Cyrus the Younger and the satrap Tissaphernes were preoccupied at the deathbed of Darius II in Susa. Upon his accession, Artaxerxes II had Cyrus arrested for allegedly plotting to usurp the throne, then ordered the cities of Asia Minor to be transferred to Tissaphernes.

The Spartans, who viewed Tissaphernes as harsh and inflexible, were dissatisfied with this development. Lysander seized the opportunity, inciting the dekarchies (ten-man oligarchic governments) established in the cities of Asia Minor to rebel. With the exception of Miletus, which hesitated, the cities revolted against Tissaphernes and aligned themselves with Cyrus. To appease his brother Artaxerxes II, Cyrus regularly sent plundered tribute from these cities to the royal court.

According to the orator Isocrates, it was likely Lysander who encouraged Cyrus to challenge his brother and helped him recruit 12,000 Greek mercenaries, primarily from Arcadia and Achaea. Plutarch writes:

Cyrus marched to confront the king with a large army of Persians and about 13,000 Greek mercenaries, inventing various pretexts for his campaign. But his true aim was soon uncovered when Tissaphernes himself informed the king of the plot. A great uproar ensued at court. Much of the blame for the war fell upon Parysatis, and her associates were suspected and accused. Astiatir (Artaxerxes' queen), anguished by the brewing conflict, reproached the king: 'What of the promises you made, and the man you spared—has he now brought war and disaster upon us?' Angered and vengeful, Parysatis set out to kill Astiatir.

According to the historian Dinon, Parysatis carried out this assassination during the war, though Ctesias claimed it occurred afterward. Given that Ctesias was present at court during this period and had no incentive to misrepresent the timing, his account appears more credible.

The Battle of Cunaxa and Its Aftermath

The armies of Cyrus and Artaxerxes eventually clashed at Cunaxa, located roughly 500 leagues from Babylon. In the battle, Artaxerxes emerged victorious, and Cyrus was killed. Artaxerxes then sent envoys to the camp of the Greek mercenaries who had supported Cyrus, proposing that they lay down their arms and return home.

Xenophon, in his Anabasis (The March of the Ten Thousand), recounts the episode:

Messengers arrived from King Tissaphernes—all Persians except for Phalinus, a respected Greek military advisor. They told the Greek commanders that since Cyrus was dead, there was no longer cause for war, and the king requested their weapons be surrendered before any negotiations. When the Greeks asked if this demand came from a position of strength or as a gesture of friendship, Phalinus replied: 'The king believes that he owns you now—you are deep in his land, the rivers block your paths, and he can raise an army so vast that if they merely stood still, you could not kill them all.'

This exchange highlights the mercenaries' precarious situation: stranded in a foreign empire with limited resources and uncertain prospects. For Artaxerxes, resolving this crisis early in his reign was critical, especially since he also faced a major rebellion in Egypt.

According to Xenophon, some Greek mercenaries proposed offering their services to Artaxerxes in suppressing the Egyptian rebellion, hoping to demonstrate their value. This may have influenced their commander Clearchus to negotiate safe passage home. Artaxerxes agreed, and the Greeks were told they would be escorted by Tissaphernes' troops.

However, Tissaphernes, known for his discipline and strictness, had other plans. He invited five of their senior commanders to a banquet, where he arrested them. As Xenophon records:

The commanders were sent to the king, who had them executed. Tissaphernes also executed twenty of their officers and around two hundred soldiers. He permitted the remainder to return to Greece—though only after enduring immense hardship and numerous battles against Persian forces.

Xenophon's account of this dramatic retreat became legendary in European literature, emblematic of Greek endurance and tactical prowess.

Tissaphernes Returns to Sardis as Satrap the Supreme Commander of Persian Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean

Following these events, Artaxerxes II promoted Tissaphernes to supreme commander of Persian forces in the eastern Mediterranean. The king restored to him the satrapies of Lydia and Ionia, previously controlled by Cyrus, which he added to his own province of Caria. Tissaphernes demanded that the rebellious Greek cities in Asia Minor submit once again to Persian authority.

In Sparta, this provoked outrage. Cyrus's reckless favoritism had undermined Persia's delicate diplomatic balance in Greece. Lysander, once the architect of Spartan dominance, now positioned himself to oppose Artaxerxes II directly. He saw an opportunity to counter Athens' brief resurgence and usher in a new Spartan-led order.

Sparta's dual kingship now became central to events. King Pausanias, who maintained secret ties with Persia and favored autonomy for Greek cities (a policy aligned with Persian aims), found himself at odds with King Agis. Agis sought to distract both Lysander and Pausanias with an external campaign, giving himself freedom to implement domestic reforms.

When Agis died, Lysander successfully supported the accession of his brother Agesilaus II, despite his physical disability. Agesilaus was soon drawn into the Persian conflict, and in 396 BC Sparta declared war on Artaxerxes II.

The Betrayal of Spithridates and Egyptian Unrest

Following Agesilaus's string of victories, Tissaphernes' position rapidly weakened. One by one, the Greek cities sent envoys seeking alliance with the Spartan king and pledged military support. These developments not only strengthened Agesilaus's hand in Ionia but also coincided with a broader campaign to destabilize the Persian Empire from its peripheries. Among the most costly fronts for Persia was Egypt, where rebellion had flared anew. Sparta now threw its support behind the Egyptian revolt, further draining Persian resources. This prolonged unrest in Egypt, which would persist in varying forms until the 340s BC, inflicted serious losses on the imperial treasury. Much of this instability stemmed from the earlier policies of Cyrus the Younger, whose enthusiastic alignment with Sparta—abandoning the traditional strategy of balance in Greece—unwittingly undermined Persian authority across multiple regions.

The Egyptian revolt began in earnest with Amyrtaeus, son of Pausiris, a former general under Artaxerxes I. Seizing on the chaos unleashed by Cyrus's rebellion and the wars in Asia Minor, Amyrtaeus declared independence in 404 BC. He quickly negotiated a treaty with Sparta, agreeing to supply wheat and barley to support Agesilaus's campaigns in Ionia. His strategy rested on the hope that the Persian satraps would remain preoccupied with the Greek theater and be unable to retaliate against him. Although Amyrtaeus died in 398 BC, he had not yet achieved full control over Egypt.

He was succeeded by Nepherites I, who continued his predecessor's alliance with Sparta. Nepherites not only maintained the grain trade but also dispatched ships and timber for the construction of a hundred-ship fleet destined for the Rhaetian Sea. However, by the time his transports reached their destination, trade routes had shifted and Persia had reasserted control over the region. Nepherites died after six years on the throne and was succeeded—either by his son or a close relative—named Achoris. Yet another relative, Psammuthis, briefly usurped the throne before being deposed in turn.

Meanwhile, Lysander received word of a potential defection within the Persian ranks. A commander named Spithridates, who served under Pharnabazus, was reportedly disgruntled with his status. Lysander quickly seized the opportunity, persuading Spithridates and his son to defect to the Spartans with two hundred cavalrymen. He brought them to Agesilaus, who welcomed the new allies and received valuable intelligence on Pharnabazus's war preparations.

In 395 BC, with this inside knowledge, Agesilaus invaded Phrygia—part of Pharnabazus's satrapy—and ravaged the region. Spithridates then urged him to march on Paphlagonia, where King Cotys, under suspicion in Susa and summoned to court, had rebelled and aligned himself with the Spartans. By the following year, Spithridates reported that Pharnabazus had encamped at Caü, yet was keeping his movements fluid. According to Xenophon, "Pharnabazus, fearing that he would be besieged if he remained in one place, would shift from one region to another, and with his troops constantly on the move, he kept his camp locations secret."

The earlier defeats of Tissaphernes had already stirred unrest among the Persian forces. Capitalizing on this dissatisfaction, Spithridates sought Agesilaus's support for an attack. Agesilaus agreed. Spithridates led a surprise raid on Pharnabazus's camp, killing many and seizing valuable spoils. While  King Artaxrexes II still commanded allies and mercenaries in Greece and Ionia—such as Pausanias—these cascading defeats threatened to undermine imperial authority in Asia Minor.

It was at this juncture that Herippidas, head of the Spartan war council and a covert agent for Persian intelligence, took action. Having learned of Spithridates' movements, he preemptively blocked the escape routes of both the Paphlagonian forces and Spithridates' contingent. In a carefully timed ambush, he seized their plunder and apprehended the returning troops. As Xenophon recounts:

Now when the Paphlagonians and Spithridates brought with them the goods which they had taken, Herippidas dispatched commanders and battalions to intercept them and recovered everything, not out of justice, but in order to secure enough loot to satisfy the magistrates responsible for the distribution.

This betrayal marked a bitter turning point. Not only was Spithridates' gamble rendered futile, but the larger Spartan effort—already riddled with internal duplicity—was revealed to be susceptible to manipulation by Persian agents. The web of shifting allegiances and covert dealings underscored the fragility of the anti-Persian coalitions and the enduring reach of Artaxerxes' intelligence apparatus, even in moments of seeming Spartan ascendancy.

The Fall of Tissaphernes

At this critical moment, Epictetus the Spartan came to Agesilaus with urgent news that Sparta was engaged in a great war with the other Greeks and that his leaders had summoned him to rush to the aid of his countrymen. It was clear that Agesilaus would have to return to Sparta and that he, not Pharnabazus, was the one who needed assistance.

Despite Agesilaus's promises of friendship to Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap remained concerned about the safety of his province after the Spartan forces had conquered Tissaphernes' territory. Now his satrapy was cut off from the unified territory of Persia, and it was possible that this separation would encourage Sparta and its allies to attempt blackmail and domination over his region. The Athenian admiral Conon, who commanded the Persian fleet, advised him that if he could convince Artaxerxes to finance the construction of new and powerful warships, the Spartan land forces could be easily defeated with superior naval power.

Conon had written to Artaxerxes II several times requesting funds for the decrepit Persian fleet. However, Tissaphernes had blocked or delayed these communications. Therefore, Conon decided to go to Babylon and see the king personally. Before he left, Pharnabazus asked him to complain about Tissaphernes' inadequate preparations and possible treachery. In Babylon, Conon met with Tithraustes, the Persian grand vizier (Chiliarch). With his help, Artaxerxes declared Tissaphernes a traitor.

Times had changed. Tissaphernes' frugal and  conservative tactics had proven ineffective after Sparta came to power in Asia Minor. The king entrusted the war against Sparta and its allies to Conon, authorizing him to build the needed fleet using ships from the satrapies in Cyprus and Phoenicia. 

The Strategic Appointment of Pharnabazus: Naval Command and Persian Pragmatism

According to Greek historical accounts, Artaxerxes II's appointment of Pharnabazus as co-commander of all Persian forces operating along the Mediterranean front was made at the explicit recommendation of Conon, the exiled Athenian admiral who had proven his worth in Persian service. These sources emphasize Conon's meticulous management of fleet expenditures and his remarkable operational efficiency, achievements that had earned him considerable royal favor and trust. The king's recognition of Conon's capabilities appeared to validate the wisdom of this Greek counsel.

However, a more nuanced analysis of Artaxerxes II's broader strategic approach suggests a different interpretation entirely. Rather than merely accepting Greek advice, the king's decision to place Conon under Pharnabazus's ultimate authority likely reflected his own sophisticated understanding of imperial administration and his characteristic wariness regarding Greek reliability. This arrangement served multiple strategic purposes: it preserved the essential hierarchy of Persian command while simultaneously exploiting Conon's undeniable naval expertise. By maintaining Pharnabazus as the supreme Persian authority over Mediterranean operations, Artaxerxes II ensured that no foreign commander, regardless of their proven competence, could operate with complete independence from Persian oversight.

This dual command structure represented a calculated balance between pragmatic necessity and imperial prudence—a hallmark of Artaxerxes II's generally astute approach to managing both Greek auxiliaries and Persian nobles throughout his long reign.

Tissaphernes: The Loyal Servant's Tragic Fate

According to Diodorus Siculus's detailed account, when reports of the successive defeats reached Artaxerxes, the Great King of Asia found himself confronted with an escalating Greek threat that demanded immediate action. His mounting alarm at the deteriorating military situation crystallized into fury directed at Tissaphernes, whom he held directly responsible for the disastrous war with the Greeks. The satrap's predicament was further compounded by the persistent entreaties of Queen Mother Parysatis, who had long harbored implacable hatred toward Tissaphernes for his role in exposing her beloved son Cyrus's treasonous conspiracy against the throne. Her demands for vengeance now found fertile ground in the king's own growing frustration with his satrap's military incompetence.

Accordingly, Artaxerxes appointed Tithraustes as military commander with explicit orders to arrest Tissaphernes, simultaneously dispatching letters throughout the empire commanding all cities and satraps to render absolute obedience to whatever Tithraustes might demand. Upon arriving at Colossae in Phrygia, Tithraustes—working in coordination with Ariaeus, a local satrap—successfully apprehended Tissaphernes while the unsuspecting victim was bathing. The execution was swift and brutal: Tissaphernes was beheaded on the spot, and his severed head was dispatched to the king as grim proof of the mission's completion.

With this bloody business concluded, Tithraustes immediately turned his attention to the broader strategic situation, persuading Agesilaus to enter into negotiations and successfully concluding a six-month truce that provided crucial breathing space for Persian forces to reorganize and prepare for the continuing conflict.

According to Xenophon, at the time of his arrest, Tissaphernes had been gambling in Sardis. The Persians accused him of treason, and the king himself had concluded that Tissaphernes' poor decisions were damaging the empire's supply lines and political networks. Thus, he was executed.

After Tissaphernes' execution, Tithraustes sent messengers to Agesilaus, declaring: "Agesilaus! The man who was a source of trouble in your eyes and ours has been punished. The king now thinks it best that you should return to your own land and that the cities of Asia, having their own freedom, should pay their old taxes."

According to Plutarch, in a 395 BC conversation between Tithraustes and Agesilaus, the Spartan general said: "He is not seeking to enrich himself, but rather to enrich his troops!" Tithraustes, pleased to show favor, funded the Spartan withdrawal. Agesilaus moved his army to Phrygia and received seven talents of gold to cover expenses.

Xenophon's account of this incident is not entirely consistent. He reports that when Agesilaus hesitated to leave, citing fear of Spartan bureaucrats, Tithraustes told him: "At least go to the land of Pharnabazus until you receive a message from Sparta! For it was I who took vengeance on your enemy." Agesilaus replied: "Then, until I go there, give me provisions for my army." Tithraustes gave him three talents, and Agesilaus set out for Pharnabazus's province in Phrygia.

Both Xenophon and Plutarch report the next critical incident: the loss of Spithridates, a key local ally. Herippidas, the Spartan officer, angered Spithridates by recovering plunder and enforcing strict discipline. This led Spithridates and the Paphlagonian allies to abandon Agesilaus and flee to Sardis. Agesilaus was deeply distressed by the departure of such a significant allied force.

Plutarch states that after this loss, Pharnabazus requested a meeting. Arranged by Apollophanes of Cyzicus, the two men met in the countryside. Agesilaus reclined on the grass; Pharnabazus, though offered rich carpets and cushions, chose to sit on the ground in solidarity. Pharnabazus voiced his indignation: though he had supported the Spartans in the war against Athens—providing cavalry, gold, and naval aid—they now ravaged his satrapy.

Agesilaus admitted that while once they were allies of the king and friends to his property, now as enemies they attacked anything under Persian control. He said, "You also want to remain one of the king's men, so we must do harm on your account."

Pharnabazus reminded him: "When you fought the Athenians, I stood by you, funded your fleet, and fought at your side. Have I, unlike Tissaphernes, ever broken a promise or betrayed you?"

Plutarch adds that Agesilaus then invited Pharnabazus to switch allegiance: if he defected, all Spartan forces would follow him. Pharnabazus replied that he had requested the supreme command of all Persian forces from the king and would fight Agesilaus if it were granted. If not, he would consider rebellion. Agesilaus promised to leave Pharnabazus's lands unharmed in return for a pledge of non-aggression.

It seems unlikely that Agesilaus was satisfied with such a vague promise: "If the king appoints me, I fight you; if not, I defect." It is more plausible, as historian Berman suggests, that Pharnabazus promised not to oppose Sparta in the Greek theater—or at least dissuaded Agesilaus from engaging in a costly battle.

Though Plutarch later claims that Agesilaus still harbored ambitions to attack Susa and fight Artaxerxes, he also provides the true reason for his departure:

But at this moment, Epictetus the Spartan came to him with the message that Sparta was engaged in a great war with the other Greeks and that his leaders had summoned and ordered him to rush to the aid of his countrymen.

Thus, Agesilaus had to return to Sparta. It was he, not Pharnabazus, who required help. The political tides had turned, and Persia had found more effective servants in Conon and Pharnabazus than in Tissaphernes. The execution of the latter marked a turning point in Persian-Greek relations in the late 5th century BC.

The Fall of Lysander and Pisander: Pharnabazus's Triumphant Command

By 395 BC, nine turbulent years had passed since the accession of Artaxerxes II. These years, marked by Cyrus the Younger's rebellion and the aggressive campaigns of Lysander and Agesilaus in Asia Minor and Caria, culminated in the fall of Tissaphernes. Now, as Artaxerxes II approached the end of the first decade of his reign, he sought to turn the page—restoring peace and order to the western satrapies of the empire along the Mediterranean coast.

Persian strategy shifted decisively at this point. The imperial command restructured its military doctrine: rather than acting solely as a distant arbiter, Persia would now support each Greek city-state under attack through regional alliances and naval readiness. The new strategic plan was refined: Persia would provide financial aid for warship construction and maintenance, assigning naval units to bolster allied city-states and counter any power seeking hegemony.

Artaxerxes thus reimagined and perfected the earlier tactics of Tissaphernes: to use the internal divisions of Greece not merely as opportunities for disruption, but as foundations for a new, enforceable peace. The goal was to support the independence and autonomy of all city-states, suppress expansionist ambitions swiftly, and act as guarantor of any peace treaties forged among them.

This change of course bore immediate fruit. In 395 BC, Sparta suddenly found itself fighting on two fronts: in Asia against Persia, and in Greece itself against a coalition of Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos—now financially supported by Persia.

Lysander was slain in battle near the Boeotian city of Haliartus, while co-king Pausanias failed to arrive in time, leading to his recall and eventual execution. Yet Pausanias's fate was sealed not merely by military failure but by political scandal: according to Plutarch, he had secretly negotiated with the Persian court—perhaps with Artaxerxes II himself or through intermediaries—seeking Persian support in exchange for curbing Spartan expansion. This clandestine diplomacy, likely aimed at preserving his own influence amid Lysander's ascendancy, was deemed treasonous in Sparta. Meanwhile, tensions between Locris and Phocis over contested territory—fueled by Persian gold—drew Thebes into war. According to both Plutarch and Xenophon, this marked the beginning of the Corinthian War.

The Crushing Blow at Cnidus

In 394 BC, Agesilaus suffered defeat and withdrew from Asia. That same year, at the Battle of Cnidus, the Persian-aligned fleet dealt a crushing blow to the Spartan navy. Comprising eighty Phoenician ships, ten Cilician vessels, and around eighty Greek ships under Conon's command, the Persian fleet annihilated the Spartan force led by Pisander. Xenophon reports that Conon's fleet engaged before the Phoenician line arrived, but Pisander's forces were soon routed, with Pisander himself killed. Diodorus records that fifty Spartan ships were captured and five hundred soldiers taken prisoner; the rest escaped to Cnidus. The defeat reverberated throughout Greece, securing Persian naval dominance in the Aegean once again.

Reassessing the Historical Record: Bias and Propaganda in Greco-Roman Historiography

Modern scholars have critiqued traditional Greek and Western historiography for understating Persian contributions and for projecting ideological biases onto the narrative of East–West relations. Greek historical writing—particularly by Herodotus, Xenophon, and later Plutarch—has long shaped Western perceptions of the Achaemenid Empire. Yet contemporary historians now recognize these sources as deeply infused with ethnocentric assumptions, political motives, and narrative constructs designed to glorify the Greek world and vilify its Persian counterpart.

As Pierre Briant notes, “The Greeks did not write Persian history; they wrote their own history in which the Persians played a role... The 'barbarian' trope was never about real Persians but about what it meant to be Greek” (Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 2002, p. 10). This observation underscores how Greek authors often employed Persia not as an object of empirical study, but as a foil through which to define Hellenic identity. Amélie Kuhrt similarly emphasizes that “Greek authors projected their own ideological conflicts onto Persia, turning it into a mirror against which they defined their own political and cultural identities” (Kuhrt, The Persian Empire, 2007, p. 15).

Even Herodotus—often dubbed the “father of history”—has been shown to blur the line between narrative and invention. As James Romm argues, “Herodotus wrote with a strong Greek perspective, often framing the conflict with Persia in moral and ethnocentric terms... He invented dialogue, motives, and entire episodes to dramatize Greek valor and Persian hubris” (Romm, in The Landmark Herodotus, 2007, Introduction).

This tradition of ideologically motivated history continued into the Roman era. Mary Beard cautions that what survives of Roman historiography is “not a neutral record but the product of power—written by elites, for elites, to justify the empire’s existence and virtues” (Beard, SPQR, 2015, p. 21). Ronald Syme famously declared that “History was written to serve the present. The so-called objectivity of historians like Livy or Tacitus is an illusion; beneath their prose lies a profound engagement with the political needs and fears of their age” (Syme, The Roman Revolution, 1939, p. vii).

In the case of Plutarch, moral instruction often trumped factual fidelity. As Christopher Pelling observes, “Plutarch was not concerned with historical accuracy in a modern sense. His Lives were moral essays first, and biographies second. Selective emphasis, omission, and the construction of character types were central to his method” (Pelling, Plutarch and History, 2002, p. 16).

Xenophon, too, has come under scrutiny for his partisan leanings. According to J.K. Anderson, “Xenophon’s treatment of Sparta and Persia reflects personal loyalties and ideological preferences. His admiration for Sparta—and his own service under Cyrus the Younger—deeply colored his account of both Greek and Persian affairs” (Anderson, Xenophon, 1980, p. 7).

Finally, Simon Hornblower emphasizes that Greek historical writing was inseparable from politics: “It was not simply about recording facts, but about shaping civic memory, justifying alliances, and vilifying enemies. Historical truth was often subordinate to rhetorical needs” (Hornblower, The Greek World 479–323 BC, 3rd ed., 2002, p. 52).

Together, these critiques demonstrate that Greco-Roman historiography was not an impartial recounting of events, but a cultural and political project—one that often marginalized or distorted the perspectives of the so-called “barbarian” world. In light of such biases, modern historians must approach classical sources not as transparent windows into the past, but as carefully constructed narratives with their own agendas. In the case of Conon and Pharnabazus at Cnidus, the distortion is telling. Often Conon's success is labeled an "Athenian" victory, but in truth, Conon served the Persian king, much like John Paul Jones in Russian service or Lord Cochrane commanding South American navies. Demosthenes made this clear: "Conon, in the service of the king, without appointment from you, defeated the Spartans at sea." Diodorus records that Artaxerxes personally recruited Conon, offering him riches, honors, and strategic autonomy. Robin Seager confirms that Conon served Persia from 397 to 392 BC.

McKechnie and Kern (1988) examine Diodorus’s depiction of Conon as an exceptionally capable commander in Persian service, portraying him as adept at balancing the demands of imperial authority with the constraints of his resources. They note that Diodorus, in likening Conon to Cyrus the Great, deliberately avoids excessive rhetorical flourish, thereby crafting a narrative that emphasizes Conon’s strategic acumen and elicits admiration through restraint rather than exaggeration.

However, Xenophon describes Conon acting clearly under Pharnabazus's authority. As March (1977) observes, Conon's command was secondary and subject to oversight: "When it comes to the conduct of the fleet, Conon is assigned to Pharnabazus, and based on his experience, contributes strategic insights without direct control."

 

Persian Alliance in the Corinthian War

In 393 BC, Pharnabazus and Conon crossed the Aegean and arrived in the Peloponnese. Visiting Corinth, they supported and organized the anti-Spartan alliance. The coalition—comprising Thebes, Argos, Corinth, and Athens—joined forces with Persian warships to challenge Spartan dominance. Under Pharnabazus's oversight, the Persian fleet defeated the Spartans decisively. By commanding the fleet alongside Conon, Pharnabazus ensured loyalty and transparency while giving the Persian navy vital operational experience. This battle shattered Sparta's dreams of maritime supremacy.

Sparta's Appeal for Peace and Conon's Downfall

By 392 BC, Sparta was alarmed. Conon, funded by Artaxerxes II, had rebuilt Athens' defensive walls and assembled a fleet that controlled the Aegean's central waters. Fearing renewed Athenian imperialism, Sparta dispatched Antalcidas to Tiribazus, satrap of Sardis, proposing a reconciliation. Antalcidas expressed willingness to accept Persian suzerainty over the Ionian cities and backed Artaxerxes' policy of city-state autonomy. Xenophon writes:

Now the Lacedaemonians, hearing that Conon was not only rebuilding the defensive walls for the Athenians with the king's money, but also maintaining a fleet with his subsidy… decided that if they informed Tiribazus, the king's general, of this, they might persuade him to act or at least curtail Conon's funding. Thus, they sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus, proposing a peace settlement to the king's liking.

The Athenians, upon learning of Sparta's maneuver, responded by sending their own envoys—led by Conon and accompanied by Hermogenes, Diones, Callisthenes, and Kallimedon—along with ambassadors from Corinth, Thebes, and Argos.

Tiribazus, although intrigued by Sparta's offer, feared acting without royal consent. Secretly, however, he gave funds to Antalcidas to assemble a fleet and imprisoned Conon, citing Spartan accusations of misconduct. Tiribazus then departed to inform the king personally, seeking approval for the reconciliation and reporting Conon's arrest.

Conon, accused of misusing Persian subsidies to strengthen Athens rather than promote peace, later escaped. Some accounts claim he died in Cyprus; others suggest he was transferred and executed in Asia.

Athens Reawakens: The Revival of Imperial Ambitions

By 389 BC, Athens appeared to be resurrecting its former imperial strength. General Thrasybulus sailed with forty ships to Thasos, Samothrace, the Chersonese, Byzantium, Chalcedon, Lesbos, and other cities, demanding property taxes to fund Athenian war efforts. In Byzantium, he imposed a 10% toll on Black Sea shipping and a 5% duty on all imports and exports.

Persia now recognized that Antalcidas's warning had been prescient: Athens was seeking to reverse the outcome of the Peloponnesian War. The city had rebuilt its Long Walls and resumed an expansionist course.

It was in this climate that Artaxerxes II turned his favor back toward Sparta. And thus began the period of greatest prestige and honor for Pharnabazus. Summoned to court by the king's grand vizier, he was elevated in status and became the son-in-law of the King-of-Kings himself.

The Suppression of Unrest in Greece and the Peace of Antalcidas

Under the leadership of Antalcidas and with assistance from Dionysius of Syracuse, Sparta—now enjoying Persian support—tightened its control over the Hellespont. With access to grain shipments cut off, Athens succumbed to starvation. Antalcidas, having brought a draft peace proposal to Susa, successfully secured King Artaxerxes II's approval for a treaty designed to humble Athens and consolidate Persian influence.

In the autumn of 387 BC, Tiribazus, the new Persian commander in Asia Minor and former satrap of Western Armenia, convened a summit in Sardis. There, he presented the terms of a universal peace treaty to representatives of the major Greek city-states. Although the terms appeared open to deliberation, it was understood that the cities were expected to comply. By 386 BC, Athens was compelled to accept what became known as the King's Peace or the Peace of Antalcidas. According to Catherine Smith of the University of Vienna, this was the first "multilateral" peace treaty in recorded history—a pact between "all the Greeks" and the Great King of Persia.

A notable aspect of the treaty was its overtly authoritarian tone, underscoring Artaxerxes’ dominant role in dictating the terms. As Taplin (1993) observes, Xenophon presents the agreement not as a Greek-brokered compromise but as a direct imposition by the Persian monarch. The so-called "Peace of Antalcidas," Taplin argues, was merely a conventional label; in reality, Xenophon portrays it as the King's Peace—an order issued by Artaxerxes and accepted by the Greeks under duress.

Artaxerxes articulated two principal conditions for peace: the formal recognition of his uncontested sovereignty over Asia and the enforcement of autonomy among the Greek city-states. This latter stipulation was designed to prevent the rise of any hegemonic power—particularly Athens or Sparta—that might dominate others, rebuild a formidable navy, or extract tribute from weaker poleis. In essence, it constituted a strategic balancing mechanism through which the Persian court sought to neutralize collective threats and forestall the emergence of a unified Greek front. This policy reflected a deliberate and long-term Persian strategy aimed at preserving regional equilibrium and safeguarding imperial interests.

Beyond its geopolitical rationale, this approach was grounded in a pragmatic economic calculus. Persistent warfare among the Greek city-states undermined their fiscal stability, disrupted trade networks, and, critically, diminished their capacity to remit tribute to the Achaemenid treasury. From the perspective of the imperial administration, peace among the Hellenic states was not merely a matter of political convenience—it was a prerequisite for economic utility. Prosperous, autonomous city-states were more likely to engage in intra-Hellenic commerce and to contribute reliably to the imperial revenue system, either directly through tribute or indirectly through sustained trade with the Persian Empire. Thus, Artaxerxes’ peace terms were not only a diplomatic imposition but also an instrument for integrating the Greek periphery into a stable and profitable imperial framework.

Xenophon records the terms of the treaty clearly:

King Artaxerxes declares that the cities of Asia and the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus shall belong to him. The other cities of Greece, great or small, shall be autonomous, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which shall remain with Athens as before. Any state that does not accept this peace shall face war from the king, alongside those who desire this system, by land and sea, with ships and with silver.

When an Athenian envoy protested, the king's representative bluntly retorted: "If the Athenians have a better plan, they are welcome to present it directly to the king!" The Athenian ambassador Timagoras was later executed in Athens for failing to defend Athenian interests. A subsequent Athenian embassy succeeded in having Amphipolis included under Athens' authority.

While Ryder (1965) suggests that the treaty primarily served Spartan and Persian interests, Isocrates lamented that the Greeks had become little more than vassals:

Now the king commands Greece... We send our ships to him, as though to a lord, to seek resolution for our quarrels. We call him the 'Great King' as if we were his captives.

By the seventeenth year of Artaxerxes' reign, Persian authority extended firmly over Greece. Sparta, the official enforcer of the King's Peace, benefited from Persian subsidies but was allowed only a limited coastal garrison and a small fleet—insufficient to threaten Persian interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

Plutarch captures the sentiment of subjugation:

After Pharnabazus and Conon won the naval battle off Cnidus, Artaxerxes deprived the Lacedaemonians of their sea power and subjected Greece to his rule... Antalcidas, acting as the king's agent, forced the Greeks into a disgraceful peace, surrendering cities and islands to the Persian yoke.

Still, Persia's careful support for Sparta was part of a broader strategy to demonstrate that loyalty to the empire brought tangible benefits. When Sparta grew too powerful, Persian support would shift—to Thebes.

Egypt's Troubles and Athens' Punishment

The Egyptian Challenge and Athenian Intervention

In 392 BC, Achoris (Hakur) ascended to the throne of Egypt, succeeding Nefertiti I as pharaoh. His eleven-year reign, lasting until 382 BC, proved to be a constant source of turbulence for Persian authority. With characteristic boldness, Achoris embarked on an ambitious program of military expansion, aided by the Athenian admiral Chabrias, who had entered Egyptian service as a mercenary commander. Under Achoris's direction, Egypt constructed a formidable naval fleet, recruited substantial numbers of Greek mercenaries, and forged an extensive anti-Persian coalition that encompassed Athens, Cyprus, Pisidia, portions of Libya, and the Arab tribes of Palestine.

This growing threat prompted a decisive Persian response. Around 380 BC, Pharnabazus dispatched envoys to Athens with a clear ultimatum: recall Chabrias immediately and restore General Iphicrates—who had previously served Persian interests at the Battle of Corinth—to Persian command. Diodorus Siculus provides a vivid account of these negotiations:

"Pharnabazus reproached Chabrias for damaging Athenian-Persian relations and insisted on receiving Iphicrates instead. To appease Persia, Athens hastily recalled Chabrias and sent Iphicrates to support the Persian command."

Recognizing the need to neutralize Greek interference before addressing the Egyptian rebellion, Persia now turned its strategic attention toward stabilizing the fractious Greek city-states.

The Persian Strategy: Divide and Rule to Secure Peace Among the Greeks

Artaxerxes II demonstrated a keen grasp of the internal dynamics and political psychology of the Greek world. He understood that, despite their recurring invocations of Panhellenic unity, the Greek city-states were inherently fractious and deeply resistant to the sustained dominance of any single polis. As Demosthenes perceptively remarked in his Speech on the Naval Reform, “I admit Artaxerxes is the common enemy of the Greeks. But the Greeks are not common friends to each other. Some are more loyal to him than to their own neighbors.” This insight captures the strategic opening that Persian policy skillfully exploited.

Recognizing this structural disunity, Artaxerxes pursued a policy of calibrated division—what might be termed a sophisticated “divide and balance” approach. By fostering rivalry and ensuring that no single polis could achieve hegemony over the others, the Persian court maintained a fragmented yet stable geopolitical environment. This strategy was not driven solely by imperial ambition but by a calculated economic imperative: enduring peace among the Greek states was essential to preserving their prosperity and, by extension, their capacity to fulfill tributary obligations to the Achaemenid Empire. Thus, the principle of divide and rule functioned not merely as a tool of imperial control but as a mechanism for sustaining economic flows and integrating the Hellenic periphery into a broader imperial system grounded in stability and commercial interdependence.

Iran's Alliance with Thebes

Persian support for Thebes sent ripples of alarm through Athens, which, setting aside past hostilities, turned to Sparta for reassurance. This development troubled Spartan observers, including Xenophon, who noted with concern that Thebes—unlike other Greek allies—refused to take individual oaths of peace, insisting instead on representing all of Boeotia collectively. This stance directly violated the autonomy clause enshrined in the King's Peace.

King Agesilaus, recognizing the threat to Spartan hegemony, issued a stark ultimatum: accept the treaty terms or prepare for war. The Thebans, emboldened by Persian backing, defiantly refused. Sparta's response was swift and decisive—King Cleombrotus marched forth with a formidable force of ten thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry.

The collision came in 371 BC at the Battle of Leuctra, where Theban general Epaminondas achieved one of the most stunning military victories in Greek history. The Spartan army was comprehensively routed, Cleombrotus fell in battle, and Spartan hegemony over Greece came to an abrupt end. Once again, Persian gold had tipped the balance of power, demonstrating the effectiveness of Artaxerxes's divide-and-rule strategy.

The Diplomatic Offensive

As part of a broader propaganda initiative in 369 BC, Artaxerxes II dispatched Ariobarzanes, satrap of Daskyleion, to send his envoy Philiscus to the Greek mainland. Ostensibly serving as a peacemaker, Philiscus convened a diplomatic summit at the sacred site of Delphi. However, the proposed terms heavily favored Sparta, leading to their rejection by Thebes, which now held the military advantage.

The diplomatic maneuvering continued with another peace conference held in Susa in 367 BC. This time, the proposed treaty favored Theban interests, reflecting the changed military realities. In a remarkable reversal of traditional alliances, Athens found itself aligned with its former enemy Sparta against the new Theban-Persian axis.

Despite this unexpected coalition, Thebes, supported by Persian resources, secured another decisive victory in 362 BC at the Battle of Mantinea. Though Epaminondas perished in the moment of triumph, the Spartan-Athenian alliance suffered yet another crushing defeat. Xenophon captured the profound confusion of the era in his characteristically laconic style:

"Everyone thought that the victors would rule Greece and the losers be their subjects. But after the battle, confusion only increased."

By the mid-350s BC, the Persian strategy had achieved its objective: no single Greek city-state possessed the strength to dominate the others. This carefully orchestrated balance of weakness was precisely what Persian diplomacy had sought to create.

Suppression of the Egyptian and Cypriot Rebellions

Having successfully pacified Asia Minor and secured the nominal allegiance of the Greek city-states, Artaxerxes II could finally turn his full attention to the persistent rebellion in Egypt. Since the reign of Darius the Great, Egypt had been recognized as an integral province of the Persian Empire, and maintaining Persian naval supremacy in Cyprus had always been essential to Egypt's security. The interconnected nature of these challenges was clearly understood by contemporary observers, as Demosthenes noted in a speech delivered before the Athenian Ecclesia:

"I was surprised to see that the same people who were pressuring this city to confront the king of Persia on behalf of the Egyptians were afraid of him when the democracy of Rhodes was discussed. Yet everyone knows that the Rhodians are Greeks, while Egypt is part of the Persian Empire."

Recognizing the strategic linkage between Egypt and Cyprus, Artaxerxes resolved to suppress both rebellions simultaneously. He dispatched Tiribazus with a Persian fleet to confront Evagoras of Cyprus, while Pharnabazus, Tithraustes, and Abrocomas led a coordinated campaign toward Egypt against Pharaoh Akoris.

The Persian land assault, undertaken by Pharnabazus and his allies around 385–383 BC, was designed to demonstrate Persian military capability while avoiding the excessive financial burden of a full-scale Mediterranean war. Although this campaign failed to achieve decisive victory, it was not regarded as a catastrophic defeat. The Persian leadership, characteristically pragmatic, drew valuable lessons from the experience for future military operations.

Isocrates, writing from an Athenian perspective, offered a predictably dismissive assessment: "This war showed how insignificant the achievements of the Persian barbarians were without the help of the Greeks!" However, the Persians, far from being discouraged, systematically analyzed their setbacks and adapted their strategies accordingly.

The Cyprus Campaign

Although Pharaoh Akoris had successfully extended Egyptian influence as far as Phoenicia, Cilicia, and even the great commercial city of Tyre, Persian strategists determined that the twin rebellions required sequential rather than simultaneous suppression. Cyprus became the immediate priority, particularly as Evagoras had assembled a formidable naval force and secured financial support from both Egypt and Hecatomnus, the rebellious satrap of Caria.

By 381 BC, Tiribazus had completed his extensive preparations, constructing a fleet of three hundred Ionian frigates and assembling a substantial force of Greek mercenaries under the command of Orontes. The decisive confrontation occurred at the strategic city of Kition, where Evagoras's fleet of two hundred warships, reinforced by sixty support vessels provided by Akoris, met the Persian armada in a climactic naval battle.

The engagement resulted in a comprehensive Persian victory. Evagoras, his naval power shattered, fled to Egypt seeking additional aid from Akoris. However, the Egyptian pharaoh, facing his own military pressures, could no longer provide substantial support, while Artaxerxes continued to reinforce Tiribazus's position.

The Negotiations and Betrayal

Faced with deteriorating prospects, Evagoras sought peace negotiations. He offered to relinquish his territorial conquests and pay regular tribute to the Great King. Tiribazus agreed to these terms but stipulated a humiliating condition: Evagoras must present himself before Artaxerxes in the traditional gesture of submission, "as a slave to his master."

This demand proved unacceptable to Evagoras, who, despite Athens having distanced itself due to the constraints of the King's Peace, refused to submit to such degradation and chose to continue his resistance. His defiance, however, proved futile. The final collapse came at Sitium in 381 BC, where Evagoras's remaining forces were decisively defeated.

Isocrates later romanticized Evagoras's struggle, celebrating his achievements in heroic terms: "He brought all Cyprus under his command, devastated Phoenicia, took Tyre by storm, and caused the revolt of Cilicia against the king..." Yet Diodorus provides a more sobering and realistic account of the rebellion's final phases.

Court Intrigue and Political Maneuvering

The conclusion of the Cyprus campaign was complicated by internal Persian court politics. Evagoras, wounded and largely abandoned, returned to Cyprus from Egypt with far less assistance than he had anticipated. Surrounded and facing inevitable defeat, he sought peace negotiations. Tiribazus, now in a position of strength, offered harsh terms: Evagoras would surrender all conquered cities except Salamis, pay substantial annual tribute, and acknowledge the king's sovereignty as a servant.

Evagoras accepted all conditions except the final one, insisting on retaining his royal status and dignity. This seemingly minor point of protocol became the source of extended negotiations and, ultimately, court intrigue that would have far-reaching consequences.

Orontes, harboring deep resentment over Tiribazus's growing influence with the king, secretly dispatched accusations to the royal court. He alleged that Tiribazus had deliberately prolonged the campaign, engaged in unauthorized negotiations with Evagoras, conspired with Spartan agents, and even consulted the oracle at Delphi regarding potential rebellion against royal authority.

These serious charges resulted in Tiribazus's immediate arrest and transport to Susa for trial, while Orontes assumed complete command of the Cyprus operation. The ramifications of this court intrigue extended far beyond the immediate military situation.

The Defection of Glos

The arrest of Tiribazus triggered a cascade of defections that threatened to destabilize the entire Persian position in the eastern Mediterranean. Glos, who was both son-in-law to Tiribazus and a trusted royal treasurer, feared association with the alleged treason. In a desperate act of self-preservation, he absconded with enormous sums of royal funds and defected to Egypt.

According to Diodorus, Glos immediately allied himself with Spartan interests, offering them substantial bribes to renew hostilities against Persia. The Spartans, eager for any pretext to reclaim their former influence in Greece following their abandonment of the Ionian Greeks, readily accepted this golden opportunity.

The Royal Trial

Alarmed by these developments and increasingly disillusioned with Orontes's conduct of the campaign, Artaxerxes II undertook a comprehensive reevaluation of the situation. According to the historian Dandamaev, the king learned that the extended Cyprus campaign had consumed fifteen thousand talents—approximately 450 tons of gold—without achieving its primary objectives. Deeply displeased with this outcome, he dismissed Orontes from command and ordered Tiribazus's release for a formal trial.

The trial of Tiribazus became a momentous affair that provided rare insight into Achaemenid judicial procedures. Diodorus records that three elite Persian judges, seated on benches dramatically covered with the flayed skins of their corrupt predecessors, presided over the proceedings—a grim reminder of the consequences of judicial misconduct.

The Defense and Verdict

Tiribazus mounted an eloquent defense of his actions. He presented the court with the more submissive treaty that had been drafted by Orontes, demonstrating that his own negotiations had been more favorable to Persian interests. He explained his communications with Spartan representatives as actions taken in service of the king's broader strategic objectives. Regarding the oracle consultation, he provided detailed testimony showing that his inquiry had concerned military strategy rather than treasonous intentions.

Multiple witnesses from the Greek world corroborated his account, testifying to his consistent loyalty and competence. Perhaps most movingly, Tiribazus reminded the court of his past heroic service, including a famous incident during a royal hunt when he had saved Artaxerxes from attacking lions at considerable personal risk.

After careful deliberation, the three judges rendered a unanimous verdict of acquittal. Their reasoning, as recorded by Diodorus, provides fascinating insight into Persian legal philosophy:

The first judge argued that although the accusations possessed surface plausibility, Tiribazus's demonstrated record of beneficial service to the crown far outweighed any potential transgressions. The second judge affirmed that the documented benefits of Tiribazus's actions clearly surpassed any perceived faults in his conduct. The third judge concluded that even if all accusations were accepted at face value, they did not constitute legal guilt under established Persian law.

Royal Justice and Reconciliation

Artaxerxes, satisfied with the thoroughness and integrity of the judicial process, publicly praised the judges for their careful deliberation. He formally restored Tiribazus to full honor and elevated him to the prestigious rank of "special friend" of the king. Conversely, Orontes faced disgrace and expulsion from the royal court for his false accusations and slanderous conduct.

This episode, as preserved by Diodorus, offers invaluable insight into the sophisticated judicial practices of the Achaemenid Empire. The legal system clearly guaranteed the accused the right to present their case personally, call witnesses in their defense, and receive judgment from qualified peers who were required to provide explicit justification for their decisions. The transparency of this process, conducted before the imperial court, demonstrates the structured legal culture that governed the Persian Empire even during periods of complex court intrigue and military crisis.

The Egyptian Campaign Renewed

In 379 BC, as diplomatic relations between Athens and Persia stabilized, Artaxerxes II assembled an enormous expeditionary force for the long-delayed assault on Egypt. According to Diodorus, this formidable army consisted of 200,000 Persian troops and 20,000 Greek mercenaries, supported by a substantial naval fleet under Pharnabazus's command. By 373 BC, Artaxerxes judged the time appropriate to suppress the ongoing Egyptian rebellion, now led by Pharaoh Nectanebo I.

Athens, honoring its renewed commitments to Persia, contributed significantly to the campaign by dispatching Admiral Iphicrates with substantial forces to assist the Persian command at Hamon. This cooperation represented a remarkable reversal from the earlier period of Egyptian-Athenian collaboration.

The Campaign's Execution and Failure

Upon entering Egyptian territory, the combined Persian-Greek forces initiated systematic warfare, plundering towns and temples, causing widespread destruction, and enslaving numerous inhabitants. As the army advanced toward the strategic city of Memphis, Iphicrates reportedly advised Pharnabazus to strike with maximum speed before the Egyptians could strengthen their defensive positions.

However, Pharnabazus chose to ignore this counsel, thereby allowing the Egyptians crucial time to fortify Memphis and organize their resistance. The campaign subsequently faltered, with the Persian army suffering substantial casualties before being compelled to retreat from Egyptian territory.

This account, transmitted primarily through Greek sources, reflects the characteristic tendency of Greek historians to attribute military failures to Persian leadership while absolving Greek commanders of responsibility. This bias is particularly questionable given Pharnabazus's proven competence as a military commander in numerous previous campaigns.

Mutual Accusations and Political Ramifications

Pharnabazus, in turn, accused Iphicrates of deliberately undermining the campaign through sabotage and treachery. Greek historians predictably minimized these counter-accusations, aligning their narratives with Athenian interests. Given that a Persian defeat would have substantially benefited Athens's strategic position, the possibility that Iphicrates acted in accordance with his city's interests cannot be dismissed.

Greek sources claim that Iphicrates, fearing punishment at the Persian court, fled to Athens in a small vessel. Although Pharnabazus formally called for his arrest and prosecution, the Athenian authorities never pursued charges against him and eventually restored him to his position as admiral of their fleet—a telling indication of where their true loyalties lay.

The Succession Crisis and Continued Rebellion

By 363 BC, Pharaoh Nectanebo I had died and was succeeded by his son Tachus, who immediately formed an alliance with Ariobarzanes, the rebellious satrap of Phrygia. Ambitious to reclaim Persian territories in Syria and Palestine, both regions having shown resistance to Persian authority, Tachus actively sought military support from both Athens and Sparta.

In 361 BC, Spartan King Agesilaus and Athenian General Chabrias arrived in Egypt with substantial mercenary forces. Tachus strategically appointed Chabrias as naval commander while entrusting Agesilaus with command of the land forces, creating a formidable Greek-Egyptian military coalition.

Internal Collapse and Persian Opportunity

The campaign soon encountered severe logistical challenges. Tachus, lacking sufficient financial resources to maintain his large mercenary army, imposed heavy taxation on both temples and the general population. These oppressive measures generated widespread popular discontent and religious opposition.

While Tachus was engaged in military operations in Syria, his nephew Nectanebo II, capitalizing on growing dissatisfaction, launched a successful revolt. Crucially, he secured the support of Egyptian priests, the general populace, and even Agesilaus himself, who calculated that supporting the rebellion served his interests better than remaining loyal to Tachus.

Faced with this comprehensive betrayal, Tachus abandoned his campaign and fled to Persia, seeking refuge at the court of Artaxerxes II. According to some accounts, he subsequently died from the effects of overindulgence, unable to adapt to the luxury and excess of Persian court life.

The Great Revolt of the Satraps

Between 368 and 358 BC, Artaxerxes II confronted the most serious internal challenge of his reign: a widespread rebellion among his western satraps. This insurrection, historically known as the "Great Revolt of the Satraps," originated from the satraps' resistance to perceived attempts by the central government to restructure and limit their traditional autonomy in the Mediterranean coastal regions.

The rebellion was led by several powerful provincial governors, including Datames of Cappadocia and Ariobarzanes of Phrygia, who received substantial external support from Athens, Sparta, and Pharaoh Tachus of Egypt. The revolt soon expanded to include other significant figures: Autophradates of Lydia and Orontes, the king's own son-in-law, who had been demoted from his prestigious position in Armenia to the lesser satrapy of Mysia following his involvement in the Tiribazus scandal.

The Leadership and Genealogy

The revolt was significantly strengthened by the participation of Ariobarzanes and Mithradates, brothers of the distinguished general Pharnabazus. The complexity of family relationships within the Persian nobility has created confusion in historical sources, particularly in Diodorus's account, which mistakenly described Ariobarzanes as the son rather than the brother of Mithradates.

In 387 BC, Pharnabazus had been summoned to Susa, where he was richly rewarded for his military victories and honored with marriage to Apama, daughter of Artaxerxes II. His brother Ariobarzanes succeeded him as satrap of Daskylion. When Pharnabazus and Apama's son Artabazus reached maturity, he was appointed to the satrapy in 361 BC, displacing his uncle Ariobarzanes.

Ariobarzanes, unwilling to relinquish power to his nephew, chose rebellion over submission. In a dramatic turn of events, his own son, also named Mithradates, betrayed him to the central government. Ariobarzanes was transported to Susa and executed by crucifixion in 362 BC, demonstrating the severe consequences of challenging royal authority.

The Scale and Scope of the Rebellion

Diodorus provides a comprehensive account of the revolt's extensive scope:

"For [Artaxerxes] was at war simultaneously with the Pharaoh of Egypt, the Greek cities of Asia, the Lacedaemonians and all their allies, and the satraps and governors of the coastal lands who had joined in common cause. Among them, Ariobarzanes of Phrygia... and Mausolus of Caria, who ruled from Halicarnassus, stood out. Others included Orontes of Mysia, Autophradates of Lydia, and the inhabitants of Ionia, Lycia, Pisidia, Pamphylia, Cilicia, Syria, Phoenicia, and possibly all of Mordetta."

The rebels chose Orontes as their supreme commander and provided him with substantial funds to recruit 20,000 mercenaries. Spartan King Agesilaus personally supported Ariobarzanes, while Athens dispatched Admiral Chabrias with a fleet. In 364 BC, this naval force posed a significant threat to Persian coastal holdings. Athens also sent 30 warships and 8,000 troops under Timotheus, though according to Demosthenes, Timotheus withdrew his support upon recognizing that aiding Ariobarzanes would violate the King's Peace, instead redirecting his forces to attack Samos.

The Mausolus Factor

A crucial figure in these events was Mausolus, son of Hecatomnus, who became satrap of Caria in 377 BC and married his half-sister Artemisia in accordance with Persian royal custom. Scholar Weiskopf argues that Mausolus remained fundamentally loyal to Artaxerxes II throughout the crisis and was richly rewarded for his steadfast service.

Contemporary critic Theopompus condemned Mausolus for his perceived excessive eagerness to serve Persian interests. An official edict from 365 BC confirms his close relationship with the king, stating that he had been appointed satrap through popular vote in Miletus and that a traitor named Arlesis had been condemned and punished with full legal sanction.

The Diplomatic Resolution

In a masterful display of political manipulation, Artaxerxes successfully neutralized the rebellion through strategic bribery and diplomatic intrigue rather than costly military campaigns. He offered Orontes restoration to his former satrapy as an incentive for betrayal. Orontes accepted this generous offer, retained the rebel funds for personal use, and arrested their envoys—a devastating blow to the rebellion's coordination.

Similarly, Raomithres, another rebel general, embezzled gold and ships intended for the revolt and betrayed his former allies to the king. Autophradates, recognizing the futility of continued resistance, made separate peace with Artaxerxes in 360 BC.

The final collapse came when Ariobarzanes's son Mithradates, likely seeking royal favor, executed his own father. Datames, abandoned by his troops and allies, attempted to wage guerrilla warfare but was ultimately killed in an ambush orchestrated by Mithradates, who had feigned rebellion to gain his trust.

By 359 BC, the revolt had completely collapsed. Artaxerxes, demonstrating characteristic magnanimity, pardoned several rebels, including Orontes, allowing them to retain positions of authority within the imperial structure.

Historical Debate and Reassessment

Modern scholarship has increasingly challenged the traditional portrayal of the so-called “Great Satraps’ Revolt.” In his influential study, The So-Called 'Great Satraps' Revolt, historian Michael Weiskopf offers a critical reassessment of the conventional narrative derived from ancient sources such as Diodorus. Weiskopf contends that these sources significantly overstated both the geographic scope and the level of coordination involved in the uprising. Rather than constituting a unified imperial insurrection, the episodes of unrest, according to Weiskopf, were in fact a series of localized and largely disconnected disturbances—primarily confined to western Anatolia—that never posed a serious threat to the structural integrity of the Achaemenid state.

This revisionist interpretation reframes the so-called "Great Revolt" not as an existential crisis for the empire but as a more manageable series of provincial challenges. In my own assessment, the revolt was symptomatic of a deeper strategic recalibration undertaken by Artaxerxes II and the central imperial administration. The experiences of the Persian regime with ambitious satraps—most notably Cyrus the Younger, Tissaphernes, Artabazus, Orontes, and Ariobarzanes—had demonstrated the risks of granting extensive autonomy to regional governors, particularly in Asia Minor, where proximity to the Greek world rendered these satrapies especially vulnerable to foreign intrigue, subversion, and opportunism by Athens, Sparta, and other poleis.

As a result, the imperial center began a deliberate process of curtailing satrapal authority and tightening fiscal control—measures that likely provoked discontent among local elites who had grown accustomed to a degree of semi-autonomous rule. The resulting backlash, though fragmented, coalesced into what ancient sources portrayed as a widespread rebellion. Nevertheless, as the historical record reveals, the unrest was ultimately contained and resolved through the deft diplomacy and administrative acumen of Artaxerxes II and his court. Far from signaling imperial decline, the episode may in fact mark a turning point in a limited centralization and institutional consolidation of Achaemenid governance.

The End of Artaxerxes' Reign

Artaxerxes II died in 358 BC at the remarkable age of 86, concluding one of the longest reigns in Persian history. Contemporary assessments portray him as a benevolent and pragmatic ruler who successfully emulated the virtues of his predecessor Darius I while developing his own distinctive approach to governance.

His court was renowned for its accessibility to all social classes, and he consistently rewarded his administrators generously, basing advancement on demonstrated merit and effective governance rather than birth or favoritism. Though capable of severe punishment when circumstances demanded it, he was generally forgiving and avoided unnecessary cruelty.

Royal Character and Anecdotes

Plutarch preserves several illuminating anecdotes that reveal the king's character. When a huntsman presented him with a torn royal robe, Artaxerxes offered it to his courtier Tiribazus with the instruction: "You may have it, but promise never to wear it." Tiribazus, lacking proper discretion, immediately donned the robe and adorned himself in full royal regalia. Rather than reacting with anger at this presumption, the king simply laughed and observed: "I care more that you are foolish than that you dress like a madman."

The king actively encouraged public engagement and demonstrated remarkable tolerance for dissent and criticism. Citizens frequently brought him modest gifts, which he invariably accepted with grace, often returning far more valuable rewards in response. He held particular admiration for agricultural workers and farmers. When a gardener named Omizos presented him with a magnificent pomegranate, the king declared: "By Mithra, if this man were given a small city, he would turn it into a paradise."

The King's Generosity

Perhaps the most touching example of his character occurred during a festival when a poor laborer, unable to afford any conventional gift, brought the king a simple handful of river water. Artaxerxes was so moved by this humble gesture that he rewarded the man with a golden bowl and a thousand gold coins.

Plutarch also records an exchange that reveals the king's tolerance for frank speech. When a Spartan named Euclides addressed him with unusual directness, a concerned royal officer warned the foreigner: "You may speak your mind—but remember, it is the king who can act as well as speak."

Historical Legacy

Artaxerxes II's long and relatively stable reign established a profound legacy of careful administration, religious tolerance, and sophisticated political strategy. His reign deserves greater scholarly attention than the frequently biased accounts of his Greek enemies typically provide. Through skillful diplomacy, strategic patience, and an understanding of both Persian traditions and international realities, he successfully maintained imperial unity and prosperity during one of the most challenging periods in Achaemenid history.

His approach to governance—combining firmness with flexibility, tradition with innovation, and authority with accessibility—provided a model that influenced Persian administrative practice for generations. The king's ability to balance competing interests, manage complex international relationships, and maintain internal stability while facing simultaneous rebellions across his vast empire demonstrates remarkable political skill that has often been underappreciated by historians focused primarily on Greek perspectives of Persian affairs.

 Artaxerxes II