Chapter Twenty: The Reign of Vologases I: Strategic Diplomacy and the Transformation of Parthian-Roman Relations

 

Introduction

The reign of Vologases I (c. 51-78 CE) stands as a testament to strategic brilliance in Parthian history. It marked a pivotal shift from an era dominated by military confrontation with Rome to one characterized by shrewd diplomatic maneuvering. Unlike his predecessors, who relied primarily on brute force, Vologases possessed an exceptional grasp of geopolitical realities. He masterfully blended selective military interventions with calculated diplomatic initiatives. His 27-year reign not only solidified Parthian influence over Armenia but also laid the groundwork for a period of peaceful coexistence with Rome that would last for decades. This chapter explores how Vologases transformed a potentially devastating conflict into a diplomatic triumph, ultimately achieving Parthian strategic objectives while significantly minimizing the human and financial costs of prolonged warfare.

The Succession and Early Challenges (51-54 CE)

The Arsacid Brothers' Alliance

Following the death of Gotarzes in 51 CE, the elderly Vonones II of Media briefly held the Parthian throne for a few months. Vonones II had three sons: Vologases I, who would become King of Parthia; Tiridates, destined for the Armenian throne; and Pacorus, who became the Parthian king of Media.

The bond among these brothers was remarkable, characterized by an enduring loyalty perhaps unparalleled in history. Vologases, possessing charisma, strong character, and keen intellect, naturally drew the support of the Parthian noble senate. Consequently, after Vonones II's passing, they entrusted the kingdom to Vologases. In turn, Vologases appointed Pacorus to the Kingdom of Media and designated Armenia for Tiridates.

The Armenian Crisis and Roman Weakness

As previously discussed, during his reign, Gotarzes had instigated Pharasmanes, the Iberian king, to overthrow his brother Mithridates, the Roman puppet king of Armenia. Thus, in 51 CE, Rhadamistus, Pharasmanes' eldest son, marched against his uncle Mithridates in Armenia. By this time, Gotarzes had died, and Vonones II's brief two-month reign had concluded, paving the way for Vologases. Rhadamistus ruthlessly put the elderly Mithridates, along with his wife and children, to the sword. The demise of this harsh Roman puppet king was met with little lament by the Armenians.

This act was a significant blow to Roman prestige, yet Rome was grappling with numerous internal challenges. Emperor Claudius had narrowly survived a conspiracy involving his wife Messalina and her lover Silius. Furthermore, the Roman campaign in Britain was hampered by the fierce resistance and guerrilla tactics of the British king Caractacus in Wales. Although Caractacus was defeated in 51 CE, the struggle to subdue Britain continued. Adding to Claudius's woes, he had responded to Jewish unrest by expelling them from Rome—an upheaval some scholars attribute to early Christians, highlighting Rome's initial inability to differentiate between Jews and Christians. It's believed that around this time, Mark was writing his version of the New Testament.

Amidst these difficulties, Gaius Ummidius Quadratus, the governor of Syria, faced severe financial constraints, limiting his ability to adequately respond to Rhadamistus's challenge in Armenia. He convened a council, which concluded that allowing Rhadamistus to continue his reign might be preferable, hoping the Armenians themselves would eventually rebel against his tyranny. Quadratus merely sent a threatening letter to the Iberian king Pharasmanes, demanding the withdrawal of his occupying forces from Armenia.

Meanwhile, Julius Paelignus, the Roman procurator in Cappadocia—a man Tacitus scorned for his frivolity and ridiculousness, yet favored by Claudius for his buffoonery—led an army to confront Rhadamistus. Instead of engaging the enemy, his troops attacked and plundered Roman allies. As pro-Iranian forces launched continuous assaults, Paelignus's troops dwindled, with many deserting. Completely defenseless, he sought refuge with Rhadamistus, who, through a substantial bribe, secured Paelignus's recognition as King of Armenia. Paelignus even attended Rhadamistus's coronation ceremony, and Rome, through Rusticus, acknowledged his kingship. Upon learning of this humiliation, and to deter other governors from similar actions, Rome dispatched Helvidius Priscus with an army to Cappadocia. According to Tacitus, Priscus, descending from Mount Taurus, "pacified many of those cities, not by violence but by gentleness, and then was recalled to Syria to avoid provoking the Parthians to battle." This clearly supports the assertion that Rome's unpreparedness and caution in the conflict with Gotarzes were not mere speculation.

Vologases' First Armenian Intervention

By 51 CE, following Gotarzes' death and during Vologases' ascension, many Armenians were already weary and angered by Rhadamistus's ambitious and disorganized rule. Vologases recognized this as an opportune moment for direct intervention to reclaim Armenia, and he invaded with a large force. Rhadamistus's Iberian army fled before the Iranian advance. Vologases captured the Armenian capital of Artaxata, defeating Tigranes of Ctesiphon. Vologases then installed his elder brother Tiridates on the Armenian throne in Artaxata.

However, a harsh winter set in. A lack of provisions and the outbreak of an epidemic forced Vologases to return to Iran, especially as Izates, the king of Adiabene, had rebelled. Simultaneously, a group of Dahae Scythians had risen in revolt, prompting Vologases to rush to Dahae to suppress this more immediate and dangerous threat. He then hastened to Adiabene in 53 CE to confront Izates, but Izates had already passed away. His brother Monobazes, who succeeded him, proved to be obedient and consistently loyal to Vologases and Tiridates.

While Vologases was preoccupied with suppressing the Scythians, Rhadamistus seized the opportunity to swiftly return to Armenia. Yet, according to Tacitus, the Armenians, fed up with his injustice and oppression, rebelled against him. He was forced to flee to Iberia with his wife Zenobia, who was the daughter of his cousin Mithridates, on horseback. Zenobia, who was pregnant, was bleeding and implored him to end her life. Rhadamistus, who had killed both Zenobia's mother (his sister) and Zenobia's father (his uncle), wounded her and left her body on a riverbank. However, a group of shepherds found her, healed her, and brought her to Artaxata before Tiridates, who bestowed royal honors upon her. Although this story contains legendary elements, by 53 CE, Vologases had re-established warm relations with Monobazes, the new king of Adiabene, and had suppressed the Dahae rebellion. He was now determined to resolve Armenia's vassalage to Rome.

The Neronian Challenge and Roman Military Response (54-62 CE)

Nero's Ascension and Its Implications

In 54 CE, Claudius's wife Agrippina the Younger murdered him by feeding him poisonous mushrooms. Nero, then 17, became emperor. Nero was Agrippina's son from another marriage, whom Claudius had adopted in 50 CE after Agrippina persuaded him to do so. Agrippina then began an all-out effort to have Claudius make Nero emperor instead of his own son, Britannicus, by his previous wife Messalina. It seems Nero was aware of the plot to assassinate Claudius, which is why he called mushrooms "food of the gods." Also, because the Romans might have chosen Claudius's son Britannicus as emperor, according to Suetonius:

Nero tried to poison Britannicus not only because he envied his voice... but also because he feared that the people of the streets and marketplaces would be less attached to Claudius' adopted son than to his own son.

According to Tacitus, when the fourteen-year-old Britannicus drank poison from a cup at a dinner party and began to tremble, many present knew who had given him the poison, but Nero coolly stated that Britannicus had suffered from fainting since childhood.

Nero, who called Claudius a "silly old man," broke many of his edicts after taking the throne. Despite his hoarse voice, he was half-mad and obsessed with playing the harp and singing. When he sang, theater doors were locked by his command, and no one dared leave during his prolonged performances—a sign of Roman culture, or governmental administration vis-à-vis barbarians! According to Suetonius:

We have read accounts of women who gave birth in the audience, and of men who, so bored with the music and clapping, would secretly throw themselves down from the wall behind the audience... and their bodies would be taken away under the pretext of burial.

Some time later, Nero hired experts to kill his mother Agrippina, constructing elaborate devices such as a bed designed to collapse the roof when someone lay on it, or a boat that would break apart in the water. Since none of these devices worked, he eventually ordered her strangled. His bloody madness and tyranny are well-documented, from the trials he orchestrated for fictitious crimes of treason to punishments that resembled delusions. No doubt, warnings from Iranian observers, aware of Nero's escalating madness, conveyed to Vologases that the time for decisive action had arrived. Thus, in 54 CE, Vologases contemplated another raid on Armenia.

According to Tacitus, when news of the Parthian invasion of Armenia reached Rome, questions abounded in a city hungry for gossip. "How could a seventeen-year-old Nero repel the formidable Parthian force? What hope can be placed in a man under the influence of his mother?" Some argued that fortune was on Rome's side, for if the old and indifferent Claudius were still alive and ready to fight, he would be indecisive and take orders from his slaves. Others, however, pointed out that although Nero was young and foolish, his advisors Burrus and Seneca were among the wisest men in Rome.

And indeed it was. Seneca and Burrus increased taxes in the eastern provinces bordering Armenia to raise funds for strengthening their armies. They deployed these forces near the Armenian border and ordered their puppet kings, Herod Agrippa II of Chalcis and Jerusalem, and Antiochus V of Commagene, to hasten their forces to the Iranian borders. Simultaneously, they entrusted the defense of Lesser Armenia to Aristobulus and Sophene to Sohaemus, granting both of them the legionary eagles and Roman imperial banners.

Installing Tiridates on the Armenian Throne and Prince Verhat's Rebellion

What truly exacerbated the situation was Rome's connivance with its agents among the Parthians. At great expense, Rome incited the rebellion of Verhat, Vologases' own son. This unfortunate turn of events forced Vologases, after installing Tiridates on the Armenian throne, to immediately return from Armenia to quell his son's rebellion. Rome seized this opportunity, recalling its experienced general Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo from Germany and dispatching him to Asia Minor in 55 CE.

Corbulo's Appointment and Military Preparations

The incompetent governor of Syria, Quadratus, was ordered to transfer half of the four legions under his command to Corbulo to confront Vologases. However, Corbulo found these troops severely undisciplined and unprepared for battle. He spent three years training and preparing them, during which time he also raised additional troops from Cappadocia and Galatia.

The Hostage Diplomacy Success

Corbulo and Quadratus each sent peaceful messages to Vologases, emphasizing that reconciliation was preferable to war and that he, like his predecessors, should send hostages to the Roman court as a guarantee of peace and a sign of friendship. No other message could have been more beneficial to Vologases. Having recently suppressed his son's rebellion, which had been supported and financially subsidized by Rome, Vologases knew that Rome had allies among the Parthian nobles always ready to hire mercenaries for its ambitions. Thus, he gladly sent a few of them as hostages to Rome. This single act, in effect, secured Roman acceptance of the Armenians' position and freed Vologases from the difficulties posed by a subversive faction.

Disciplinary and Command Disputes in the Roman Military: The Corbulo–Quadratus Controversy

In this atmosphere of scandal and discord, the rivalry between Roman commanders reached its peak. For example, as soon as Corbulo learned that the Parthian hostages had been handed over to Quadratus, he dispatched some of his soldiers to receive them, as he was the commander-in-chief of this operation according to the Senate's order. However, Quadratus, jealous of Corbulo, refused to hand over the hostages, leading to a conflict among the Roman soldiers. According to Tacitus, to prevent this disgrace "from lasting long in the eyes of the foreigners (the Iranians)," they decided to ask the men themselves which group they wanted to be handed over to, and they chose Corbulo!

The Triumph of Tiridates and the Predicament of General Corbulo

Finally, in 57 CE, Corbulo crossed the Euphrates River at Melitene and spent the winter in the Armenian highlands. A year later, in 58 CE, he attempted to force Tiridates to accept Roman suzerainty by pursuing a series of guerrilla wars. But Tiridates, with his courage and defiance, repelled his attacks with the help of the Armenian forces loyal to him. Consequently, Corbulo committed all his forces to the campaign at great expense, and his raids caused extensive destruction to Artaxata and Tigranocerta. Corbulo then went to his brother Pacorus in Media to launch another attack on Armenia from there. Corbulo and his army endured severe hardships, facing limited food and water and the hostility of the Armenians. He desperately tried to incite rebellions in Iran to relieve pressure on his forces. Tacitus speaks of envoys from Hyrcania who, in return for financial assistance from Corbulo, promised to prevent the advance of Vologases' forces.

Imperial Misconduct and Strategic Opportunity: Nero’s Nocturnal Outings and Vologases’ Armenian Policy

In Rome, Nero's madness escalated daily. After killing his mother, he would roam the streets and markets at night with a retinue of prostitutes and thugs, causing commotion and engaging in beatings. He would rob people's shops and property, and then auction these goods at the imperial palace the next day, forcing people to buy them. One night, a senator, whose wife Nero had severely mistreated, seized the opportunity and severely beat the emperor, then feigned sudden realization of his identity and profusely apologized. But Nero forced him to commit suicide, and from then on, he took a group of gladiators on his nightly outings for protection. He killed his pregnant wife by kicking her, then found a man who resembled her, ordered him castrated, dressed him like his wife, and married him, displaying this spectacle in the streets and markets on a floating bed before the populace. A little later, he found another man, dressed himself in women's clothes, and became his wife. One can imagine Vologases and the Iranian commanders' astonishment upon hearing these stories. However, Vologases, having suppressed his son's rebellion in 58 CE and established peace and order in the country, was now focused on his long-term plan for Armenia.

At this time, Rome sent a prince from Cappadocia named Tigranes, who had lived in Rome as a hostage for many years, to Corbulo as its puppet king for Armenia. According to Tacitus' writings, he was shallow and ungenerous, and many Armenians were disgusted with him. Despite all this, Corbulo, eager to leave Armenia as soon as possible, left Tigranes with an army and returned to Syria, while his rival Quadratus, the governor of Syria, had already passed away.

Vologases believed that if Rome realistically assessed the situation, it would find greater benefit in economic and commercial stability than in engaging in unwinnable wars. He knew Rome was in no position to wage a prolonged conflict. Moreover, he wanted to minimize the cost of war and its impact on trade and agriculture. Therefore, the best solution was a diplomatic effort, hoping that wiser minds in Rome would consider it and choose the right path.

But at that moment, he learned that Tigranes had entered Adiabene with the forces Corbulo had placed at his disposal and was plundering it. Monobazes, the king of Adiabene and an ally of Vologases, pressured him, arguing that peace could only be achieved through a show of force and that diplomatic tactics in this situation would only be interpreted as a sign of weakness. According to Tacitus, Monobazes said:

What protection should he seek? From what country? Armenia is now lost, and its neighboring countries will soon suffer the same fate. If Parthia refuses to protect her allies, then the yoke of Rome will be less burdensome on the countries that surrender than on those that fail to resist and Rome will conquer them. Tigranes is now overthrown and in exile, and now it is your silence or your limited and calculated protest to Rome that weighs on him. "Great empires do not stand by idleness—they need the challenge of armies and the rattle of swords. It is only the strength of the prince that is the measure of justice and fairness. The virtue of a family is to keep what is theirs, and the glory of a king is to seize the possessions of others."

Finally, Vologases called his senate councilors to a meeting, seating his brother Tiridates beside him. He declared, "This prince, who is my father's son, has renounced his right to the kingdom in my favor, and I have appointed him to rule Armenia, the third power of the present day. For Pacorus is now our ruler, and it seems to me that instead of jealousy and fraternal resentment, I have acted fairly and brought our hearts into harmony. And such conduct is alien to the Romans, and they have broken the peace, which they have never been able to successfully challenge. I do not deny that in order to keep what is mine, I prefer to use justice and equity rather than bloodshed. I prefer wisdom and prudence to the use of the sword and spear. But perhaps I have acted wrongly by showing hesitation, and I will not make up for this mistake by showing pride. In any case, nothing has diminished your strength and fame, and you have increased your greatness by showing tolerance, and this is not something that the chosen ones consider small, and this will be counted in the Minu." He then placed the diadem of the Armenian king upon Tiridates' head, and placed his cavalry under the command of Monobazes, with additional troops from Adiabene, entrusting them with the mission of overthrowing Tigranes. He also ordered all his vassal states to prepare for war with Rome, and he himself hastened to suppress the rebellion in Hyrcania.

Corbulo’s Proposal to Vologases for a Negotiated Settlement

Monobazes besieged Tigranocerta, the city where Tigranes of Cappadocia was installed. Vologases crushed the Hyrcanian revolt and hastened to Armenia. Corbulo wrote to Rome, requesting a new commander to defend Armenia and warning that if Vologases launched an attack with his full forces, Syria, which was in a worse position than Armenia, would have no hope of defending itself. Since Rome was in the midst of the chaos caused by Nero's recklessness, Corbulo decided to negotiate with Vologases himself. He wrote in a message to Vologases: "Now violence has come to the provinces under my command, and the cities of the allies and kings friendly to Rome are under siege. It is better that these sieges are ended, or we too will be forced to set up camp in the enemy's lands."

In 62 CE, Casperius delivered Corbulo's message to Vologases at the city of Nisibis, seventy kilometers from Tigranocerta. Rome apparently sent proposals for a détente following Corbulo's message. Tacitus believes that Corbulo did not want to tarnish his recent record of victories by suffering defeat at the hands of Vologases, and so he agreed with him that if Parthia withdrew its forces from Armenia, he would also end the siege of Tigranocerta, and Vologases could send ambassadors to Rome to obtain Rome's consent to Tiridates' kingship.

Tacitus demonstrates the wisdom of this hypothesis in the form of questions such as: "Why did the Roman army withdraw from Tigranocerta? Why did Rome abandon that city in peace, while it had defended it in war? Was it really to Rome's advantage that its troops should spend the winter in a hastily assembled camp on the slopes of Cappadocia, instead of spending the winter in the capital of a country they had just secured?"

It seems that Corbulo was able to convince Vologases of his good faith. For Vologases replied to Corbulo's message that he would send envoys to the Roman emperor to put the Armenian problem and the peace issue on a firmer footing. And so Vologases ordered Monobazes to end the siege of Tigranocerta and himself returned to Parthia.

As previously noted, Corbulo had requested that Rome appoint a new commander to oversee the defense of Armenia. The choice fell upon Lucius Caesennius Paetus, who immediately criticized Corbulo’s conduct. Paetus remarked that “he has neither shed blood nor committed any crime, and the claim that he has attacked cities is mere wordplay. The responsibility now rests with me, so that, instead of defending a nominal king, I shall impose tribute, laws, and the authority of Rome upon Armenia.”

In 62 CE, Nero's wise advisor Burrus had died, Seneca had resigned, and now Tigellinus, a "yes-man," was making decisions and re-establishing trials for trumped-up charges of treason. At this time, Vologases' envoys returned from Rome, and indeed there was no one in Rome who would pay attention to their wise suggestions. Vologases now had no choice but to fight. Paetus had marched into Armenia with two legions, intending to rebuild whatever Corbulo had not destroyed in Tigranocerta. But with the onset of winter and lack of provisions, he withdrew.

The Paetus Disaster and Mithraic Justice (62-63 CE)

Roman Command Changes and Strategic Miscalculation

The appointment of Lucius Caesennius Paetus to command Armenian operations represented a catastrophic error in Roman strategic judgment. Paetus' criticism of Corbulo's diplomatic approach—dismissing the veteran general's accomplishments as "mere wordplay"—revealed a fundamental misunderstanding of the strategic situation. His boastful declaration that he would impose "tribute, laws, and the authority of Rome upon Armenia" demonstrated the kind of imperial arrogance that Vologases had learned to exploit.

The timing of this command change coincided with significant political upheavals in Rome. The death of Burrus and Seneca's resignation removed the moderating influences that had guided Nero's early reign, while Tigellinus' ascendancy brought a return to arbitrary rule and fictitious treason trials. These developments provided Vologases with clear intelligence that Roman policy would become increasingly erratic and unreliable.

Vologases' Demonstration of Mithraic Justice

When Vologases' forces reached the Euphrates, his decision to attack Paetus rather than Corbulo represented more than military strategy—it embodied the Mithraic principle of honoring agreements with those who keep their word. Corbulo had withdrawn from Tigranocerta as promised, demonstrating good faith that Vologases reciprocated by sparing his forces. This selective targeting revealed sophisticated moral reasoning that differentiated between honorable and dishonorable opponents.

The deployment of three thousand long spearmen on the Taurus Mountains to prevent reinforcements from reaching Paetus demonstrated meticulous tactical planning. Vologases' forces created such terror among Roman troops that, according to Tacitus, even their commander "abandoned all his duties" and desperately appealed to Corbulo for salvation.

The Rhandeia Settlement

The negotiations that concluded the siege of Paetus' forces established principles that would govern Parthian-Roman relations for decades. Vologases' message to Corbulo—declaring that "Mithraic Heaven has now added an assignment worthy of the honor of the Arsacids, and that is to decide about the fate of the Roman armies"—revealed his understanding that military victory must be translated into lasting political arrangements.

The terms imposed on Paetus required complete Roman withdrawal from Armenia and the surrender of all fortresses and equipment to Parthian forces. This outcome, sealed at the Battle of Rhandeia in 63 CE, was a profound humiliation for Rome. However, Vologases' decision to humiliate rather than massacre the defeated Roman army demonstrated strategic restraint designed to achieve maximum psychological impact while avoiding unnecessary bloodshed.

The Theater of Victory

Vologases' orchestration of the Roman withdrawal revealed his profound understanding of psychological warfare's importance. By forcing Paetus to construct an unnecessary bridge over the Arsanias River, then crossing it triumphantly on a royal elephant followed by Parthian cavalry, he created a spectacle that would be remembered throughout the Roman world. The image of defeated Roman soldiers fleeing while Armenians lined the roads hurling insults provided a stark contrast to typical Roman victory celebrations.

The requirement that Paetus swear before Roman standards that no Roman army would enter Armenia until Nero accepted the peace treaty transformed military defeat into a diplomatic opportunity. This oath, witnessed by Monobazes and other allies, created legal obligations that subsequent Roman administrations would find difficult to ignore.

According to Cassius Dio, Vologases forced Paetus to build a bridge over the Arsanias River, although there was no need for it; he only wanted to demonstrate his superiority over them. Then Vologases placed Tiridates on the throne of Armenia, and he himself, as a sign of victory and authority, rode across the bridge proudly on a royal elephant, followed by the Parthian cavalry marching in unison. According to Tacitus, the bridge bore the weight of that heavy load.

Then the Roman soldiers, who according to the treaty were to leave Armenia as quickly as possible, fled in a state of mourning, while the Armenians stood on both sides of the road, shouting insults at them with clenched fists and some even physically assaulting them. They fled Armenia in haste, disorder, and disgrace. After three days, they reached Corbulo's troops, who gave them shelter. Those troops embraced each other and wept bitterly, knowing they had ruined Rome's honor.

Corbulo wrote to Rome that if Paetus had been able to hold out, the Parthians would soon have been forced to abandon the siege of Tigranocerta due to lack of supplies. But now Paetus, in the presence of witnesses whom Vologases had called, had sworn before the Roman banners and standards that no Roman army would set foot in Armenia until an envoy from Rome brought word that Nero had accepted his peace treaty.

According to Tacitus, Corbulo had told this story to add insult to injury to Paetus's defeat. Paetus begged him to combine their forces and retake Tigranocerta, now that Vologases had returned to Iran from Armenia. But Corbulo, concerned about the small number of his troops in Syria, hurried back to his headquarters.

It seems that Corbulo had been realistic and honest in his relations with Vologases, and Vologases had consistently respected him and treated him with tolerance. Yet Corbulo warned Rome that if Vologases invaded Syria, the damage to Rome would be far greater than the difficulties in Armenia. And perhaps Corbulo, who was afraid of Nero's insane games, was trying to create a haven for himself by befriending Vologases, especially at a time when Rome's fictitious trials of traitors were escalating. Perhaps it was Corbulo who had assured Vologases that Rome had no power to expand under these circumstances and that all he had to do to gain Armenia was somehow to keep the "crazy power" happy, and perhaps this would be the only cost of this investment in regaining Armenia. Vologases, who always preferred stability and economic peace to the turmoil of campaigning, was willing to entertain Nero in a sham show and return Armenia to the Parthian federal government in return.

The Coronation Diplomacy (63-66 CE)

Vologases sent envoys to Nero's court, offering that if Rome would accept his brother Tiridates' kingship, he would travel to Rome himself and receive the kingship from Nero directly.

Nero and his advisors could not reconcile Vologases' message with the report of the Battle of Paetus. All Roman troops had been driven out of Armenia, and Vologases now wanted Nero to choose his brother as king. Nero now needed a victory and a hero, and Corbulo could be the victorious hero who would bring Tiridates to Rome to receive the crown from him.

Nero appointed Corbulo to be the general of the provinces of Asia, and all the Roman puppet kings in Asia were ordered to take orders from him. When Corbulo returned to Syria, he summoned the envoys of Vologases and Tiridates, and said: "The affairs between us have not come to such a point as to necessitate a war to a bitter end. Rome has had many victories, and Parthia has had many, and both have learned lessons against self-exaltation."

And this is not only in the interest of Tiridates, who will freely take possession of a territory that has not been ruined, but Vologases will also bring to Iran the benefit of friendship with Rome, and this will be detrimental to both sides instead of the destructive path. He knows very well how much internal discord there is in his kingdom and how much resentment and anger the people under his command have. On the contrary, my emperor enjoys a stable peace everywhere, and this tension is his only challenge.

Tiridates, informed of Corbulo's plan, came to meet Corbulo, who congratulated him on choosing a conciliatory policy instead of a destructive one. After a speech in which he recalled the honor and nobility of his family, Tiridates sarcastically said, "I am going to Rome to bring Caesar a new honor - an Arsacid pretending to be a petitioner!"

It so happened that to keep Nero happy, Tiridates laid the kingdom of Armenia on the ground in front of Nero's statue and then received it from Nero in Rome. This exchange ended with a kiss. Then, a few days later, a magnificent ceremony was held: on one side, the Parthian cavalry with their national symbols and decorations, and on the other, the Roman troops with their golden eagles and banners. In the middle of the square stood the emperor's chair, and next to it stood Nero. Tiridates, after a ceremony of sacrifice and offerings, took the royal diadem and placed it at the foot of Nero's statue. Corbulo then arranged a banquet to report on his honor, and Tiridates curiously inquired about every new detail in that ceremony. Corbulo, in turn, excitedly exaggerated the importance of those symbols to impress Tiridates. Tiridates then went first to Pacorus in Media to say goodbye to his mother and brothers, and then to Vologases in Ecbatana before setting out on his long journey.

Vologases instructed Corbulo in a letter that his brother, on his journey to Rome, must be treated with the respect due to a true and powerful king and not be subjected to any indignities a vassal king might endure. He was not to be disarmed, was to be welcomed by local administrators, and was not to be kept waiting at their doors for a meeting.

At this time, due to Nero's crazy games, the Great Fire of Rome broke out in 64 AD, engulfing ten of Rome's fourteen districts for six days, three of which were completely destroyed, and in seven districts only a few half-burnt houses remained. According to Suetonius, Nero watched the fires from the top of the Tower of Maecenas. According to Cassius Dio, "he went up to the roof of the palace, from which he had a better view of the great extent of the fire, and there he sang 'The Conquest of Troy.'" According to Tacitus, "while Rome was burning he went on stage to his own play, and in a reflection of the present calamity he sang about the destruction of Troy." These stories may have been fabrications, but one thing is certain: Nero's reign was marked by instability and chaos, a stark contrast to Vologases' steady leadership.

The Great Fire of Rome in 64 AD, a catastrophic inferno that consumed swathes of the imperial city, undeniably shifted Nero's focus. It became evident that Tiridates' planned journey to Rome would have to be postponed. This delay was further compounded a year later, in 65 AD, by the accidental discovery of the "Pisonian Conspiracy" against Nero. This extensive plot involved a diverse group of prominent Romans, including the renowned Latin poet Lucan, the distinguished Roman senator Gaius Calpurnius Piso himself, a freedwoman named Epicharis, and even a prefect of the Praetorian Guard, Faenius Rufus. Their audacious plan was to assassinate Nero during one of his notorious nightly escapades with his rowdy companions, when he would be roaming and vandalizing the city streets. However, the conspiracy's premature revelation led to a brutal wave of executions and forced suicides, claiming nineteen lives, including Piso and Seneca. The punishments were swift and merciless; those who incurred Nero's wrath or jealousy received a simple note ordering them to take their own lives, ushering in a renewed reign of terror. Unfazed by the turmoil, Nero himself departed Rome to compete in the Olympic Games in Greece, where, predictably, he emerged victorious in the chariot race.

Finally, in 66 AD, Tiridates, accompanied by his wife, Queen Teti, and a formidable entourage of Parthian princes and nobles, including the sons of Vologases and Pacorus, and King Monobazes of Adiabene, was at last able to undertake the journey to Rome. A vanguard of three thousand Parthian cavalry, resplendent in shining armor and magnificent gold insignia, preceded the king himself. Once more, Vologases seized the opportunity to orchestrate a magnificent display of power. The historian Rawlinson aptly describes this as a veritable triumphal procession, traversing two-thirds of the Roman Empire. Along this extensive route, the grand procession was met with an overwhelmingly warm reception from the populace, for everyone knew that this was the very army that had secured a decisive victory at the Battle of Rhandeia, yet had come in peace, not to shame Rome, but to uphold its honor. Rome, in an effort to maintain appearances, bore the enormous cost of this journey, reportedly 800,000 sesterces per day, an astronomical sum estimated to be equivalent to approximately 140,000 U.S. dollars per day in 2017 currency.

It appears that Tiridates and his companions first met Nero in Naples. While historians remain silent on whether Nero regaled his guests with a performance, one peculiar detail of the coronation ceremony has been preserved: according to Roman custom, no one could approach the emperor while bearing arms. When Tiridates entered the imperial audience hall, the guards demanded he relinquish his sword. He steadfastly refused, citing the oath Corbulo had sworn. The Romans, ever resourceful, devised a solution: Tiridates' sword would be ceremonially nailed into its scabbard, thereby ensuring the emperor's safety without violating the spirit of the agreement. Tiridates, seemingly pleased with this compromise, readily agreed. Upon approaching the emperor, he greeted Nero according to traditional Parthian etiquette. Although Roman historians record that he addressed Nero as "sir," it is plausible that this was merely a polite formality, and his earlier refusal to draw his sword indicated his true stance: he did not genuinely consider Nero his master.

The lavish coronation of Tiridates unfolded a few days later before the awe-struck populace of Rome. Every street was meticulously adorned, and the Tiberian Guard, clad in pristine white robes and bearing boxwood branches, entered the grand hall. Imperial guards, gleaming in their polished armor and weapons, lined the processional route, while citizens thronged the rooftops of buildings overlooking the theatre, eager to witness the spectacle. Nero entered the theatre with his guard and the senators, taking his place on a magnificent throne atop a specially constructed stage. Tiridates was then introduced, and in a concise speech, he expressed his gratitude to Nero for bestowing upon him the crown of Armenia. Nero, in turn, responded with graciousness, placed the diadem upon Tiridates' head, hailed him as the King of Armenia, kissed him on the cheek, and invited him to sit on a couch beside him.

Following the formal proceedings, minstrels and singers presented a performance, with the emperor himself participating. However, the nature of his performance was more surprising than delightful; indeed, according to Cassius Dio, Tiridates found Nero's singing "very unpleasant and disgusting." Then came the exchange of gifts, with Nero bestowing upon Tiridates a colossal gift, perhaps equivalent to an astonishing 20 million U.S. dollars in 2017 money!

Tiridates subsequently returned to Armenia, now unequivocally recognized as king over a vast and fertile land. The price he paid for this kingdom was merely enduring a madman's song for a few moments and accepting immense gifts. The true victor, undoubtedly, was Vologases, who had not only secured his brother's undisputed claim to the Armenian throne but had also successfully brought that land into the sphere of Iranian influence, effectively excluding Rome. And so it was that in 67 AD, a year after the Armenian settlement, Nero dispatched an edict to Corbulo, ordering him to commit suicide. Many Western historians ponder why Tacitus remained silent regarding the motive for this harsh punishment. Even the capricious Nero perhaps realized that he had lost Armenia with considerable dishonor.

Like all tyrants throughout history, Nero ultimately met the inevitable end of his destiny. In 68 AD, Gaius Julius Vindex, the governor of Gallia Lugdunensis, revolted and declared Servius Sulpicius Galba emperor. The Roman Senate subsequently condemned Nero to death by scourging, forcing him to commit suicide. Galba, upon his ascension, attempted to recover the colossal bribes Nero had distributed to some Roman nobles. However, pervasive corruption and bribery within his own administration quickly turned public sentiment against him. Less than a year into his reign, the Praetorian Guard, swayed by promises, invited Otho to their camp and rebelled against Galba. In January 69 AD, they delivered Galba's severed head to Otho.

After Otho ascended the throne, he ordered Nero's statues to be re-erected and some of the key figures from Nero's reign to be reinstated. For there are always those who, instead of looking to the future, cling to the past and fail to understand that the disorders and ugliness they witness are the direct result of the preceding regime, and that a return to that regime would only exacerbate difficulties and solve no problems. The aftermath of any tyrannical regime invariably brings hardships, suffering, and corruption to the forefront, creating an opening for cunning swindlers and shameless tricksters to sow discontent and regret for the overthrown order.

However, Otho, who had relied too heavily on the support of the Praetorian Guard, soon discovered, to his dismay, that Vitellius had claimed the imperial throne in Germany, and that Gaul and Spain had accepted his claim. This Vitellius was the very same individual who had earlier made peace with Artabanus III on the Euphrates River, a treaty that acknowledged Persian rule over Armenia.

When Otho's forces were defeated by Vitellius's legions at Cremona in April 69 AD, Otho committed suicide, bringing his brief three-month reign to an end. The gluttonous and corpulent Vitellius ruled as emperor until October 69 AD, when his forces were swiftly defeated by Vespasian. The Roman populace then dragged Vitellius, who was attempting to hide in disguise within the imperial palace, from his refuge. His half-naked body was brutally dragged through the streets and ultimately thrown into the Tiber River—very non-barbarian indeed.

Throughout this tumultuous period, Vologases and Tiridates meticulously monitored the volatile situation in Rome. For the first time in many years of internal strife, Rome's internal struggles had provided a period of peace and prosperity for Iran.

When Vitellius became emperor in 69 AD, Vologases was displeased with this turn of events. The name Vitellius was associated with the breaking of treaties. Vologases knew well that, according to the peace treaty between Vitellius and Artabanus III, Rome was to recall its puppet king Mithridates from Armenia and relinquish any further claim to the region. Although Caligula had initially honored that treaty by capturing Mithridates and expelling him from Armenia, after Caligula's assassination, Claudius had flagrantly broken the agreement and sent Mithridates back to Armenia. This breach of treaty was an unforgivable Mithraic offense to the Arsacids, for which Vitellius was held responsible. It was for this reason that when Vespasian, the military governor of Syria, with the assistance of his allies, claimed the imperial throne and challenged Vitellius, Vologases, according to Suetonius, promised Vespasian the assistance of forty Parthian archers.

After Vespasian ascended the throne, relations between the two empires significantly improved. Vespasian, like Vologases, was eager to expand trade relations and sought to integrate the Roman road system with the imperial roads leading to the Persian Gulf and India. When Titus, Vespasian's son, successfully conquered Jerusalem and brought an end to the Jewish revolt, he traveled to Zeugma on the Euphrates River to thank Vologases for his assistance to his father. Vologases, in turn, celebrated Titus's victory with a gift of gold coins.

In 72 AD, Paetus, now promoted to governor of Syria, reported to Vespasian that he had uncovered a conspiracy. According to Paetus, Vologases and Antiochus IV, king of the Roman vassal state of Commagene, were allegedly plotting to bring Commagene under Iranian influence.

Perhaps Vologases still harbored resentment from his earlier defeat in Armenia and sought to establish a new reputation for himself. On the other hand, the Parthians consistently maintained contact with the countries of Asia Minor, hoping to secure the Mediterranean borders of Iran, and thus Paetus's concerns may not have been entirely unfounded. According to this alleged plan, Samosata, the capital of Commagene, with its narrow passage on the Euphrates River, would become a strategic base for Parthia to annex Cappadocia, Cilicia, and Syria to its empire.

Vespasian granted Paetus full authority, and he immediately attacked Commagene with the support of the armies of Chalcis and Emesa, two minor Roman puppet states. Antiochus fled to Cilicia, and Vologases refused to actively assist Antiochus's sons, merely offering them refuge in Iran. He wrote to Vespasian, requesting forgiveness for the Commagenian princes. For Vespasian, the value of a stable relationship with Vologases was paramount enough to accept his guarantee and pardon the two Commagenian princes. The two princes were summoned to Rome, where Vespasian allocated a substantial stipend for their upkeep.

In 75 AD, the Alans, a Scythian people from the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, allied with the Hyrcanians and launched a devastating invasion of Iran. They first swept into Media, forcing Pacorus to flee to the mountainous heights. Then they invaded Armenia, defeating Tiridates in a fierce, hand-to-hand battle. Vologases sent a desperate message to Vespasian, pleading for his help, as this threat from the Scythians was a common danger for both empires. However, Vespasian refused to intervene, despite his younger son Domitian's eagerness to aid Iran with an army.

Many historians attribute Domitian's desire to jealousy of his brother's achievements. Yet, it is also plausible that he recognized the strategic importance of maintaining a stable and peaceful trade base, understanding that the Scythians posed as significant a threat to Rome as they did to Iran. Ultimately, Vologases was able to drive the Alans out of Media and Armenia, but Hyrcania continued to be a rebellious province.

Vologases I died in 78 AD, having ruled for approximately 27 years since his undisputed ascension. He was succeeded by his son, Pacorus II. Pacorus inherited the peace and stability his father had painstakingly established in the country and went on to rule a prosperous kingdom for thirty years.

Cultural and Religious Contributions

Administrative and Cultural Reforms

Vologases I’s replacement of Greek script with Aramaic on coinage, coupled with the restoration of ancient Iranian toponyms in place of Hellenized names, marked a decisive assertion of Parthian cultural autonomy. Numismatic evidence—particularly bronze tetradrachms struck at Seleucia-on-the-Tigris—bears Aramaic legends beginning in the mid-50s AD, replacing the Greek inscriptions that had dominated since Seleucid rule. These issues often depict the king wearing the traditional Arsacid tiara, with reverse designs maintaining Hellenistic compositional balance but reframed with Iranian royal symbolism.

This reform was not mere antiquarianism. It reflected a calculated rebalancing: retaining the administrative efficiency and artistic sophistication influenced by Hellenism while subordinating them to a self-consciously Iranian imperial identity. By embedding these changes into widely circulated coinage and public inscriptions, Vologases communicated an unambiguous political message both to his subjects and to Rome—that the Arsacid monarchy was the custodian of Iranian tradition.

The Avestan Collection Project

Later Zoroastrian tradition, as preserved in the Dēnkard (Book IV, Ch. 20), attributes to Vologases I a comprehensive initiative to collect and systematize the scattered Avestan scriptures—both written texts and oral liturgical transmissions—that had been disrupted since Alexander's conquests. Although the Dēnkard represents a late Sasanian/early Islamic Zoroastrian compendium (9th–10th centuries CE) compiled centuries after Vologases I's reign, it preserves valuable traditions concerning earlier Parthian and Achaemenid rulers. These narratives, however, are inevitably filtered through the ideological perspective of the Sasanian priesthood, which often portrayed the Arsacids unfavorably due to their tolerance of Mithraic-influenced religious practices.

Despite this interpretive bias, the Dēnkard's attribution of an Avestan compilation project to Vologases I remains historically plausible, consonant with the Arsacid dynasty's well-documented commitment to Iranian cultural revival. The very fact that Sasanian sources—fundamentally hostile to Mithraism—nonetheless credit a Parthian ruler with safeguarding the Avesta lends this tradition considerable credibility, transcending its polemical context. The project likely operated from administrative centers in Media and Persis under the supervision of high-ranking magi, with imperial patronage providing essential resources for transcription, collation, and regional dissemination.

Significantly, the compiled material incorporated not only the canonical gāthās but also pre-Zoroastrian ritual hymns, particularly those connected to ancient Mithraic traditions. This deliberate inclusiveness reflects the syncretic religious landscape characteristic of Arsacid domains, where diverse spiritual traditions coexisted and intermingled. Vologases' decision to integrate these archaic hymns reveals a sophisticated political strategy: by preserving and legitimizing ancient traditions revered by powerful aristocratic houses—particularly in Armenia, Atropatene, and eastern Iran—he strengthened his spiritual authority while fostering cultural cohesion throughout his empire. Through this approach, he skillfully bridged Iran's profound religious heritage with emerging Zoroastrian orthodoxy, ensuring continuity with the past while reinforcing a unifying imperial ideology.

Christian Communities Under Vologases

Evidence for Christian presence in Parthian territory during Vologases’ reign is fragmentary but consistent across textual and material sources:

• Syriac Traditions: The Chronicle of Arbela and later Nestorian writings claim that bishops were active in Edessa, Arbela, and Nisibis by the mid-1st century AD, often linked to the missionary journeys of the Apostle Thomas or his disciples.

• Acts of the Apostles (2:9): This text lists "Parthians, Medes, and Elamites" among the earliest recipients of the Christian message at Pentecost, implying that by the 50s AD, the faith had adherents within the empire’s western satrapies.

• Archaeology: In the Dura-Europos region—then under intermittent Parthian influence before Rome’s permanent occupation—burial patterns dated to the late 1st century show iconographic markers consistent with early Christian identity, suggesting tolerated or unnoticed practice.

• Political Climate: Vologases’ priorities lay in securing Armenia and countering Roman incursions, not in religious uniformity. The Parthian model of decentralized satrapal governance left considerable autonomy in local religious affairs, allowing minority faiths—including Christianity—to function without systematic persecution.

No direct evidence indicates formal imperial patronage for Christianity, but the absence of documented suppression during his reign stands in marked contrast to later Sasanian policies. This suggests a default policy of pragmatic religious tolerance, so long as a sect posed no political challenge.

Numismatic Plate 

Conclusion: The Achievement of Vologases I

Vologases I's twenty-seven-year reign represents a masterpiece of strategic leadership that transformed Parthian-Roman relations from destructive conflict to managed competition. His greatest achievement lay not in military victories, impressive though they were, but in his recognition that diplomatic solutions could achieve more lasting results than conquest alone. By combining selective military intervention with patient negotiation, he secured Parthian objectives while avoiding the catastrophic costs of prolonged warfare.

The Armenian settlement established under Vologases created a template for Parthian-Roman coexistence that would endure for decades. His success in installing Tiridates as a legitimately recognized Armenian king while maintaining Parthian influence demonstrated that skillful diplomacy could accomplish what military force alone could not achieve. The transformation of military victory into ceremonial Roman triumph, while maintaining substantive Parthian gains, revealed diplomatic sophistication rarely matched in ancient international relations.

Perhaps most significantly, Vologases demonstrated that effective leadership in a multipolar world required not just military strength but also cultural vision and moral authority. His Mithraic approach to international relations—honoring agreements with those who kept their word while punishing those who violated them—established principles of conduct that elevated Parthian prestige throughout the known world.

When Vologases died in 78 CE, he bequeathed to his son Pacorus II not only a stable and prosperous kingdom but also a diplomatic framework that would serve Parthian interests for generations. His reign stands as testimony to the proposition that true strategic success requires not just the capacity to wage war effectively, but the wisdom to recognize when peace serves one's interests better than continued conflict. In an age dominated by military conquest and imperial expansion, Vologases I proved that diplomatic mastery could achieve more lasting victories than the sword alone.